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FIELD MANUAL

STABILITY OPERATIONS—INTELLIGENCE

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., *28 August 1972*

STABILITY OPERATIONS-INTELLIGENCE

FM 30–31, 8 January 1970, is changed as follows:

1. This change reflects new or revised doctrine and procedures for intelligence personnel engaged in internal defense and internal development operations.

2. New or changed material is indicated by a star.

3. Remove old pages and insert new pages as indicated below.

Remove Pages	*Insert Pages*
1–1, 1–2	1–1, 1–2, 1–2.1
2–1, 2–2, 2–5, and 2–6	2–1, 2–2, 2–2.1, 2–5, 2–6, and 2–6.1
5–3, 5–4	5–3, 5–4
8–3, 8–4	8–3, 8–4, 8–5
10–1	

4. File this change sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Section I. GENERAL

★1–1. Purpose and Scope

★*a.* This manual provides guidance on doctrine, tactics, and techniques for intelligence support to US Army stability operations. It is intended for use by commanders, staff officers, and intelligence specialists. It is applicable to major commands and subordinate units and will serve as guidance for intelligence planning, training, and operations (unilateral and combined).

★*b.* This manual addresses intelligence requirements in support of US Army stability operations, encompassing US internal defense and internal development assistance operations where US personnel advise, assist, and train host country (HC) military intelligence personnel. For this reason, the scope is not limited entirely to stability operations but includes a description of the overall internal defense intelligence system, its management, and its unique aspects in stability operations, including those involving collection and production agencies. A discussion of intelligence training requirements for stability operations and a proposed intelligence training program also have been incorporated in this manual.

★*c.* The contents of this manual are based on the broad guidance and doctrine found in FM 100–20, FM 31–22, and FM 31–23. The manual applies primarily to Army forces employed in internal defense and internal development operations. FM 30–5 contains the established conventional intelligence doctrine for—

(1) Nuclear and nonnuclear environments.

(2) Chemical, biological, and radiological environments.

★*d.* Guidance on doctrine, tactics, and techniques for intelligence interrogation, counterintelligence operations, and aerial surveillance and reconnaissance operations in support of stability operations is contained in FM 30–15, FM 30–17, FM 30–20, and FM 32–10.

★*e.* Additional information on intelligence activities in stability operations may be obtained from the following sources:

	FM 30–5	Combat Intelligence
	FM 30–17	Counterintelligence Operations
(C)	FM 30–17A	Counterintelligence Special Operations (U)
(S)	FM 30–18	Intelligence Collection Operations (U)
(S)	FM 30–31A	Stability Operations-Intelligence Collection (U)
	FM 31–16	Counterguerrilla Operations
	FM 31–22	US Army Counterinsurgency Forces
(S)	FM 31–22A	US Army Counterinsurgency Forces (U)
	FM 31–23	Stability Operations, US Army Doctrine
	FM 31–73	Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations
	FM 33–1	Psychological Operations, US Army Doctrine
	FM 33–5	Psychological Operations, Techniques and Procedures
	FM 41–10	Civil Affairs Operations

★1–2. Recommended Changes

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations to improve its clarity or accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications), and forwarded direct

to the Commanding Officer, US Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613. Originators of proposed changes constituting significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General, USACDC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060. This action will facilitate review and followup.

★1–3. Definitions

The terminology used in this manual is consistent with terminology contained in AR 310–25, FM 31–23, and FM 100–20.

Section II. BACKGROUND

★1–4. General

★*a.* Recent history has been characterized by the frequent occurrences of insurgencies which have usually taken place in developing and/or emerging nations as a result of having obtained independent status from a Colonial power. Frequently, such insurgencies have been Communist inspired or have become subversive in nature as Communist elements manage to gain control of the movement and its leadership and exploit the movement for their own purposes. Any forecast of the future must consider the probable further spread of insurgencies among other newly-emerging and developing nations of the world.

★*b.* Insurgencies usually develop when discontent among the population of a country is not alleviated by appropriate government action. Governments, perhaps unwittingly, may not respond to such discontent in time to prevent its development into real or imagined grievances. Skillful agitators may capitalize on existing conditions and develop grievances when none originally existed. With organization and leadership, growing discontent within a country may develop into insurgency. (See appendix E for Insurgent Activity Indicators.)

★*c.* An insurgency is often used as a tool to achieve power by the use of military, political, economic, sociological, and psychological means in an integrated attack on weak governments. Insurgency must be properly recognized as a major form of political/military conflict often requiring a major commitment of effort for successful resolution. The main objectives of insurgencies are the control of the people and the destruction and replacement of the existing government. A combination of persuasion and frequent terrorism is used to gain control of the people while the government is destroyed by subversion, sabotage, and, if necessary, armed conflict. In recent years the Communists have instigated or supported insurgencies in many parts of the world as a means of expanding their sphere of influence and/or control.

★1–5. United States Policy

★*a.* The United States has long viewed an international community of independent, stable, peaceful, progressive, and free nations as the best guarantee of its own security. For this reason the United States Government has undertaken to assist, upon request, certain newly-emerging nations in their development toward political stability and economic and social progress. Many of these nations, however, are confronted with latent, incipient, or active insurgencies which inhibit their national growth and often threaten their very existence. Such nations seek and receive internal defense and development assistance from the United States and other allies to protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency as well as to free them from conditions which foster this unrest and instability.

★*b.* In response to requests for internal defense and development assistance, the United States provides selected nations a wide range of assistance through its various governmental agencies and private enterprise. However, the assistance provided is predicated upon the requirement that any country whose security is threatened and who requests assistance must assume primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its own defense. US Army resources may vary from provision of a few selected advisors to provision of combat support and combat service support elements.

★*c.* Internal defense involves all measures taken by a government to free its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. While these measures will most probably involve some form of military participation, internal defense is not purely a military operation. Political, economic, and sociological factors influence military operations at all levels. Consequently, all US military intelligence personnel and agencies and their host

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country counterparts are confronted with many intelligence tasks which must be accomplished if stability operations are to make a valuable contribution to the success of the overall internal defense and internal development effort.

★1–6. The Nature of the Insurgency

★*a. General.* In order to contribute to the destruction of insurgency, the military intelligence staff officer and military intelligence specialists must have a thorough understanding of the evolutionary development of insurgent movements. While the nature of insurgencies varies in some respects from country to country, certain patterns and similarities have been discerned. (See appendix E for Insurgent Activity Indicators.) Three frequently overlapping phases have been utilized as an aid in analyzing insurgencies. They are discussed in *b* through *d* below.

★*b. Phase I. Subversion.*

★(1) Phase I insurgency varies from situations in which subversive activity is only a potential threat to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with rising frequency in an organized pattern. Subversive activities are those actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength of a regime. No major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity occurs during this phase. The beginnings of an insurgency are difficult to recognize. Insurgent activities may appear as one of many legitimate party activities or movements, such as loyal opposition or social or religious reform. However, during this development period, when forces of the movement are few, resources limited, and organization and leadership uncertain, the insurgency is most susceptible to counteraction. Although each particular

insurgency will develop in its own way, a general pattern providing clues to its progress will exist.

(2) Grievances, whether real or imagined, will exist together with a lack of faith in the ability or desire of the government to improve conditions. A leadership appears which is capable of crystallizing this discontent into an impulse for action. An organization is established that is capable of planning, coordinating, and executing actions. If the organization is outlawed, it goes underground and continues to function. Equipment and supplies are stockpiled and hidden. Production or fabrication facilities are established for future use. Such diverse items as food, firearms, communications-electronics equipment, drugs, leaflets, clothing, and fuel may be stockpiled, locally or in adjacent countries. Literature is distributed and speeches are presented to arouse the population and incite unlawful actions. Strikes, work stoppages, demonstrations, parades, and other actions occur in the hope of intimidating the government and further alienating the people from the government. Riots and mass actions (which include violence) are planned to increase the vehemences of feeling, to further intimidate the government, or to goad the government into responses which will alienate the people. Martyrs may be created in the process.

(3) An attempt often will be made to overthrow the government through mass demonstrations and riots. Overthrow of the government is easier if the insurgents gain adherents among the government elements, the military, the police, or among other powerful government officials. The insurgents may temporarily settle for achievement of some amount of representation within the government in the belief that the remainder of government leadership could be purged at a later date. Insurgent effort at this stage usually is oriented against the existing government rather than toward the population. If the insurgency is not successful and develops into Phase II—additional organizational effort is required in preparation for the ensuing long hard struggle.

c. Phase II: Guerrilla Warfare.

(1) Phase II occurs when the insurgent movement, having developed sufficient organization, leadership, and local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare and related forms of violence against the established authority. The insurgents concentrate their efforts toward the people whom they must win over to gain more support in the struggle.

(2) The insurgents embark upon a long range effort to alienate the people from the government and to prevent the government from maintaining law and order and continuing nation-building programs. The basic strategy is to force the government to do everything everywhere at once so that its means will be more quickly dissipated. The insurgents will concentrate their efforts to gain startling local successes at times and places of their own choosing by enticing the government to spread itself thinly across the land. They will seek to exploit every government weakness and to undermine or circumvent every government strength. If the insurgency continues, the insurgents will seek to interrupt and frustrate the nation-building process while pointing to the government's lack of progress in this area as proof of government incompetence or insincerity. Likewise, the insurgents attack public safety and attempt to break down effective law and order. This breakdown of law and order is very important to the rate of spread of the insurgency. It creates doubts concerning the government's ability to perform its functions, injects fear into the minds of people who want to support the government, and encourages the active or passive support of the insurgency on the part of persons who fear for their own safety or who wish to be on the side of the eventual winner of the struggle. The breakdown of effective law and order, provides the proper climate for successful insurgency.

(3) Expansion into more violent and criminal acts against the government and the people requires the formation of local militia-type military elements to engage in open guerrilla warfare. The leadership element of the movement and the mass of the insurgent organization will continue to remain hidden. This part of the movement has been compared to the submerged portion of an iceberg while the militia forces constitute the portion visible above the surface of the water. Military elements are used to accelerate the spread of the underground organization, while the underground in turn accelerates the building of the militia forces. The underground portion of the movement directs political activities, consolidates control of the populace, and reestablishes militia forces when they are destroyed. The general pattern of the insurgency during this stage is apparent in the following activities:

(*a*) Acts of sabotage will occur against selected public and private facilities and will increase in magnitude and frequency.

(*b*) Terrorism will spread and become se-

lective in order to demonstrate to the people the merits of cooperation with the insurgent movement.

(*c*) Small bands of guerrillas appear in the countryside, particularly where the forces for law and order are weak and where the basic grievances against the government are most pronounced.

(*d*) Guerrilla bases (e.g., safe havens, storage points, training centers) begin to appear.

(*e*) The pattern of gerrilla activity will indicate that insurgent infiltration of the government has occurred and that the underground is spreading its influence.

(*f*) Guerrillas will attempt to infiltrate radio stations for the purpose of broadcasting propaganda.

d. Phase III: War of Movement. The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority. By this time regular type military forces have been organized on a regional and sometimes nationwide basis. The forces are larger and better equipped than the militia although they often continue to use unconventional guerrilla tactics in their military operations. The insurgents continue to expand and perfect their military organization and tactical capabilities in order to eventually achieve the capability of standing up to the government in open combat. When strong enough, the insurgent forces may not always flee and hide from government military forces, but may delay in position for considerable periods of time and even deny entry to particular areas to all but the very strongest of government forces. Eventually, the insurgent may engage the government forces in a decisive campaign, or the insurgents may establish complete control in some portion of the country and seek international recognition and the status of belligerency for their government. The general pattern of activities and achievements during this phase includes the following:

(1) Insurgent military forces, armed with more sophisticated weapons and possessing improved means of communication and transportation, will operate in larger units than previously.

(2) Insurgent activities involving both small and large unit operations will become bolder and of longer duration.

(3) Insurgent ability to coordinate many dispersed activities and to react quickly to dangers or to exploit opportunities will increase.

(4) Insurgent control of land areas will spread and the numbers and sizes of base areas will increase.

(5) Foreign support of the insurgents may increase in volume and may become overt.

(6) The insurgent political organization map surface and appeal for international recognition. Quick support of this movement by foreign countries who have been sponsoring the insurgency can be expected.

1–7. The Dynamics of Insurgency

a. The insurgency may not pass through each of the three mentioned stages (para 1–6*b*–*d*). When large elements of trained military and paramilitary forces of the government are converted to the insurgent cause, the insurgent leadership may have the necessary strength to challenge the remainder of the government forces in open battle. The insurgents may train a well-equipped combat force in foreign sanctuary and, thus, move quickly into Phase III with little or no Phase II effort. Furthermore, different phases may occur simultaneously in different parts of the host country.

b. The insurgent leadership can reduce the level of intensity quickly and temporarily for tactical advantage. Such action may be taken to confuse the government, to make government efforts appear ridiculous in the eyes of the people or to reduce government pressure. Such action, however, may undermine the confidence of the supporters of the insurgency and be interpreted as a favorable government accomplishment by the people. Insurgent leadership, in retaining flexibility and in view of the situation, may find it necessary to regress from Phase III to II, or from II to I.

c. The insurgency can be defeated at any stage of its development. However, the earlier resolute internal defense and development programs are established, the easier the insurgency can be prevented or destroyed. All insurgent movements have exploitable weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Energetic nation-building programs combined with sound internal security measures can produce an environment in which it will be impossible for insurgent activities to continue. (Nation building involves a complex of interdependent economic, psychological, political, and social changes. It includes the development of the economic substructure necessary to meet the material needs of the people. It consists of the development of a social organiza-

tion wherein people work in unity to achieve common goals. This means, in many cases, a change in habits, loyalties, and thought processes of people.)

d. It should be noted that several insurgencies may exist simultaneously in the same country and may operate at cross purposes to each other because each may desire to control a single national movement. Each movement seeks to demonstrate its own particular superiority over others. Consequently, any one insurgent effort may be less apt to take antigovernment actions that could benefit other movements. A situation of this type offers many possibilities for government exploitation. When the insurgents lack the means to force a final decision and the government is equally incapable or disinclined to defeat the insurgents, the movement may continue over a number of years. Such a situation is particularly characteristic of movements by minority groups which are seeking to separate from the established state.

CHAPTER 2

THE ENVIRONMENT

Section I. THE INSURGENT ARMED ELEMENTS

★2-1. General

★*a.* With the possible exception of the leaders, the insurgent is likely to be poorly educated and a part of the underprivileged group of a nation. The low standard of living to which he is accustomed has adapted him to privations. Although he can be well-trained and disciplined, he will normally require strong leadership and supervision. He is intimately familiar with the terrain on which he fights and has learned to use it to his best advantage. His knowledge of the area and its people together with his skill at melding into his surroundings generally keeps him from having to fight pitched battles. He is almost always a native of the country, and he generally relies on the populace for supplies, information, and other support. Outwardly, he is usually indistinguishable from the populace; he has the potential of hiding his weapon and melding into his environment.

★*b.* During the early stages of an insurgency (latter portion of Phase I and during Phase II), the insurgent's tactics emphasize a "hit-and-run" technique; he masses sufficiently to insure success, hits his target where least expected, and disperses immediately thereafter. The insurgent relies on flexibility and the use of surprise to compensate for his lack of numbers and equipment. His tactical doctrine demands that the initiative be maintained. The insurgent doctrine further requires that his intelligence be comprehensive and accurate, for intelligence is considered the key to success. If unexpected resistance is encountered during an operation, the mission is aborted and foreseeable defeat precluded. Movement normally is accomplished during the hours of darkness or during other conditions of poor visibility. The insurgent keeps his operations simple, thus reducing considerably the burdens of administration and logistics. In Phase III (war of movement), the guerrilla will and must accept battle in a relatively conventional scale, and "hit-and-run" tactics are deemphasized.

★*c.* The insurgent often is highly motivated because of the nature of the cause for which he is fighting, excellent leadership, or because of the intensive and continual political indoctrination he receives which promises relief from real or imagined grievances and injustices. If the insurgent's tactics are successful, his morale will remain at a relatively high level, particularly in the early phases of an insurgency. The insurgent may or may not be a Communist. The nature or directions of the insurgent cause may or may not have a connection with a Communist cause and may or may not in fact be connected with communism. In the case of a Communist supported or instigated insurgency, the individual insurgent may not even know whether or not the Communists are supporting his effort for their own purposes.

d. The individual insurgent is distinguished chiefly by his skill at his own sort of fighting, his superb knowledge of the environment in which he lives and fights, and his devotion to the insurgent ideal or cause. It must be remembered, however, that the validity of any generalities concerning the insurgents will vary with the state or degree of education, training, organization, equipment, and leadership which exists in the country concerned. Insurgent regular force units may be introduced into the conflict in the late Phase II or early Phase III stages of the insurgency. The organization and mission of these forces may closely approximate the characteristic of conventional forces.

★2-2. Organization

★*a.* At the heart of some insurgency movements, a tightly disciplined party organization may be found, structured to parallel the existing governmental organizations. In most instances this structure will consist of committee organizations at

levels paralleling the existing legitimate political structure. Intermediate echelons may be deleted from the party structure if the party leadership believes that it can adequately supervise and coordinate the activities of subordinate committees from a national level. (See appendix B for an example of a Communist insurgent organization.)

☆*b.* During a latent insurgency, the demands placed upon a typical political party, so far as administration and tactical adaptability are concerned, warrant a relatively simple internal political organization. The party organization could consist of little more than the committee system itself, plus such agencies or specialized personnel as might be required for intelligence collection, agitation, propaganda, and occasional strong-arm activities. As the insurgency develops, however, the need to establish a mass civil organization and a military force dictates the creation of new echelons of authority and new organizations to accommodate them. Details concerning a type insurgent organization can be found in appendix B.

☆2–3. Command and Staff

a. The insurgent military organization is austere and its structure simple. An actual physical installation for a headquarters may be nonexistent or of the most primitive type. The headquarters personnel often fight alongside the rank and file of the military force. The staff structure is often informal, but individuals within the force are assigned to perform roughly the same functions required of any military staff. Differences between staff functions necessary in insurgent force organizations and conventional force organizations generally are as follows:

☆(1) The insurgents generally place little emphasis on the broad spectrum of personnel functions, however, recruitment and replacement do receive significant attention. The personnel records maintained are limited, and the required administration is conducted informally. The insurgent personnel functions dealing with discipline and morale are politically oriented.

(2) The intelligence function, on the other hand, receives even more attention in insurgent units than in many conventional military units. This is due to the clandestine, conspiratorial way in which insurgents must live and operate.

☆(3) Insurgent planning often emphasizes areas outside normal tactical planning. Even at local levels the party chapter often maintains formalized sections dealing with long-range interests, such as youth affairs, agriculture, civilian proselyting, and materiel procurement. General, long-range strategic planning usually is performed by the secret directing apparatus. The results of this long-range planning are usually transmitted to the individual insurgent force in the form of written orders. Operations are characterized by surprise, swift attack, and rapid dispersal, and usually occur under conditions of reduced visibility. Much of the tactical training takes place during actual operations, but considerable attention is given at small unit level to pre-attack rehearsals. Ideological indoctrination receives a high degree of emphasis whenever the insurgents reach a relatively safe position.

☆(4) Insurgent military forces often have a much less sophisticated logistics system than conventional forces. When the insurgents are supplied through clandestine channels, the supply problem may be complicated by the need for security; however, supply operations are made as simple as possible. Insurgent military forces rely on the people for logistical support and also obtain supplies or equipment by successful attacks on government forces or from external support provided by a sponsoring power.

(5) Insurgents may have an immediate and near total dependence on close and continuous contact with the population. Winning population support is the key to success or failure of an insurgency. Civilian proselyting sections or equivalent organizational elements are continually engaged in extensive political activities.

(6) Special staff activities of the insurgent armed elements can range from the austere to the complex. While medical care is often scarce and primitive, extensive field hospital facilities may still be found. Construction is kept simple or avoided when possible. It is possible, however, that the insurgents will establish vast tunnel networks and underground facilities. Other insurgent activities may be highly sophisticated. Financing, for example, can attain a degree of complexity that includes formal taxation, issuance of war bonds, and the printing of money.

(7) Insurgent communication will vary from the use of couriers to modern radios. The communication nets will be relatively simple in operations and procedures in the initial stages of insurgency. Subsequent stages normally will evidence more sophistication.

☆*b.* One of the major characteristics of leadership in an insurgency is its high quality and ex-

treme degree of loyalty to the movement. This key leadership is often provided by foreign powers for operations in the specific insurgency being developed. When a recognized major insurgent force leader lacks a military background, a sponsoring power may infiltrate qualified personnel to serve as his military and technical advisors. By so doing, the military capabilities of the insurgent force are exploited effectively without destroying the command structure of the established organization. Replacement of local leadership with personnel from outside the area, however, may create exploitable morale and disciplinary problems. Often, promising native leadership candidates are recruited, trained over extended periods of time, and then returned to

their natural locale to assume responsibilities in the insurgent organization. Successful insurgent campaigns invariably have been characterized by intelligent and dedicated leadership.

2–4. Tactical Advantages

a. The advantages which insurgents hold in fighting against conventional forces arise from the nature, composition, and organization of the insurgent forces, as well as from the situations in which they operate. These strengths, or advantages, generally can be divided into two categories —operations and intelligence.

b. The operational advantages of insurgents include mobility, elusiveness, and flexibility.

(1) The small number of guerrilla forces and the lack of heavy equipment usually enhance their ground mobility. Because they have little equipment which they cannot carry with them, headquarters units can be moved readily. Their lack of vehicles does not hinder them, for they usually operate in areas not favorable to vehicular traffic. Their intimate knowledge of the terrain allows them to easily frustrate pursuers by choosing routes especially difficult or hazardous for the opposing, often road-bound, government forces.

(2) Unless modern communications equipment is obtained from outside sources or as a result of capture of government equipment or equipment from other sources, the insurgents usually rely on couriers or primitive signals for communications. Examples of primitive signals are the opening and closing of windows, the location of tethered animals, or the arrangement of laundry on rocks, bushes, and clotheslines. These signals are difficult for outsiders to detect, since they blend so completely with the environment. Furthermore, they are quite flexible. The signal which serves one day as a danger signal may be an all-clear signal the next day.

(3) Insurgents are usually native to the areas in which they fight and have many contacts among the population. Thus, many of the populace can be expected to serve as sources of information and warning, as well as provide members of the insurgent forces with hiding places, food, and cover stories. This permits insurgent forces to disband and merge with the civilian population when necessary. The headquarters equipment and records, along with weapons, may be cached while the insurgents are not active, using their knowledge of the area and the help of the people to elude their opponents.

(4) When operating independently as small units, the insurgent forces are extremely flexible. They formulate short-range goals based on targets of opportunity or react to immediate necessity. This flexibility permits the insurgents to adapt to changing situations. They lose much of this flexibility, however, when fighting in coordinated, larger scaled actions. This loss of capability is brought about by the generally slow and primitive communications systems which do not facilitate rapid tactical adjustment to changing battlefield situations. Thus, commitment of component elements of larger units often is based on detailed, preconceived plans rather than on the tactical needs of the situation.

c. Although the staff structure of the intelligence section of the insurgent armed elements may be rudimentary, usually an excellent information collection capability exists. The fact that the daily life of an insurgent is clandestine emphasizes to each individual the need for information collection and security. The insurgent main forces normally maintain close coordination with guerrilla and local force units to obtain intelligence. In addition, the insurgent regular forces collect, produce, and disseminate this same intelligence in a manner similar to that of conventional military forces.

2–5. The Base Area System

a. The insurgent must have resources, facilities, and routes of communication, but, when the government armed force is relatively strong compared to the insurgent force, the insurgent must design a system which makes him less vulnerable to government attack. The insurgent solution is the development of a base area system.

b. A base area is an element of a system of urban and rural bases tied together into a functioning whole by a network of roads, paths, communications, couriers, and radio links. This system may extend to neighboring countries and may remain in use throughout the insurgency. It has flexibility so that the loss of a singular base or section does not jeopardize or compromise the entire system. It provides lodging and rest areas for units in motion, cached supplies of food and munitions, routes, communications, transit points, staging areas, and medical facilities. In the more remote regions, facilities for training and for weapons manufacture and repair are included. The urban insurgent has all these services around him and requires only minimal other facilities

such as a basement or small cache site. On the other hand, the secretive movement of bodies of troops, the need for assembly areas, the span of time required to mass foot-mobile elements, and the need for communications systems to relay orders and intelligence require a labyrinth of resources, areas, and control. The routes are an organic part of the overall system. They do not necessarily connect by the shortest route, but rather, by a secure one.

c. In order to maintain sustained operations, a base area is obviously necessary. Further, because the population is the object of the insurgency, the base area system must allow access to the population and must, sooner or later, incorporate populated areas, the so-called "liberated areas." Once the insurgency is underway, the government and the insurgent are competing for the same resources. The effect of this competition on the government is powerful. If resources accrue to the insurgent, the relative strength ratio between the government and the insurgent changes significantly. The base area system is far more elaborate and complex than is normally realized. While myths grow about secret bases in remote mountainous areas and impenerable jungles, the primary operating system functions within and near the populated areas where support and assistance is provided as a result of the insurgents' carefully prepared plan to avoid prolonged conflict. The configuration of the terrain is used to advantage, particularly those features which handicap government forces. While the insurgent fighting unit may have both time and manpower, when it fights, it does so in or near a base area, wherein any given tactical engagement, it is generally bound by time and space limitations. It is therefore imperative to the insurgents' survival to avoid decisive engagement with superior government forces unless his battlefield has been thoroughly prepared. Tedious hours are spent on plans and rehearsals for attack, withdrawal and counterattacks. Positions are prepared well in advance and thoroughly camouflaged. These elaborate preparations require a scale of manpower available only in the local population. When he has support of the population, he enjoys decided advantages over the government forces, particularly in the field of intelligence. To a large extent, therefore, the relatively high degree of mobility of the insurgent is dependent on the base area systems.

Section II. WEATHER

2–6. General

A wide variation of climatic and weather conditions may be found among developing nations. The economics, customs, and traditions of developing nations are strongly influenced by climatic conditions. For example, in some areas of the world, a rainy season extending over a number of months adversely affects the economy. During this period little, if anything, is done to improve economic conditions or to satisfy the basic needs of the society. Lethargy may be prevalent among the people and their leaders. On the other hand, in some areas of the world, the rainy season makes possible the planting and growing of basic food crops. In these areas the wet season is a boon to the economy.

2–7. Considerations

a. Tropical or hot and arid climates are characteristic of many counties which are considered as likely areas of insurgency. Tropical-type weather gives a particular advantage to an insurgency. It usually permits the insurgent to live off the land the year around and minimizes the effects of exposure. Because the insurgent fights when and where he chooses, he can exploit the effects of weather and use such effects to his advantage. Harvest time, whether once or twice a year, influences both the insurgency and internal defense operations. The production of food is important and large forces are often required for harvesting as well as protecting the harvest. The internal defense target analyst must consider these factors in determining such objectives as when to destroy the insurgent's food crops.

b. Many likely areas of insurgency have two predominant seasons—dry and rainy. This permits more accurate and reliable long-range weather forecasting. It also requires constant reevaluation of terrain trafficability because terrain which may support tank traffic during the dry season may not even support human traffic during the rainy season.

c. A weather advantage enjoyed by the insurgent, for example, will appear to opposing forces as a disadvantage and an increase in the number of nonflying days or days in which vision will be limited to some degree. The impact of these nonflying days, or days of limited visibility, will directly affect the use of visual observation by the opposing forces and, in so doing, increase the reliance which must be placed on other sensory

★means. Since climatic conditions vary from nation to nation, National Intelligence Summaries, area handbooks, and USAF Air Weather Service climatic summaries should be consulted to determine the details of weather and climatic extremes which will affect the employment of US forces and planning assistance programs to the host country. Also, special climatic studies for specific countries, areas, or operations can be obtained upon request through the command Weather Officer from the USAF Air Weather Service.

★*d.* Hot and extremely humid weather may weaken personnel and have an adverse affect on materiel. Hot, dry climates in desert areas may also have weakening effects on personnel and present serious problems in equipment maintenance. Health hazards, such as malaria, dysentery, parasitic infections, and others, present additional difficulties.

Section III. TERRAIN

2–8. General

★*a.* Insurgent forces exploit the geographical, as well as the political, sociological, economic, and psychological conditions of the environment. Often the terrain is rugged and difficult to negotiate. Inaccessible mountains, swamp areas, rain forests, or uncharted wastelands affect internal development as well as military operations. Communications and transport systems in most developing nations rarely are equal to the requirements of internal defense and internal development operations. Thus, insurgents are able to capitalize on these geographical conditions by their small lightly equipped operational units which are not dependent on sophisticated logistical supply lines.

b. A host country may contain a wide variety of terrain features. Operations must be conducted in areas which vary from high mountain ranges to inundated areas, from desert to thick jungles and rain forests, and from relatively open plains to rugged mountain ranges. The terrain in each area presents significantly different problems in supply, transportation, maintenance, medical support, and other logistical services.

★*c.* Efforts should be constantly directed toward gaining and maintaining familiarity with the region. Such efforts include habitually employing forces in the same area, integrating assistance activities into the activities of the population, and continually collecting information to obtain complete intelligence of the area.

★*d.* In the early phases of an insurgency, operations are rarely conducted to seize and hold terrain objectives. Internal defense and internal development operations are conducted to destroy the insurgent organization and to control and secure the population. When population centers are seized, every effort must be made to secure them so that the insurgents cannot reestablish or continue insurgent activities.

★2–9. Environmental Considerations

Terrain characteristics which must be considered during stability operations planning include the following:

a. Dense jungle with undergrowth and canopy overgrowth reduces ground vehicular mobility, adversely affects aircraft operations, and provides concealment for insurgent forces from ground and aerial observation and cover from superior firepower. In order to attack the insurgent effectively, friendly forces have a heavier burden of finding and fixing the insurgent than in conventional warfare. The navigation of observation or reconnaissance aircraft to target areas will be difficult. The determination of the geographical location of detected targets also will be difficult.

b. Swampland, river deltas, and valleys which are flooded during the rainy season, and dense networks of rice paddies in river valleys and lowland areas may be difficult to traverse. Canals and rivers are the "roads" and "highways" of this type of area.

c. Poor trafficability for vehicles and heavy weapons which limits cross-country movement may prohibit or severely reduce the use of sophisticated equipment. Limited roads and terrain approaches may also channelize trucks and tracked equipment.

d. Terrain and atmospheric conditions may limit radio communications.

e. Mountainous terrain with rain forest type vegetation may prevent ready accessibility to an area.

☆*f.* The vegetation of an area may not only provide concealment to the insurgent, but, together with the animal life, increase the ability of the insurgent to live off the land.

☆*g.* Forested areas often present an obstacle to movement, particularly in deep snow cover.

☆*h.* In arctic or subarctic areas, tundra, ice, muskeg, grassland, semi-desert or mountains provide challenges that affect military operations in a variety of ways. Since the most serious problem to movement over glaciers and ice cap areas is crevasses, special crevasse detection equipment, should be used.

☆*i.* The following field manuals should be consulted for detailed information on the respective terrain:

FM 31-25	Desert Operations
FM 31-35	Jungle Operations
FM 31-71	Northern Operations
FM 31-72	Mountain Operations
FM 31-75	Riverine Operations

Section IV. PEOPLE

2-10. General

☆*a.* Control of the populace is a primary aim of insurgent organizations. Once this is accomplished, the government usually will fall. Conversely, government internal defense efforts have the purpose of separating and protecting people from the insurgent. The success or failure of an insurgency depends substantially upon the attitude of the population. The possible effect on the people of any action must be carefully assessed and *immediate* gain versus *long-term* loss evaluated.

☆*b.* Subversive organizations exploit the discontent of the population. Consequently, most insurgencies are supported by the disenchanted elements of that society. Because of this identity factor, the organized cadres of full-time military and paramilitary insurgent units frequently are able to blend into the population when necessary.

c. Insurgent activities, including terrorism, sabotage, subversion, espionage, raids, and ambushes, are conducted by the insurgent from within the structure of society. For this reason, detailed knowledge of the population in an insurgency area is a definite requirement in order to analyze and evaluate insurgent activity.

☆*d.* There is often no mutually shared national identity between the government and the population in areas affected by insurgencies because some governments are new and undergoing rapid change. There is seldom a national tradition or heritage to act as a unifying force. It is necessary, therefore, that a strong and proud national identity be quickly developed to provide a cohesive force for unifying the government and the population. Governments seek to accomplish this by implementing measures that will develop political and social cohesion and demonstrate economic progress. Civil affairs operations and psychological operations in support of this objective are important aspects of stability operations.

2-11. Considerations

a. The developing nations are undergoing rapid changes associated with modernization. The process is often a source of tension. The people who resent the loss of traditional ways and values may become alienated from the government. Those portions of the population, not benefited by the change, envy those of the same element within the population who are benefited. The upper strata of society who anticipate loss of status may resent the new developments. Segments of society which favor change in a different manner, or by different processes than those proposed or accomplished, may press for their own programs. For these reasons, while the national government process brings the promise of eventual internal peace and a common national identity, its short-term impacts usually involve the further increase of internal pressures. The potential for insurgency lies in these dissatisfactions and grievances.

b. People residing in sparsely settled areas are strongly influenced by their immediate environments—such factors as family relationships and factors related to obtaining food, clothing, and shelter.

c. The racial stock and physical characteristics of the area population are important considerations. A tendency exists among the populations of developing nations to fear and distrust persons who are not of their own race.

d. Ethnic groups, especially those constituting minority factions, are of prime consideration.

Ethnic groups may be either a source of discontent or of major assistance depending upon the amount of discrimination or persecution which exists. Where the antagonism between the government and minority faction is not immediately reconcilable, the US or allied forces may provide advisory elements to assist in gaining the support of these groups. However, the ultimate solution to this complex problem must be a lasting reconciliation between the government and minority groups.

e. The introduction of large numbers of military and civilian assistance personnel from the United States and allied nations may create additional social and economic problems and antagonisms.

f. Some developing nations are reaching, or have gone beyond, the population saturation point. Many of these nations cannot feed, clothe, employ, or otherwise satisfy even the basic subsistence needs of their populations. Compounding this problem is the fact that the econmic growth rate normally does not keep pace with the rate of population increase.

g. The population saturation point may occur in certain geographical areas within a developing

nation. For example, local, primarily urban areas frequently are overpopulated because of the migration of rural populations or refugees to urban areas seeking employment or refuge.

h. Government structure is frequently poorly organized at the local (village, hamlet) levels. Community organizations usually are incapable of coping with the process of modernization. Civic leaders adequate to handle the operations of government in the traditional society, usually are unable to function in a developing society. These leaders often lack the education and motivation required to effectively govern their transitional societies. Subversive insurgency movements pose particularly acute threats at the local levels because of the lack of native expertise and resources to counter such threats.

i. Varying problems concerning religion may also afflict a developing nation. In some developing nations, one religious organization predominates; in others, religious fragmentation prevails. In most of these nations, religion and religious organizations exert an extremely strong influence on their adherents and through them can have a considerable effect on national affairs. Religious organizations may substitute for, supplement, or compete with, the established national political, economic, military, and social organizations. If religious friction already exists between different religions or between religions and government, the insurgents may attempt to expand and nurture this discontent.

j. Most developing nations contain numerous minority groups, who may speak a language or dialect different from one another and from the language of the majority. Although the urban elite may be multilingual (as a result of having been educated outside the country), the more remote rural segments of the population probably will not be multilingual.

k. A majority of the population is likely to be illiterate. National education programs may direct children to attend school (partly to instill national consciousness), but other considerations such as lack of teachers, facilities, and transportation, and the need for youth to help in the production of food usually will reduce the effectiveness of these programs.

2–12. Psychological Consideration

a. In some developing nations, the people may not be motivated to fight subversive insurgency. The government leaders in many developing nations may not take positive actions to increase the confidence of their people in the government's ability to correct poor social/economic conditions and to provide security from insurgent attack and intimidation.

b. Poor sociological and economic conditions in the nation foment dissatisfaction among the poor-class population. Insurgents promise change in prevailing conditions and a batter way of life in general. These promises may include the supply of basic needs, food, and land reform.

c. Traditionalism often will adversely affect economic progress and social reform in developing nations. Governmental departments may formulate adequate general plans for economic progress, but take little effective action to achieve goals. Individuals may undertake the management of public enterprises only because they see them as means of benefiting their relatives and friends. What may seem like graft is, to them, the fulfillment of traditional family loyalties and moral obligations. Other individuals are earnest, but lack initiative because they have traditional, unquestioning respect for the opinions and ways of their elders. Additional factors affecting attitudes may include—

(1) A widespread sense of injustice; lack of means of redressing individual injustices.

(2) Lack of a dynamic ideology.

(3) Low national morale.

(4) Poorly motivated civil and military establishments.

(5) Dislike and distrust of government authority as alien and remote to their vital interests.

2–13. Insurgent Exploitation

a. In conventional warfare the intelligence effort is directed primarily against the enemy military forces. The enemy is easily recognized by his uniform, is called a prisoner of war, and is granted protection under the articles of the Geneva Convention. He is of value to intelligence personnel because of his ability to provide, among other things, order of battle information. Normally, the nature of conventional warfare restricts the civilian population's ability to gain information on the enemy's forces, capabilities, and objectives. Victory is dependent upon seizing and holding terrain, superiority in firepower, destruction of the enemy's military organization, and his capability to wage war. The civilian population in

such a conflict is considered of secondary importance for intelligence exploitation, although it is of value to the counterintelligence effort.

b. In an insurgency, however, *the civilian population is the primary objective*, and in the final analysis, victory or defeat is totally dependent upon the degree of support of the people to one side or the other. The political struggle is born within the population and is fed by the population's grievances against the defacto government. This political struggle is organized and directed by those seeking power through the destruction of the governing political organization. Basically, the face of insurgency is national rather than international, although external support may be provided. The inhabitants participate in, as well as suffer from, the hardships of the struggle.

c. Insurgent organizations in their "wars of liberation" have defined as the highest priority the gaining of support of the rural population.

d. The people represent the insurgents' logistical base, intelligence system, and military and political organization. He motivates them and obtains their support through propaganda, illegal taxation, kidnapping, terror; various forms of aid, rewards, and promises; and the stated belief of some that he, the insurgent, offers a "better life." To foster unrest and mistrust, he plays ethnic, religious, linguistic, and socioeconomic differences of people against each other. The insurgent first attempts to organize in those areas where the government has failed to associate or identify itself with its people. He initiates actions to force a complete breakdown of the governmental apparatus, and then proceeds to fill the vacuum thus created with his own political organization. The insurgent will constantly attempt to impress the population with his superiority over the established government. He directs his efforts to changing the social structure initially at the grass roots level and then attempts to assume the role of the government through control of the primary groups within the social structure since they have the strongest influence on attitudes within the total society. The insurgent attempts to control existing primary groups (such as teachers, political, religious, trade union organizations, etc.), destroy those that cannot be controlled or used, or create primary groups as control mechanisms.

CHAPTER 3
INSURGENT CAPABILITIES

Section I. GENERAL

3–1. Introduction

a. Intelligence planning must permit assessment of insurgent capabilities as well as a determination of insurgent vulnerabilities. This chapter will discuss insurgent capabilities. Chapter 4 discusses insurgent vulnerabilities or weaknesses. All insurgent courses of action will have the ultimate goal of destroying the existing government. However, during Phase I the insurgent movement may attempt to establish a united front government and progress to an overt or conventional military posture in Phase III if the attempted "peaceful" overthrow of the government fails. It is essential that internal defense intelligence agencies gain information on the political party or parties that the insurgent movement supports, the amount of influence which the insurgent exerts, and the substance of the insurgent movement in overt nonviolent attacks against the government. While intelligence efforts are directed primarily toward the obvious area of direct insurgent activity, efforts should also include other areas in which insurgent influence may appear indirectly.

b. Intelligence planning must also consider situations in which resolute friendly actions have reduced insurgent capabilities and a de-escalation of insurgent warfare takes place, i.e., from a Phase III to Phase II, or a Phase I situation. Such a de-escalation must be carefully distinguished from one in which the insurgent movement deliberately reduces its actitivy for a temporary period to suit its own purposes. In the first situation, the insurgents may no longer have the capability, for example, to mount regimental sized tactical operations because of combat losses sustained in earlier engagements with friendly forces. In the latter situation, the capability of the insurgents to mount large offensive operations will still exist although insurgent operations may continue for weeks or months at a lesser degree of tactical activity. Intelligence planning in de-escalation situations must be thorough and accurate and fully support government efforts leading to the ultimate destruction of the insurgency.

3–2. Analysis of Insurgent Capabilities

Any analysis of insurgent capabilities must meet the following criteria:

a. The capabilities must be presented in relation to the mission of the host government and allied forces.

b. The capabilities must encompass all possible insurgent courses of action, whether directed at the people or the forces of the government.

c. The capabilities must be described completely and in sufficient detail to permit planning for internal defense and development operations.

3–3. Capabilities

For the purpose of analysis by intelligence personnel the capabilities of the insurgent can be classified into three broad areas: basic, supporting, and reinforcing. Activity aimed directly and immediately toward the destruction of the government is termed a basic capability. Supporting capabilities are those which pertain directly to maintenance of insurgent's activities and only indirectly to the downfall of the government. The insurgent's ability to protect his organization from government penetration is an example of a supporting capability. Reinforcing capability is the ability of the insurgent to concentrate on or reinforce his efforts in one area of activity.

Section II. BASIC CAPABILITIES

3–4. General

Basic capabilities available to the insurgent include nonviolent action, terroristic activities, guerrilla operations, and conventional tactical op-

erations. If one course of action becomes ineffective, the insurgent will attempt another. These actions will tend to be cumulative, however, rather than a substitution of one for another. In the later stages of an insurgency the enemy will be capable of conducting all four types of activity simultaneously, with variations, in different parts of the country depending on the comparative strengths of both sides and other environmental influences.

3–5. Nonviolent Action

Nonviolent actions will be directed toward bringing about changes in the political, economic, and social framework of the society—frequently through psychological means. In this manner the insurgent will attempt to influence the opinions, attitudes, feelings, and drives of friendly, hostile, and neutral individuals to bring about behavior favorable to his objectives. During Phase I (subversion) mental and emotional persuasion is the primary weapon of the insurgent. Nonviolent action, however, can be expected to continue throughout the life of the insurgent movement, i.e., throughout Phases II and III.

a. Political. The insurgents will attempt to influence the direction, control, and authority exercised over the nation as a whole and the administration of the political system. Insurgents will be active in areas of political appointments, political organizations, political education, and judicial enactment. They may resort to subverting the government through elections in which the insurgents cause the replacement of an unfriendly government official with one favorable to their cause. Insurgent activity will include provision of campaign funds, provision of publicity, assistance in membership drives, and organization of political rallies for their candidates. Bribery may be attempted, and informants may be placed in key areas to counter government action. Propaganda attacks may be launched to discredit and ridicule political leaders or government officials. In addition, insurgent leaders may enter political contests as candidates for government office.

b. Economics. The insurgents will attempt to affect the production, distribution, and consumption of resources within a country in an effort to further impair the effectiveness of the government. Economic influence may emerge in the form of boycotts, strikes, riots, or it may be in the form of civic action designed to improve a local economy with the purpose of winning the allegiance of the people or to share in the products of the improved economy. The national and local tax structure, monetary policies and import-export tariffs may be subverted in order to provide sources of revenue for insurgent operations or to provide a basis for characterizing the existing government as inefficient and corrupt. Insurgent psychological operations may be used to reduce popular confidence in the existing currency. Actual counterfeiting of the currency may also occur.

c. Sociological. The insurgents initially attempt to exploit those traditional social and behavioral patterns of the people which further their interests. When such measures fail, the breakdown of these patterns normally will be attempted in order to create instability. A rising crime pattern or insurgent agitation to create religious unrest is to be expected. Social organizations may be infiltrated to gain close contact with the people and to exploit both the resources and influence of those organizations which can further insurgent objectives. Existing grievances are identified and new ones created in the minds of the people. Unrest is promoted through agitation and propaganda. The insurgents may engage in actions in direct opposition to the rules of society for the specific purpose of breaking down cultural values, thus bringing about instability.

3–6. Terroristic Activities

If nonviolent methods do not accomplish the desired goals, the insurgents may resort to harsher measures to bring about submission and cooperation with their demands. Terroristic activities are particularly useful for gaining control over the populace. Terror may be applied selectively or indiscriminately. Selective terror is directed toward an individual or a small segment of the society. Indiscriminate terror, on the other hand, involves the whole population and serves to further discredit the government while at the same time giving a magnified aura of power to the insurgents. Confidence in the government is undermined when no protection is provided. The capability of the insurgent to engage in terroristic activities may be one of the direct determinants of the government's internal defense policy. Aside from the obvious use of torture, murder, extortion, and kidnapping, the use of sabotage is one of the most effective methods of creating havoc. Terroristic activity is extremely difficult to prevent.

3–7. Guerrilla Operations

a. The insurgents normally will use terror as one of their main weapons during any phase of

the insurgency, but insurgents do not engage in guerrilla operations until they have developed a military capability of at least squad or platoon size. This growth in strength usually indicates the beginning of Phase II of insurgency development. Often activities will be initiated against transportation arteries. Their primary effect is to interrupt supply and communications lines to prevent adequate supply of government forces. By cutting telephone lines, stealing wire, and destroying telephone poles in places to which access is difficult, the insurgent may deny communication through an area as effectively as if he were occupying and defending that terrain with a large body of soldiers. Roads may be blocked or damaged, bridges destroyed, and railroads and airfields damaged.

b. While harassment, destruction, and interdiction operations are of an aggressive nature, the insurgent's capability of dispersion enables him to avoid contact with superior government forces. This in itself is an operation in that it is as carefully planned as the aggressive tactics that precede it. If correctly implemented, this insurgent capability directly and significantly defeats the government's ability to close with and destroy the insurgents. The ability to temporarily withdraw from contact, regroup, and redirect effort to an area where government forces are weak is one of the inherent advantages of guerrilla warfare and must be considered along with each of the previous capabilities discussed.

3–8. Conventional Tactical Operations

The insurgent's capabilities in the field of conventional tactical operations can be considered from the viewpoint of his ability to attack, defend, or withdraw when opposed by conventional host government or allied forces. Each of these capabilities can be further divided into more specific courses of action as stated in FM 30–5. The insurgent's capability of conventional tactical operations is determined in the light of the current intelligence on the insurgent, the capabilities of the government forces, and the effect of the characteristics of the environment upon both of these. In general, the employment of large insurgent forces in conventional tactical operations would indicate that the insurgency has progressed to Phase III.

Section III. SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES

3–9. General

The support capabilities of the insurgents can be categorized into five general areas—intelligence and security; recruitment and retention; organization and training; finance and logistics; and communication. The insurgent's basic capabilities are directly dependent upon his ability to communicate; gain intelligence; and protect, develop, and supply his own organization.

3–10. Intelligence and Security

a. General. Intelligence and security are absolutely essential for the insurgent's survival. The insurgent must gain intelligence of his enemy and secure himself from capture and neutralization. As the conflict progresses the insurgent's needs become more detailed.

b. Recruitment and Retention. The insurgent possesses a capability of recruiting and retaining personnel. As the scope of insurgent operations widens, the conflicting needs of security and expansion of the organization become more acute. Aggressive recruitment is essential for the attainment of expanded objectives, while security is essential to survival. As a result, the insurgent must strive to attain an optimum balance between this requirement for expansion and the necessity of maintaining security. This will involve varying the sizes and patterns of organization of their forces.

3–11. Organization and Training

The insurgent leaders must possess the ability to create an effective organizational structure. Once nuclei have been firmly established and membership in the insurgent movement increases, expert abilities are required to unify the efforts of the different elements of the movement into a single complementing force. In addition to continuous political indoctrination and leadership training, training programs are required for specific segments of the insurgent movement, such as political activists, intelligence personnel, propaganda specialists, and saboteurs. Basic subversive, terroristic, and guerrilla techniques are taught to all elements with emphasis on the techniques of most current importance.

3–12. Finance and Logistics

Through finance and logistics activities the insurgent develops a capability of supplying and

moving his forces. Supply items to include food, paper for written propaganda, communication equipment, weapons and ammunition, clothing, and medical supplies must be obtained. The insurgent has many techniques to obtain financial assistance both from within and outside the country. His capability to effectively employ these techniques provides the foundation of his logistical ability which in turn provides the necessary materiel to enable the insurgent to engage in specific courses of action. The insurgent's financial sources from within the country may range from special taxation of the population and sale of food crops in areas under insurgent control, to extortion of business and shop owners.

3–13. Communications

The ability of the insurgent to communicate is essential to the success of his mission. At least a small nucleus of insurgents must be well trained in communications. The communications equipment employed by the insurgents varies in quality and use.

Section IV. REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY

3–14. General

The insurgent's reinforcement capability is predicated on the mission and the availability of manpower and other resources. At any given time the insurgent may increase his effort in any limited number of activities—by either increasing the manpower devoted to these activities, giving them greater attention, or devoting more material and supplies to those actions.

3–15. Reinforcement

Reinforcement can be made for any activity, whether it be basic or supporting. During a time when nonviolent techniques are being employed the insurgent may reinforce his political action elements. However, the effect of such reinforcement on his economic, sociological, organizational, and logistical activity must be considered. Depending on the insurgent's resources, and the relationships among the above activities, action in these areas may be severely limited during the period of reinforced political action.

CHAPTER 4
POTENTIAL INSURGENT VULNERABILITIES

4–1. Exploitative Weaknesses

a. The detection and exploitation of insurgent weaknesses are necessary to success during internal defense intelligence operations. This chapter presents in broad form the common, inherent weaknesses of insurgent forces and discusses their potential for intelligence exploitation. The insurgent is often conscious of such weaknesses and may partially correct them or attempt to conceal them, but no matter what form his defensive measures take the insurgent's basic weaknesses cannot be completely eliminated.

b. It is not possible to comprehensively list every weakness associated with insurgent forces. For this reason the matters discussed in this chapter are general rather than definitive in nature. Details of insurgent weaknesses which pertain to a specific region of the world must be developed by intelligence officers assigned for duty in that region. When considered individually, certain insurgent weaknesses may not seem to be exploitable. The intelligence officer can narrow the search for hard evidence through analysis of patterns of behavior.

4–2. Insurgent Base Area System

a. The base area system itself is a vulnerability. The physical characteristics of the system and known insurgent activities can be mapped and, given sufficient knowledge of insurgent methods and tactics, deductions can be made about insurgent courses of action.

b. The insurgent mobility is less a matter of light equipment and fleetness of foot than it is the use of sound plans offering multiple courses of actions because the ground has been prepared. The simple fact that the insurgent commander knows where to go while the government forces do not is a decisive advantage to the insurgent. The insurgent loses this advantage to the degree that the government commander is able to deduce and restrict the insurgent's options in using the facilities of the base area system.

4–3. Insurgent Intelligence Needs

Timely and accurate intelligence is always of great importance to an incipient insurgent movement, but it is especially critical during Phase I when the movement is weak and most vulnerable. During Phase I, the major insurgent efforts are directed toward subverting neutral or progovernment people and organizations, establishing bases of operations, developing an intelligence collection system, and strengthening insurgent leadership and control elements. The insurgents' success in winning adherents to the cause will be directly related to their ability to collect information they need to further the growth of the movement. At this stage, the insurgent intelligence system is dependent almost entirely on human sources as a means of collecting information. The information is gained more through simple, unobtrustive observation by nets of spies, informers, and agents rather than by sophisticated means such as radar, aircraft, and photography.

4–4. Insurgent Intelligence Communication System

The insurgent intelligence communications system uses couriers or messengers and intermediaries or hiding places to securely transmit information, intelligence, operational documents, and funds. Friendly counterintelligence activity must first be directed to identify and locate these couriers and sites and then to neutralize them. Neutralization —severing the links between its echelons—will severely damage the entire insurgency movement. COMINT exploitation of insurgent wire and radio communications is performed to gain insight into the intelligence apparatus.

4–5. Insurgent Organizational Structure

a. Command and control over the insurgent military structure usually is exercised by political organizations at each operational echelon. This type of organizational doctrine is discussed in detail in appendix B. An interlocking structure in which key personnel hold dual or multiple positions in

several organizational elements of the movement, tends to defeat insurgent practices of compartmentation for security purposes. Intelligence on one cell in the party can often lead to intelligence on parallel cells.

b. Frequently the leaders of each echelon of an insurgent organization are better trained and better qualified than those of the government. Their removal will have a detrimental effect on the functioning of the units. The identification of the commander, then, is a prime goal for internal defense intelligence operations. Intelligence analysis of the leadership of insurgent organizations may develop information which could be used to discredit and lessen popular support of the leaders. Detection and disruption of logistical support operations may be complicated by the fact that many of these facilities will be located in areas adjacent to the recognized borders of the insurgency affected country. Access to these areas may be limited by separate international agreements.

4–6. Communications Requirements

As the insurgency progresses, a rapid means of communications and a large, complex communications system may become necessary for the insurgent leadership to exercise command and control. The insurgent may also maintain contact with an outside sponsoring country in order to receive direction and assistance. Insurgent intelligence, counterintelligence, security, and propaganda functions also increase and demand a greater variety of communications means. As the need for a rapid means of communications progresses, the insurgents may be forced to resort to less secure systems such as telephone, telegraph, radio, and postal service. This will enhance insurgent command and control, but at the same time, make the communications system more vulnerable.

4–7. Logistical Requirements

a. The insurgents usually obtain a large portion of their logistical needs from the immediate areas of operation. Procurement of supplies, equipment, and services is by local purchase, volunteer contributions from supporters, theft, levies on the populace, raids, and combat operations against government forces. Expansion of the insurgent armed forces results in a step-up of tactical operations and in a corresponding increase in requirements for logistics support. Some of the increased support is obtained by intensification of procurement from the people. This increased demand on the populace may tend to alienate the insurgents from the people. Internal defense intelligence can exploit such a situation. Information on supply resources, identity of supporters, supply shortages, caches, and supply bases and routes can be obtained more readily.

b. During Phase III the insurgent forces may require considerable logistical support from external sources to meet the demands caused by large scale combat operations. Many items must be transported illegally into a target country. Points of entry for such materiel are often limited in number. The illegal goods arriving through these entry points are vulnerable to counterintelligence checks and inspections. Illegal ground routes or paths for bringing in supplies are susceptible to detection by aerial reconnaissance and photography and other intelligence means.

c. Insurgent logistical support facilities such as bases of supplies, way stations, caches, factories, and farm plots will increase in size and number concurrently with force expansion. The resultant increase in trail patterns, diggings, thermal emissions, disturbances of natural terrain features or vegetation and other signs of increased human activity will make the insurgent support facilities more vulnerable to detection.

4–8. Tactical Operations

a. During Phase I and the early part of Phase II, insurgent tactical operations against the government, its military and police forces, and its population normally are limited to isolated acts carried out primarily to entrench their positions in-country. In the latter stage of Phase II and during Phase III insurgent operations increase in scope and ferocity. Attempts are made to defeat internal defense military forces by conventional combat operations which results in occupancy of larger ground areas, requires supplies and equipment, and requires more storage facilities. Insurgents will rely heavily on communications for command and control. Communications equipment will begin to appear in greater numbers, and communications nets will become more sophisticated.

b. As the insurgent forces expand in size, a distinction between the local population and the insurgent force becomes evident. Base areas are created which must be closed to civilian movement and defended with field fortifications. These base areas are vulnerable to discovery and exploitation by combat surveillance and reconnaissance sources. Long-range patrols can penetrate the insurgents' territory and observe trails and insur-

gent activity and base camps. The use of aerial photographs and other aerial sensors will help to identify new camps, cache sites, field fortifications, and training areas. Intelligence personnel can secure information on the location of insurgent base areas from local people who have seen activity or have been denied access to the area.

c. Detailed planning is vital for all of the insurgent's combat operations. Insurgents normally follow up their detailed, precise, planning with "dress" rehearsals. This preparation often entails marking of routes in and out of the battle area as well as stockpiling of supplies and equipments. These patterns of preparation for military operations constitute yet another vulnerability to intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance activity.

4–9. Dependence Upon the Population

To succeed in his phased development the insurgent relies on the population as the major source for expansion and replacement of his military forces; the framework for establishment and operation of his warning and collection nets; the labor resources necessary to build up his base areas and training camps; the main source for consumable supplies; medicines, and construction materials; and the cover he requires to meld into the local environment. Insurgent dependence upon the population is critical during all phases of insurgency. The importance of this factor is heightened as the insurgent extends the scope and magnitude of his organization and operations.

a. In order to achieve the ultimate aim of overthrowing the government forces, the insurgents usually organize regional and regular armed forces which possess the actual or potential characteristics of conventionally organized military forces. These forces can be achieved by expansion of the civil base of the insurgency or by infiltration of armed elements from external sources. The requirement to rapidly increase the size of armed elements is in conflict with the leadership's concern for extreme caution in the assesssment of the loyalty of recruits. It is extremely difficult to achieve a rapid expansion of forces while at the same time maintain high recruitment security standards. During such an expansion phase, the insurgents are especially vulnerable to government intelligence penetration efforts.

b. Labor requirements for insurgent base area buildups usually exceed the capability of the insurgent force itself. The insurgents must depend upon voluntary or involuntary local civilian labor to meet the requirements. Thus, specific knowledge concerning base locations may be possessed by large numbers of local people. This knowledge con be exploited by internal defense intelligence forces. Information concerning insurgent activity may be willingly given by some individuals. Other individuals will require inducement of some sort. No matter what their motivation for providing the information all will require that their informer roles not be compromised and if compromised that they and their families will be protected from insurgent reprisal. The requirement for secrecy must be respected in all collection activities.

c. The insurgent's supply needs will require that he contact certain local people such as commodity brokers and merchants. When persuaded to act as informers, such people can be used to identify insurgent contact men. Surveillance of identified contact men may lead to the uncovering of identities of other key insurgent personnel as well as insurgent base locations. Information relating to insurgent purchases can also be used by intelligence analysts when assessing insurgent force strengths, critical supply needs, and probable operational plans.

CHAPTER 5
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Section I. GENERAL

5–1. Introduction

a. Intelligence requirements are formulated by commands and staffs based on analysis of assigned missions and represent information and intelligence needed for the successful completion of the missions. Requirements will be specific or general, short or long range, depending on missions. A detailed discussion of intelligence requirements is contained in FM 30–5.

b. A discussion of U.S. Army missions in support of internal defense and internal development assistance operations is contained in FM 31–23. These missions, which must be understood by intelligence personnel involved in stability operations, include—

(1) Advisory assistance.
(2) Psychological operations.
(3) Intelligence operations.
(4) Civil affairs operations.
(5) Tactical operations.

c. U.S. Army participation may take many forms. Members of the U.S. Army may act in an advisory capacity with host country, other U.S. agencies, or the combat forces of the U.S. Army may be committed.

5–2. Types of Intelligence Requirements

a. Stability operations intelligence requirements are of two types:

(1) Preparedness—those requirements for contingencies.

(2) Operational requirements—those needs generated at, and after, actual commitment of U.S. Forces in any capacity.

b. Intelligence requirements for preparedness are separated into two categories—basic intelligence and current intelligence.

Section II. REQUIREMENTS FOR PREPAREDNESS

5–3. Basic Intelligence

a. The first requirement is for a detailed, comprehensive, and up-to-date intelligence documentary data base on all countries and areas of the world which are susceptible to insurgency. A documentary data base is essential for long- and short-range contingency planning and for the training and use of personnel and units assigned readiness responsibilities on a geographical basis.

b. The data base must contain six broad categories of detailed intelligence regarding likely host countries:

(1) Political.
(2) Economic.
(3) Sociological.
(4) Geographic.
(5) Military.
(6) Insurgency intelligence.

c. These categories should be covered in detail at national, regional, and local levels. For example, in the political field, biographic data on key personalities of every province, district, and village are required in addition to data on the top political figures of the individual countries. This requirement for comprehensiveness in all of these basic subject areas is of considerable importance.

d. Documentary intelligence on such insurgency subjects as the background of the insurgency, its known leadership, its extent of development, its actual or potential strengths and weaknesses, its internal organization and structure, and its support from within and without is included in the data base. Since many of these detailed data are needed prior to the commitment of U.S. military forces, military intelligence relies to a large extent on external agencies for the documentary data base it requires. It is then the task of the ap-

propriate Army intelligence element to immediately request such data and convert them to meaningful documents which the user can apply to his operational environment.

5–4. Sources for the Data Base

a. Estimates, surveys, studies, area handbooks, analyses, and reports published by various agencies serve as the basis for the initial development of the documentary data base. All possible contributory agencies are queried for available information to contribute to the data base.

b. One method of obtaining this data is the use of the Statement of Intelligence Interest (SII) which may be forwarded from subordinate to higher levels. The SII is a standing request for the dissemination of the full range of intelligence produced by the entire national intelligence community within suitable classification and need-to-know restrictions.

c. Because of the broad scope of stability operations, the data base requirements differ greatly from those needed for conventional military operations. Stability operations require elaborately detailed intelligence concerning sociological, political, geographic, and economic information and usually a minimal amount of scientific and technological intelligence. This difference often is dicated by the depth of involvement with the civil population during stability operations.

d. A suggested coverage of the data base is listed in appendix C. The list should be viewed as minimum subject coverage intended for use as a guide for specific operational planning. Gaps in coverage should be filled through priority collection tools such as those discussed in chapter 7.

e. It is incumbent upon commands which have contingency responsibilities to acquire the pertinent segments of the national data base for their respective geographic areas of interest.

5–5. Current Intelligence

a. In addition to the documentary data base a requirement exists for timely and accurate current intelligence for day-to-day monitoring of the extent of subversive activities and the development of insurgencies. Such warning data is essential for the refinement of contingency plans, the reorientation of training, and the initiation of preliminary operational requirements. Current intelligence must cover the most recent, significant developments in areas of interest in each of the six categories of intelligence (para 5–3*b*) in as much detail as possible.

b. Current intelligence, when combined with the documentary data base, will provide an operational data base. Spot reports; routine, daily, and weekly summaries; and other special reports from national agencies and from unified and component commands, normally in abbreviated telegraphic format, comprise the bulk of the current intelligence support available to commands with internal defense missions.

c. Current intelligence and information must be provided to the users in an expeditious manner. Commanders and intelligence staffs must insure that current intelligence is disseminated to the lowest practical level.

Section III. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

5–6. General

The basic documentary data and the current holdings available at the time of commitment of Army forces represent the base from which the operational intelligence requirements for the specific mission are formulated. As noted, initial commitment of Army forces may take many forms and occur during any phase of the insurgency. Army units will, therefore, orient their efforts on their specific missions, because it is the mission which determines intelligence needs.

5–7. Phase I

a. During Phase I of an insurgency, the U.S. Army's role basically will be in the form of advisory and training assistance by military assistance advisory groups, missions, military groups, and mobile training teams. Of the five missions listed for Army participation in stability operations, four are the inherent responsibilities of the host country. The one exception is the advisory assistance mission. Nevertheless, intelligence requirements will exist for all four missions at the inception of the military assistance program. When host country efforts, combined with military assistance, fail to meet the insurgent threat, greater participation by forces can be expected.

b. U.S. advisors may be furnished, at the national level at least, early in the assistance effort

for civil affairs operations, intelligence operations, and psychological operations. These advisors will have some requirements in common in the six intelligence subject areas; however, each will have his own special interest which must be met by operational intelligence. Intelligence advisors must continually bear in mind that their status may shift at any time from primarily an advisory to a basic operational role, and that their basic intelligence requirements will increase accordingly. Thus, even though there may be no current indications of such a shift in their status and its accompanying requirements, their efforts concerning buildup of the documentary data base should be shaped around that eventuality.

★*d.* Consideration should also be given to the utilization of tactical cover and deception measures during Phase I. Because of the insurgent's heavy dependence upon accurate intelligence during this phase, many insurgent activities can be compromised and frustrated by the deliberate introduction of false or misleading information. This in turn can significantly degrade the growth and effectiveness of the insurgency. For additional guidance on tactical cover and deception, refer to FM 31–40.

5–8. Phase II

★*a.* Intelligence requirements generated at the initiation of the military assistance program for the use of advisors will continue to be applicable as US military efforts are expanded during Phase II. The US military assistance program may be greatly enlarged with more effort at the provincial and lower level of the host country. US Army support units may be committed in Phase II to provide direct technical and specialized assistance to host country military forces. Army aircraft, communication, transportation, ordnance, military police, and medical units are examples of such support. US Army combat units may also be committed in the later stages of Phase II.

★*b.* In the determination of operational intelligence requirements for the Army forces during this period, a significant factor is that the US Army may become involved, in some capacity, in all of the major missions associated with stability operations. Requirements may include combat intelligence forces and intelligence to support operations in the other missions: civil affairs, intelligence, advisory assistance, psychological, and population and resources control operations, which are conducted concurrently with tactical operations.

★*c.* Tactical requirements are concerned with finding, fixing, and destroying the insurgent armed forces. FM 31–6 considers the specific requirements for these operations in great detail. Intelligence requiremnts for combat support and combat service support units participating in the tactical counterguerrilla effort are adequately established in appropriate field manuals. The combat intelligence requirements for tactical operations in an insurgency differ little from those of other types of warfare. However, what is distinct in counterinsurgency operations is the requirement for the other Army missions directly associated with stability operations in counterinsurgency operations. As part of the stability operations effort during Phase II, intelligence units, psychological operation units, and troops engaged wholly or in part in civil affairs and population and resources control operations may be utilized. This requires detailed, comprehensive, and current data concerning the six categories of intelligence (para 5–3*b*). With the involvement of US combat units, the entire Army intelligence support capability becomes active.

5–9. Phase III

★*a.* US Army participation in Phase III may involve only support personnel and units, or it may involve combat forces in tactical operations. With such involvement it can be expected that the entire spectrum of the stability operations mission will be encountered. Where US buildup is gradual from the initial phase into Phase III of an insurgency, the intelligence requirements for Phase I and Phase II will have been formulated based on advisory and support needs. In such a situation the involvement of Army units in support of host country military forces will have little effect on requirements, except for an obvious increase in the collection-production resources. Where Army involvement begins with little or no advance warning or buildup, an intelligence program to support all missions, tactical and internal development, will be required immediately. Tactical intelligence requirements in Phase II should be expanded to meet the expected larger insurgent force structure.

★*b.* During Phase IIII, US Army intelligence staffs, specialists, and units will be helping to provide all tactical and nontactical stability operations intelligence needs. Working in coordination with host country and other US and allied intelligence agencies, the US Army will collect

and process information, and diseeminate the resulting intelligence necessary to support tactical, civil affairs, intelligence, psychological, population and resources control operations on a continuing basis.

★*c.* As discussed in paragraph 6–2, combined military intelligence operations with the host country are the most effective in stability operations. Early development of such combined operations should lead to the establishment of combined intelligence production centers during Phase III at both national and subnational levels. Additionally, establishment of the following types of combined intelligence facilities will assist in a fully coordinated effort to exploit all available intelligence assets:

(1) Interrogation Center (for details, see FM 30–15).

(2) Document Exploitation Center (for details, see FM 30–15).

(3) Materiel Exploitation Center (for details, see FM 30–16).

(4) Imagery Interpretation Center (for details, see FM 30–20).

CHAPTER 6
THE INTERNAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

Section I. INTRODUCTION

6–1. General

The internal defense intelligence system consists of all host country military and civilian intelligence systems plus all U.S. and other allied intelligence resources which are committed in-country to assist in preventing or defeating insurgency. The host country's intelligence structure is the base of this system. It normally includes a national intelligence directorate (NID) or comparable agency at the top level and includes the intelligence elements of area commands at subnational levels. Intelligence systems of tactical forces are integrated with the overall intelligence system.

6–2. U.S. Army Intelligence Participation

a. The nature and extent of U.S. Army intelligence participation in an internal defense intelligence system is dependent upon the level of support being provided by U.S. military forces in the furtherance of U.S. internal defense and internal development assistance operations. Generally, U.S. Army intelligence operations should be initiated as soon as a U.S. military advisory effort is committed to conduct internal defense operations with a host country which is threatened by an insurgency. Such operations should begin as soon as possible after it is determined that an incipient insurgency situation exists or is developing. This participation should extend to the entire spectrum of intelligence production and collection activities which should be conducted on a combined basis with the host country. For additional guidance, see FM 100–20.

b. A fundamental premise of U.S. internal defense policy is that U.S. assistance will be channeled primarily through the HC structure. This is basic doctrine for U.S. intelligence operations as well as for other U.S. programs. A determination should always be made as to whether a particular activity is a combined activity or basically only a host country activity receiving advisory assistance from U.S. elements. In some cases, U.S. representation may be for liaison purposes only. When the activity has sufficient U.S. participation to be considered a combined activity, i.e, U.S. elements have an operational mission in the internal defense program, then it is desirable that the management of the activity also be handled on a combined basis with objectives and procedures developed by common agreement. Combined military intelligence operations facilitate the quick establishment of effective collection and production capabilities. Whereas the host country contributions are detailed area and language knowledge and accessibility to all levels of society, U.S. Army intelligence can provide professional and technical expertise as well as managerial talent and advice. Of particular importance is the requirement for the U.S. Army to initiate as early as feasible combined counterintelligence operations in the field of countersubversion. Although, according to existing national policy, combined intelligence operations of the U.S. Army normally pertain to a coordinated effort with host country *military* intelligence and security agencies, U.S. Army intelligence must be prepared to provide assistance in intelligence roles outside those defined by major policy as a consequence of mission default by other U.S. agencies or by virtue of peculiar roles and missions of particular host country civilian and military intelligence and security agencies.

6–3 Unilateral Requirements

There usually are some unilateral intelligence requirements imposed on both the U.S. and HC intelligence personnel by their respective countries. When time and subject matter permit, the combined intelligence resources should be drawn upon in meeting these requirements; however, there may be times when mutual effort will be impossible, as in the case of independent estimates or when contingency planning is required by the re-

spective national authorities. In such cases independent U.S. or host country action will be required.

6-4. Determination of Objectives

The U.S. and host country intelligence authorities should coordinate, in detail, to determine mutual long-range objectives and basic organizational and operational procedures and policies required. Long-term plans developed by U.S. and host country intelligence authorities must provide for intelligence efforts related to the possible further growth of the insurgency, possible external invasion, and possible third country active or passive support of the insurgents. In an internal defense environment it is at times difficult to determine relative priorities for various intelligence requirements. U.S. and host country intelligence personnel must reach an agreement as to the major programs and activities to be undertaken and their relative priority for accomplishment within available resources. Actual organization and procedures adopted are tailored to the operational situation and environment. Combined U.S./host country planning is the key to progress in the development of in-country intelligence capabilities.

6-5. Employment of Resources

a. Planning, centralization of control, and flexibility are all related factors which contribute to the ability of the internal defense intelligence system to make the best possible use of available personnel and materiel. Care must be taken to see that the intelligence and security resources of both the U.S. and the host country are employed effectively and efficiently. There should be no unnecessary competition or duplication of effort between the various echelons and agencies involved. There must be sufficient organization of effort to insure that each essential function is handled in a thorough manner. Staffing must come primarily from within the total in-country capability. However, thorough planning and management action to define basic responsibilities, specific tasks, and allocation of resources between the various agencies and echelons comprising the intelligence system should insure the most effective and efficient use of all available intelligence assets.

b. Centralization, pooling, and control of critical intelligence resources by higher echelons are frequently required. This may necessitate control of personnel, funds, and other resources at national level to insure that efforts at lower levels remain subject to the desired degree of centralized supervision and control.

6-6. Intelligence Support Available from U.S. Theater Army

The theater army intelligence structure has the principal mission of developing intelligence required for theater missions which is not satisfied from U.S. national intelligence agency sources. Particularly during Phase I of an insurgency, intelligence advisory elements are normally augmented from theater army intelligence resources.

Section II. HOST COUNTRY ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS

6-7. General

a. Coordination centers should be organized at national and subnational levels of government down to province, district, and even township. Their purpose is to provide an integrated approach to the planning and direction of all aspects of the government's program of internal security. They serve to coordinate and control the planning and direction of the efforts of the country, to achieve unity of effort, and to obtain rapid response to any indications of insurgent activity. Composition of these coordination centers depends on local conditions and the desire of government leaders; however, the four functional areas such as intelligence, operations, administration, and logistics, must be met by the internal structure selected. Use of the coordination centers to achieve close integration between intelligence and operational acivities assists in the achievement of a united effort against insurgency. This integration of effort, coupled with the skillful use of aggressive tactics imaginatively applied, creates a situation in which the effectiveness of insurgent activities will be seriously impaired.

b. Organizations, to be effective, must have structural patterns familiar to people of the host country. Two countries that have evolved from dependence on the same colonial power may follow similar organizational concepts; however, only in rare cases when U.S. Forces are likely to be employed would American organizational concepts be dominant. U.S. personnel, therefore, must expect to adapt themselves to indigenous organizations. Actual titles of host country internal defense coor-

dination centers may vary from one country to another. However, for clarity of reference in U.S. Army doctrine, the national level center is identified as the *National Internal Defense Coordination Center (NIDCC)* with subnational centers being termed as *Area Coordination Centers.* (For details, see FM 31–23.)

6–8. The National Intelligence Structure

a. The national intelligence structure of the host country should be established to direct information from all sources into a single channel. This channel leads to a central body whose responsibility it is to produce a composite intelligence picture for the country as a whole. This body is the intelligence branch of the NIDCC, organized specifically to direct and coordinate the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence information. Intelligence operations of the area coordination centers at major subnational level are performed by intelligence branches with format and function similar to that of the NIDCC. The composition of each of these intelligence elements will vary according to the level and circumstances, but to be effective they should be established on the following guidelines:

(1) Single directorship.

(2) Incorporation and integration of all civil and military intelligence agencies at all levels.

(3) Staffing by trained professional intelligence personnel.

(4) Access to a secure, rapid system of communication.

(5) Functioning to—

(*a*) Review all local activities and external influences that may affect the security of the area or country and the campaign against the insurgent.

(*b*) Provide intelligence assessments of insurgent programs and advise on the security policies and actions necessary to combat these threats.

(*c*) Review the effectiveness of the intelligence effort and originate methods of improving it.

b. Close integration must be maintained between the intelligence elements of the coordination centers and the intelligence units which provide them operational support. This integration should be extensive enough to permit the interchange of personnel between the two elements and should serve as an excellent source of trained intelligence manpower for staffing of the area coordination centers. Depending on the local situation, it is possible that the commander of the major supporting operational intelligence unit and the intelligence head of the area coordination center may be the same individual.

6–9. Local Area Coordination Centers

a. The organizational and operational features of the area coordination center at local levels will vary according to the local geographical, political, sociological, psychological and military factors present in the area. The local area coordination center has three missions:

(1) To provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction to all of the governmental effort in their area of responsibility.

(2) To insure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements.

(3) To communicate with the people and invite their participation in programs designed to improve the economic, social, and political well-being and security of the area.

b. Prior to, or during, the initial stages of insurgency it is likely that the intelligence chief of a local area coordination center will come from the civilian police organization in the area. Some advantages and disadvantages in selecting a police official for this position are as follows:

(1) *Advantages.*

(*a*) They have intimate contact with the population which permits them to gain valuable intelligence concerning the existence and extent of insurgency in their area.

(*b*) They usually are accepted by the people as the government organization at local level with enforcement prerogatives.

(*c*) They are best suited to exploit the insurgents' dependence on the local populace.

(2) *Disadvantages.*

(*a*) In times of stress, younger, healthier, more energetic policemen normally are called to military service. Civilian police forces are undermanned or replacements are less able and less trained auxilaries. "Usual" police duties (traffic and curfew controls; licensing; civilian crimes against property and person; complaints of misconduct by civilians and military persons against the other) increase progressively. Thus, the chief of a police force of reduced capability already faced with increased work, cannot undertake a major additional reponsibility.

(*b*) The police chief, or key members of his force, may be allied with or intimidated by insurgents, organized criminals, or legitimate enter-

prises (business, religious, cultural, etc.) whose interests are adverse to the intelligence program.

(*c*) The police chief may be closely associated with a local faction and as a result of distrust by the opposition may not be effective in his role as chief of police.

c. If insurgent strength grows, several causes may contribute to the government's relative inability to maintain itself. One possible element of government weakness is the intelligence effort. All facets of the military intelligence/counterintelligence program, including economic, political, and sociological intelligence, must be scrutinized for areas of possible improvement. Indigenous attitudes, host government and United States policies, and other factors may indicate changes in staffing organization, mission, or procedures of area coordination centers.

d. The local area coordination center is composed of the same elements as the coordination centers of the national system—i.e., intelligence, operations, administration, political, and logistics. For details on a type area coordination center at province level, see FM 31–23.

(1) The intelligence element is composed of two sections—collection and production. It is staffed by representatives from each intelligence organization and each agency within the area coordination center area of responsibility which has some type of activity devoted to the collection and/or processing of intelligence information. The area coordination center provides a pooling of all available intelligence for use in operations against the insurgent.

(2) Basic functions of the intelligence element of the local area coordination center parallel those of the higher level coordination centers of the national system. Some of the more important of these functions are to:

(*a*) Determine intelligence objectives.

(*b*) Integrate local intelligence programs with those of the national intelligence system.

(*c*) Evaluate intelligence resources.

(*d*) Organize and train new intelligence activities and forces.

(*e*) Formulate intelligence operational plans.

(*f*) Establish priorities and allocate resources for intelligence attack of selected insurgent targets.

(*g*) Establish and conduct an active liaison program with intelligence elements of other area coordination centers.

e. Civilian advisory committees which are composed of both governmental and influential private citizens should be formed to assist the area coordination center.

Section III. U.S. IN-COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

6–10. Country Team

In order to coordinate its multifunctional programs of advice and assistance to host countries threatened by insurgency, the United States has established a flexible organizational concept to support those countries. The primary center of operations is the "country team" which, when utilized, is the senior in-country U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency. Included are members of the State Department, U.S. Information Service, U.S. Agency for International Development, Defense Attache, other key personnel, and the senior military officer of the advisory or assistance program. The country team operates to insure that there is a close, continuing cooperation between the various agencies implementing U.S. military, economic, social, and political assistance programs. It maximizes the total contribution towards internal stability by balancing both national development and internal defense assistance programs which are mutually interdependent. Continuous assessment of the effectiveness of operations, modified as necessary, is inherent in country team activities.

6–11. Pre-Commitment Planning

U.S. Army commitment in stability operations may occur suddenly, or gradually, over a long period of time. Major commitment of combat forces is contemplated only on a contingency basis. The intelligence staffs of MAAG and missions assist in the development of the intelligence portion of country team contingency plans for expansion of U.S. assistance. This requires an understanding by Army intelligence officers of responsibilities of the U.S. in-country intelligence staff and its relationships with the host country intelligence system in order to determine the total intelligence requirements. To accomplish this it is necessary for the intelligence staffs to:

a. Evaluate the intelligence documentary data base and develop a program for data base expansion.

b. Determine overall intelligence collection requirements; prepare U.S. collection plans, orders, and requests; recommend allocation of collection tasks to NIDCC and area coordination center elements; and asisst in the development of the HC collection plan.

c. Determine overall intelligence production requirements, establish production standards and formats, assign production tasks to U.S. functional staffs, assign intelligence input requirements to U.S. agencies in-country, propose combined intelligence production programs to the host country, and determine dissemination policies.

d. Resurvey periodically projected U.S. intelligence personnel requirements.

e. Task out-of-country resources, such as communication intelligence.

6–12. Expansion of Internal Defense Intelligence Support

a. An increase in U.S. participation in the internal defense programs of any insurgency-affected country usually will be accompanied by a significant expansion or reorganization of U.S. in-country forces. Existing U.S./host country integrated organizations, such as may exist as the NIDCC and area coordination center levels, will similarly expand or reorganize. This growth will be required due to the expanded missions which U.S. organizations must undertake. When reorganizing, care is taken not to unduly disturb existing relationships between U.S. elements or individuals and their host country counterparts. Every effort is made to maintain the rapport and mutual trust and respect which already exist.

b. U.S. civilian and military intelligence support to the internal defense intelligence system may consist of advice, financial and material aid, provisions for professional education, and development of an intelligence documentary data base. Most of this effort is directed at the host country national level, but mobile training teams and advisors may be sent throughout the country to subnational levels. Some military intelligence advisors may also be required to assist nonmilitary elements.

c. U.S. Army involvement in the internal defense intelligence system gradually may branch out into subnational areas. Intelligence advisors may be sent to assist commanders and staffs of selected combat, combat support, and combat service support units of the host country—both military and paramilitary. Intelligence programs of instruction are established. Buildup of the U.S. in-country military intelligence effect also includes U.S. Army intelligence participation on intelligence staffs of the NIDCC and area coordination centers at major subnational level, as well as provision of advisors to the host country military intelligence organizations which directly support the NIDCC and area coordination centers. These facilities serve as a focus for issuing requests for information, receipt and evaluation of collected data, and rapid dissemination to all agencies, particularly those which can readily exploit the information. Overall planning and supervision on an integrated U.S./host country basis of intelligence collection, processing, and production programs is necessary to insure an effective and efficient effort that meets the U.S. and host country intelligence requirements. This is accomplished by the intelligence director and integrated staff at each level. Special benefits of an integrated U.S./host country staff are to:

(1) Reduce misunderstanding and confusion between U.S. and host country intelligence authorities.

(2) Eliminate gaps and undue duplication of intelligence effort.

(3) Make available specialist personnel and expertise necessary for the production of required intelligence estimates or for rapid, accurate evaluation of estimates prepared by others.

(4) Improve supervision over intelligence personnel management through better evaluation of tasks to be accomplished and resource availability.

(5) Establish and supervise activities to support in-country intelligence requirements for centralized intelligence data processing, storage, and retrieval.

6–13. Relation of U.S. Tactical Forces to the Area Intelligence System

a. U.S. Army tactical units, introduced into a country where the combined U.S./host country area intelligence system is already developed, work with the area intelligence elements on a mutual support basis. This relationship is shown schematically in figure 6–1.

b. U.S. tactical forces arrive in-country with attached military intelligence support detachments. The makeup of these detachments is similar to the structure of standard MID; however, strengths of



Figure 6–1. Relationship of tactical units to area intelligence system at subnational level.

their functional intelligence elements are based upon predetermined intelligence needs of the tactical forces. These attached MID provide most of the intelligence specialist support required by their respective tactical forces, but the wide-ranging nature of tactical operations results in some dependence upon the area coordination centers for current intelligence and additional spe-

cialist support required for each specific mission within their current areas of operation.

c. When tactical forces are deployed in such a manner whereby they are subject to frequent and sudden change of locations, they should not be given responsibility for long-term, area-oriented intelligence programs. However, they may contribute significantly to short-term collection and production efforts in support of area coordination center intelligence programs.

d. Details regarding functional intelligence support arrangements with tactical forces are found in subsequent chapters of this manual.

CHAPTER 7
PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

7–1. Introduction

a. The primary responsibility of intelligence personnel engaged in stability operations is to produce intelligence aimed at preventing or defeating an insurgency. To defeat an insurgency, information must be collected and intelligence produced on virtually all aspects of the internal defense environment. When insurgents are known to be receiving aid from an external power, it will be necessary to obtain information on the role of the external power in the insurgency.

b. The scope of the intelligence cycle described in FM 30–5 differs only in its application to the production of intelligence for stability operations. In planning, for example, information is not only needed on the armed insurgents but also on their underground organization and their relations with the populace as well. In collecting information, the local population represents one of the most lucrative sources of information. In processing information into intelligence, sociological, economic, and political requirements may have equal or even higher priority with conventional military needs. Governmental and private agencies, military and nonmilitary, host country and allied, may all represent valid users of the intelligence products. This section of the manual is designed to supplement the contents of FM 30–5 regarding intelligence production by covering those aspects of the internal defense environment which *do* or *can* affect the production of intelligence for stability operations.

7–2. Pattern Analysis Techniques

a. A sound collection program and proper utilization of the various collection agencies and sources of information will result in a very heavy volume of information which flows into the respective intelligence staff's processing element. The very nature of the insurgent environment, his base area system and his political and military tactics, dictate that intelligence requirements can be met only by reporting minute details on a great variety of subject areas. Each one of these details may appear unrelated to others and insignificant by itself, but when painstakingly mapped and otherwise chronologically recorded over long periods of time and analyzed in the light of other details reported, they may lend to definitive and predictable patterns of insurgent activity.

b. The insurgent recognizes his shortcomings in his military posture and must, therefore, minimize the weaknesses inherent in employing and supporting isolated, unsophisticated forces, using a ponderous and primitive communication and logistical system. He must make maximum use of the weather, terrain, and the population, employing secrecy, surprise, and simplicity. But to be implemented by their forces, the plans must be simple, comprehensive, and *repetitive.* Therefore, the solution to a given problem is composed of a system or systems which together are complex, but apart are independent, having simple, logical, and uniform characteristics. Because of the interaction of the various systems and the educational level of the individuals employed, the systems and planned solutions are not conducive to change; instead, they remain organically *inflexible* until disturbed by an unanticipated activity or influence. In developing a pattern analysis, it is important that not only insurgency actions and activities are charted resulting from the insurgents' own initiative, but also those actions and activities which result from friendly tactical operations. As actions of friendly forces disturb the environment and patterns of insurgent activities, it forces the insurgent into unanticipated and unrehearsed situations which can be exploited tactically. COMINT may be used to obtain direct insights into insurgent operations and plans by exploiting insurgent communications sytems. The basic objective of the pattern analysis technique should aim to answer the two basic questions: (1) Where can the enemy be expected to be found? and (2) Where would the enemy normally not be expected to be found?

c. The data to be developed and compiled by subject matter vary considerably with the intensity of the insurgent's operations. The types of overlays and categories of subjects plotted thereon will, therefore, vary extensively according to the needs. The use of a graphic keying system and color schemes in conjunction with large scale maps will greatly facilitate data analysis when superimposing transparent overlays.

7–3. Intelligence Estimate

a. Upon completion of the study of an area, an intelligence estimate of the insurgency is prepared. There are certain differences between these estimates and those used in conventional military operations. The main difference is in the matter of relative emphasis given to the various component parts. The statement of the mission, for example, may be a more complicated process than is generally involved in estimates concerned with conventional battlefield situations because of the wide scope of stability operations and its relationships with other portions of the internal defense program. In the body of the estimate a chief difference from conventional estimates is in the relative emphasis accorded nontactical considerations, such as psychological, political, sociological, and economic factors. The number of factors to be considered in the deliberative process of comparing advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action may also make the process considerably more complicated than conventional intelligence estimates, where terrain, weather, and a visible, tangible enemy are the chief factors to be considered. The intelligence estimate for a stability operation, as in any situation, is based on all available intelligence and considers everything of operational significance. A format of an intelligence estimate for stability operations is contained in appendix D.

b. In addition to assessing the operational situation at hand, the intelligence estimate should be used by research and analysis staffs at appropriate levels for considered speculation as to eventualities which may develop in other areas of the world as a consequence of present insurgency situations. Intelligence estimates should thus be accompanied or followed by assumptions as to situations which may result in the event a given enemy insurgency operation proves to be successful and the effects such successes might have on U.S. security and strategy. Such an analysis has great potential in guiding U.S. training and operational policy for future commitments.

c. The initial intelligence estimate will serve to point out the gaps which exist in intelligence holdings. Gaps which exist in general knowledge will be combined with more specific requirements and will be the subjects of initial intelligence requirements. The informational requirements must be readily available to the area coordination center so that intelligence operational plans can be formulated and detailed collection guidance provided the collectors. Collection planning must insure that requests for information are valid, clear, and concise so that the specific requirements are fulfilled.

d. A basic requirement in stability operations is a thorough understanding of the target area in all its aspects. Knowledge of the nature of the target society must be augmented by a complete understanding of the internal and external forces at work, those supporting the integrity of the society as well as those engaged in subverting it. Only when these factors are thoroughly understood can apropriate programs be effected. All available assets must be utilized to provide this intelligence.

e. Commanders, intelligence staffs, and intelligence specialists must recognize the impact which political, economic, and sociological factors have on tactical operations of the insurgent and friendly forces. This applies even to a very narrow, confined, and localized situation. Therefore, an intense and continuing study must be made of local history and developments, contemporary personalities, aspirations, and motivations. Because political, sociological, and economic factors are overlapping and interdependent, collation and interpretation of such data are extremely intricate and can seldom be reduced to formulization similar to order of battle.

Section II. PLANNING THE COLLECTION EFFORT

7–4. Determination of Intelligence Requirements

a. In conventional military operations, intelligence staffs assess the objective factors in an area, such as weather and terrain, and the subjective factors comprising the enemy situation. The intelligence needs for stability operations are based upon broader considerations of the insurgent situ-

ation and the operational environment. The latter consists of both the geography and the people of an area. Once the mission is understood, valid intelligence requirements are determined by considering these two variables.

b. Stability operations which are directed against the insurgents generate intelligence requirements based primarily on insurgent capabilities. The operational environment is considered primarily only to the extent that it influences insurgent capabilities. In an incipient insurgency where minimal violence is occurring, requirements will be obtained primarily from a consideration of the nonviolent insurgent capabilities in the political, economic, social, and psychological fields, and from the insurgent's support capabilities (intelligence and security, recruitment and retention, organization and training, and finance and logistics). Intelligence gaps in each of these areas are determined and become intelligence requirements, i.e., the information needed to produce the intelligence necessary for operations against the insurgents.

c. In addition to considering the capabilities of the enemy, whether they be basic or supporting, cognizance must also be taken of the operational environment. Nonviolent insurgent activity attacking the economic structure of the country would, for instance, be strongly affected by the climate of the region and the terrain. Terrain considerations may materially affect the insurgent's capability in the sociological field. For example, terrain often determines the location of people and their degree of isolation from the rest of society. The people themselves will have a strong influence on insurgent capabilities. If they refuse to give logistical support to the insurgents, for instance, the entire insurgent effort will be significantly hindered. Stability operations aimed at internal development programs are based primarily on the operational environment as it is influenced by insurgents. For example, internal development plans for improving agricultural production in a certain area will generate requirements concerning terrain, climate, and existing agricultural conditions. Also, there is a requirement for determination of ways in which the insurgents may influence the people and affect any government effort in the area.

d. Positive management is essential to the effectiveness of the intelligence system in support of stability operations. Developed requirements must give purpose and direction to the collection system to obtain needed information. Planning must result in efficient utilization of the available intelligence resources. No intelligence system can be effective without this management; nor can any satisfactory system be developed without considering how the available means and resources can work toward a clearly definable end requirement. It is essential that intelligence requirements be clear and concise and that they continuously be revised and updated to meet the commander's need as the situation changes.

7–5. Intelligence Priorities

a. The terms "essential elements of information (*EEI*)" and "other intelligence requirements (*OIR*)" represent a priority system for arranging critical elements of information required by a commander, with the *EEI* having the highest priority. (For a discussion of these terms, see FM 30–5.) These requirements are arranged in a descending order of priority in the collection plan. The purpose of the priority system is to insure the most effective use of the collection means available; because, in most instances, the requirements exceed the capabilities of the means available.

b. EEI and *OIR* are formulated for stability operations by the same careful considerations as are present for conventional intelligence requirements. However, the collection planning process in stability operations must make provision for political, economic, and sociological data collection, and the intelligence officer must be concerned with a wide variety of nontactical data to support the mission of the command.

c. The following listing shows examples of EEI which may have application in an insurgency situation:

(1) Are there any legal political organizations which may be a front for insurgent activities?

(2) What are the salient geographic, demographic, social, political, and economic characteristics of the urban and rural areas?

(3) Are the political boundaries established by the insurgent the same as those established by the government?

(4) What psychological operations activities are being conducted by the insurgent? What are the indications of its effectiveness?

(5) What is the nature of national and local

communication media (radio, TV, newspaper, etc.)? Does it support national objectives?

(6) What social problems (juvenile delinquency, narcotic addiction, unemployment, poverty, etc.) are, or may become, significant?

(7) What public assistance programs are offered, upon what basis is assistance granted, and to whom? Are there significant weaknesses in the programs?

(8) Is the public education system vulnerable to infiltration by insurgent agents (with a long term aim of gaining control of the population through the youth of the country?

(9) What is the influence of politics on teachers, textbooks, and students, conversely, what influence does the education system exercise on politics?

(10) What is the nature of labor organizations; what relationships exist between these organizations, the government, and the insurgents?

(11) What general economic conditions and problems of the nation (limited human or natural resources, low per capita income, savings, consumption, national goals, etc.) are vulnerable to insurgent attack?

(12) What general conditions and problems exist in the national transportation system (rail, vehicular, water, air)?

(13) What relationships exist among organized and unorganized religious and religious leaders (indigenous and missionary), the established government, and the insurgents?

(14) What are the principal nonindigenous sources of support for the insurgents? What form does this support take and what are the channels through which it is transmitted?

(15) What urban and rural social stratum or strata provide the greatest support to the insurgency? What form does support take (food, clothing, shelter, etc.)?

(16) In what areas are insurgent forces located?

(17) In what areas are government controls most effective? Why?

(18) In what areas are the people in sympathy with the insurgent forces? Why?

(19) In what areas are insurgent forces in full or partial control?

(20) In what areas are insurgent forces active?

(21) What activities are most evident in specific areas (subversion, attacks, assassinations, intimidation, kidnapping, propaganda, taxation, bribery, sabotage, rallies)?

(22) Has the insurgent force established patterns of deployment?

(23) Are insurgent redoubts, safe houses, factories, hospitals, caches, liaison sites, mission support sites, control points, and the like being pinpointed geographically?

(24) Are routes within operational areas constantly used by the insurgents?

(25) Are these routes and alternates defended?

(26) Are movements conducted in mass or sporadically in small groups?

(27) Are certain units characterized by their method of movement?

(28) What type of transport is used?

(29) Where is this transport procured?

7–6. Determination of Indicators

a. An indicator is any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity or any characteristic of the area of operations which points toward enemy vulnerabilities or the adoption or rejection by the insurgent of a particular capability which may influence the selection of a course of action.

b. FM 30–102 discusses indicators pertaining to various courses of action. These will have general application primarily in the later stages of an insurgency. In the earlier phases, indicators will be developed based on an analysis of insurgent operations and activities such as raids, ambushes, outpost attacks, assassinations, and sabotage. The intelligence officer's experience and background knowledge of insurgent operations and order of battle will play an important role in developing these important indicators. Appendix E is a listing of indicators for application in stability operations. The determination of indicators is further discussed in FM 30–5.

7–7. Sources of Information and Selection of Collection Agencies

a. The appropriate selection of agencies and of sources is discussed in FM 30–5, and that doctrine is generally applicable to stability operations. The one significant difference arises from the much wider variety of sources and agencies available to the intelligence officer in stability operations. His collection effort should reflect the flexibility that additional sources and agencies give him. The sources and agencies used will depend on require-

ment priorities, and these in turn are dependent on the insurgency phase. Another factor to be considered is the capabilities of the sources and agencies. While the principles are valid and the selection process is the same as in conventional warfare, the possibilities for collection will be increased.

b. During an insurgency, almost all government agencies, whether or not their primary function pertains to intelligence, are called upon to collect information. Therefore, a close liaison must exist between all nonmilitary collection agencies. Insurgents use widely divergent methods in their attempts to exploit government weaknesses and popular discontent. Government agencies involved in activities ranging from public health to communications should be called upon to assist in the collection of information relating to their fields of interest. The finished intelligence will be useful to these same agencies for further planning as well as to military planners.

c. Orders and requests for specific information are based on indicators. Collection agencies are directed or requested to supply the information which will confirm or deny the indicators. FM 30–5 contains a discussion of the formulation and dissemination of these orders and requests. In stability operations, emphasis should be placed on value of negative reports since a lack of enemy activity may be a significant indication of the insurgent's course of action in a particular area or a shifting of emphasis to another area.

d. FM 30–5 contains a discussion and an example of a collection plan. Appendix F is an example of a collection plan for stability operations. The EEI and OIR shown are based upon insurgent capabilities. The portion of the plan listing the collection agencies has been expanded to show the additional sources and agencies which are available for the collection of information. The collection agency shown simply as "military" is actually a composite of all the collection agencies available within the military organization. It can be expanded as appropriate by the intelligence officer in much the same manner as is shown in FM 30–5.

e. One of the significant variations to the overall collection program and the selection of collection agencies in stability operations is the heavy reliance on police, security, and counterintelligence units and agencies, particularly in the early phases of an insurgency. As a result of the subversive nature of an insurgency, these agencies which are normally charged with the conduct of counter-subversion operations have the best capabilities to satisfy a wide range of high-priority intelligence collection requirements. In conjunction with their mission to penetrate the insurgent infrastructure and the maintenance of area coverage-type informant networks, these agencies are also in a position to develop considerable information of potential intelligence value in the political, economic, and sociological fields.

7–8. PSYOP/Intelligence Relationships

a. The impact of the internal defense environment on psychological operations (PSYOP) has far reaching implications to intelligence planners. The role of PSYOP is of particular importance to internal defense programs and requires extensive intelligence support beyond that normally demanded of PSYOP conventional missions (FM 33–1 and FM 33–5).

b. Military psychological operations are completely dependent upon timely, accurate, and useful intelligence at all levels of command where PSYOP are employed. The success of such operations depends in great measure on their timing, which in turn depends on the relevance and scope of available intelligence. No two groups of insurgents have identical environments, attitudes, behavior, or motivations. It is also quite likely that factors present in the everyday life of different groups within an insurgent movement would change the psychological approach to individual elements within the same insurgent force. Intelligence to support PSYOP against the insurgents will not necessarily be adequate for psychological operations directed towards the population as a whole. Psychological operations can have little hope of success in trying to influence the minds of audiences without the benefit of all intelligence available to give the psychological operators the needed insight into what makes these audiences think and act the way they do. These extensive intelligence requirements in support of PSYOP place a heavy burden on host country and U.S. intelligence organizations.

c. Intelligence staffs and personnel responsible for planning and directing the collection effort in the internal defense environment must establish and maintain close and continuous contact with the civil-military operations officer or staff and operational PSYOP elements to insure that the necessary intelligence is obtained to support psychological operations. Coordination and liaison be-

tween intelligence and PSYOP operational elements must be maintained at all echelons and information obtained in response to high priority requirements should be passed laterally to appropriate PSYOP operational elements. PSYOP operational elements must also be included in the dissemination of all information and intelligence reports pertinent to PSYOP use. In considering possible sources for intelligence requirements, planners should include PSYOP personnel as contributors to the overall collection effort.

7–9. Civil Affairs/Intelligence Relationships

a. In the internal defense operational environment the country subject to insurgency is often a poorly administered country and the government's activities and influences may reach certain remote areas of the country only infrequently. Military and paramilitary forces often may be utilized in such regions to correct this deficiency. More intelligence support is required for such a mission than that associated with conventional civil affairs requirements. As with psychological operations, intelligence planning staffs must establish and maintain close and continuous liaison with the civil-military operations officer or staff and civil affairs operational elements to insure proper intelligence support to these activities (FM 41–5 and FM 41–10). Close coordination between intelligence and civil affairs operational elements should be maintained down to the lowest tactical echelon where such personnel are deployed; information obtained in response to high priority requirements should be passed laterally to appropriate civil affairs elements.

b. Military civil affairs in stability operations make it necessary for civil affairs personnel to develop a close relationship with representatives of the civil community. This requirement places civil affairs personnel in a very favorable position to collect information vital to the command's internal defense intelligence needs. In considering possible sources for intelligence requirements, planners should include such civil affairs personnel as contributors to the overall collection effort.

7–10. Military Police/Intelligence

a. Internal defense operations are characterized by "frontline" involvement of host country police elements (both civilian and military) in identifying and neutralizing insurgent and other subversive organizations and movements, particularly in the early stages of an insurgency. In fact, in some host countries, the police elements my represent the only significant and cohesive defense or security forces involved in countering a developing or existing insurgency.

b. U.S. Military Police assist host country police forces in providing training and advice in internal defense operations. They also participate in combined host country-U.S. police operations in support of coordinated military stability operations as well as civilian internal defense operations. Advisory or operational support to host country civilian police agencies is provided upon request for assistance to appropriate U.S. civilian agencies which have primary responsibility for advising civilian police and internal security agencies.

c. As a result of the military police mission, their close association with host country police forces, and daily contact with the population, military police elements can provide significant information on an impending or existing insurgency. Furthermore, current information of potential intelligence value is frequently obtained on a biproduct basis through an active police intelligence collection effort and wide use of police informants oriented at countering criminal activities or in support of populace or resources control operations. Military intelligence elements may be able to provide timely military, political, economic, and sociological intelligence information which will assist military police elements in the performance of their mission. Close coordination between military intelligence and military police elements should be maintained down to the lowest tactical echelon where such elements are operating. Intelligence staffs should also consider military police elements as a collection agency which may be capable of fulfilling certain intelligence requirements in support of the respective command or the tactical unit commander. For details on military police operations in support of stability operations, see FM 19–50.

Section III. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

7–11. General

Collection of information is the systematic extraction of information from sources by military and government agencies.

7–12. Individual Sources

During an insurgency, and particularly in its earliest stages, the most abundant source of information available to government collection agencies at the local level is the *people*. Many people, and particularly members of dissident groups and their leaders, possess information about insurgent personnel, their intelligence collection activities, and their local supporters. Still larger segments of the local population will have first hand knowledge of insurgent psychological operations and propaganda. To deal effectively with the people, the intelligence officer needs to know the political, economic, and sociological conditions and the existing or potential causes of popular dissension. Some examples of individuals who, because of their work or position, should receive primary consideration among collection planners in attempting to select specific sources of information are—

a. Leaders of Dissident Groups (minorities, religious sects, labor unions, political factions) who may be able to identify insurgent personnel, their methods of operation, and local agencies the insurgents hope to exploit. The insurgents will attempt to contact these groups and their leaders in order to—

(1) Determine the principal causes of discontent which can best be exploited to overthrow the established government.

(2) Recruit loyal supporters.

b. Merchants who will have detailed information on local economic conditions and the attitudes and grievances of the people. Such knowledge will result from daily contact and business dealings. They may also be able to identify insurgent personnel and their specific needs such as money, clothing, food, weapons, and drugs if they have been contacted by the insurgents to provide these items.

c. Bar owners and bar girls who may be able to identify insurgent personnel, their intelligence targets and information requirements, and their methods of operations. Bar girls are frequently employed by insurgents to collect information, and bars are used as meeting places.

d. Native religious leaders and foreign missionaries who will have detailed information about people belonging to their sects—attitudes, problems, grievances and their attendant causes, such as local economic, sociological, and political conditions. Native religious leaders and missionaries are familiar with local geography by virtue of having lived and traveled throughout the area for many years.

e. Medical personnel (doctors, nurses, hospital employees) who may be able to identify insurgent personnel, their plans, and their need for doctors, nurses, and medicine. The insurgents will need medical personnel and supplies to treat their patients.

f. Ordinary citizens who are typical members of organizations or associations which represent predominant local occupations, such as farming, industry, labor unions, farm cooperatives, social organizations, political parties, religious groups, and other organizations which play an important role in the local society.

g. Insurgents who are recruited or who volunteer to work for friendly forces, become informants and can provide detailed, firsthand, and current information. Such information will enable early offensive action against the insurgents rather than simple defensive reaction.

h. Insurgent defectors who can also provide detailed, firsthand information concerning insurgent organization and activities. However, much of the information they possess may be valid only up to the time of their defection or shortly thereafter. To effectively exploit defector-supplied information, it must be acted upon quickly, before the insurgents discover the defection and take countermeasures.

i. Captured insurgents who possess most of the attributes of informants and defectors with regard to their ability to provide information. The greatest difference between informants, defectors, and captured insurgents lies in their willingnses to provide information. Most informants and defectors *want* to provide information in order to assist in the defeat of the insurgent and/or to benefit themselves. Captured insurgents, on the other hand have come under government control involuntarily, and because they may have been highly trained and indoctrinated with an insurgent ideology, normally will be unwilling to provide any information.

7–13. Insurgent Inspired Activities and Their Effects

a. Insurgent inspired activities and their effects may provide the intelligence officer with detailed information to support stability operations. Factors to consider include the following:

(1) Strangers appearing in urban and rural areas may be insurgents, particularly if the areas are remote and not normally visited by strangers, or if the areas are undergoing a period of unrest.

(2) Unscheduled meetings among the people

may indicate that insurgents have recently entered an area and are beginning their attempts to win the support of the people.

(3) In rural areas the discovery of unexplained trails, recently used campsites, small farm plots, caches of food, clothing, and weapons may indicate that insurgents have recently moved into an area but do not yet want to make their presence known.

b. Insurgent intelligence collection activities will be of two types—overt and clandestine. Overt activities involve open collection of information by insurgents who circulate among the people and those who attempt to procure local maps, publications containing information about the area, and official government and military publications available to the general public. Clandestine activities involve secret collection of information by insurgent agents who may join mass organizations, government agencies, the police, and military intelligence units. Unusual activity by government employees, such as unexplained absences, overtime or weekend work when the workload does not justify it, and taking official documents home overnight may mean that they are providing information to the insurgents. Government workers who are living beyond their normal means may be able to do so because they are receiving money or other material rewards fom the insurgents in exchange for information concerning their agencies. When information received from established sources is consistently false, misleading, or of no value, these sources are likely to be under insurgent control. When all government efforts fail to identify and apprehend insurgents known to be in the area, this is an indication that insurgent informants are likely to be present in the government forces and are able to anticipate government actions.

c. Insurgent psychological operations have two general aims—to weaken the established government and to win the support of the people. Often both these aims are achieved by a single act. The following indicates types of insurgent psychological operations, their effects on the local population, and the information that can be derived from them:

(1) Activities to weaken the established government are antigovernment propaganda; assassination and kidnapping of local government leaders; breakdowns in government provided public services; use of influential organizations, groups and individuals, knowingly or unknowingly, to create or spread statements of dissatisfaction throughout the local government and military, its activities, plans and personnel. Other enervating activities include instigating riots, strikes, and demonstrations to cause government or military forces to react violently resulting in mistreatment or death of some of the individuals involved. In countries where there are several religious groupings, insurgent propaganda may cause religious unrest by making one religous sect feel that another is receiving preferential treatment from the government.

(2) Propaganda that stresses popular grievances typifies activity carried on to win support of the populace. Strangers who spend most of their time mingling with the people and who become popular by showing the people practical ways to improve their living conditions often are an indication of activity to win popular support. Terroristic acts (assassination, kidnapping, mutilation) against unpopular government agencies signify that the insurgents are attempting to win the support of the people by eliminating individuals and agencies they consider to be oppressive. The formation or resurgence of organizations whose aims are to alleviate local grievances is still another indication of activity to win the support of the people.

d. Newly formed organizations or reappearance of formerly inactive organizations, attacking local government or stressing immediate social, political, or economic reform may be an indication that the insurgents have gained a significant degree of control.

e. Insurgent recruitment and training of new personnel is a continuous process. Insurgent movements make it a practice to give continuous political indoctrination, leadership training, and training in the methods of revolution to selected key members of the movements. Some typical insurgent recruitment and training activities and their effects are as follows:

(1) The unexplained disappearance of young men may indicate insurgent recruitment and departure to receive training at another location.

(2) Reports from people concerning contacts by strangers to join new movements or underground organizations may indicate that insurgents are actively engaged in recruitment. These reports may also indicate patterns and targets of insurgent recruitment.

(3) Radical and hostile changes in the attitude of the people toward the government may indicate that the people have been subverted by the insurgents.

(4) Unexpected shortages of doctors, printers, and other specialists may indicate that they have been recruited or forced by the insurgents to work for the movement.

(5) Travel by individuals to foreign areas or local areas under insurgent control may indicate that these individuals are receiving training and indoctrination or are somehow engaged in insurgent activities.

(6) The apprehension of individuals engaged in subversive activities, clandestine information collection, or sabotage, is usually a clear indication that they are part of the insurgent movement.

f. Insurgents depend in varying degrees upon local sources for financial and logistical support. Their procurement needs during any particular period may indicate a financial and material weaknesses or it may indicate their future intentions (large scale procurement of arms, ammunition, and medical supplies indicate that the insurgents are preparing for guerrilla warfare). The principal items which the insurgents may procure locally are—

(1) *Money.*

(2) *Food.*

(3) *Clothing and field equipment.*

(4) *Weapons, ammunition, and explosives.*

(5) *Medical supplies.*

(6) *Printing material and equipment for propaganda purposes.*

7–14. Objects as Sources of Information

The final category of sources of information consists of objects. This category is broad, ranging from objects which provide specific information on the identity and plans of the insurgents, (e.g., captured documents) to objects which provide general information on local, social, political, and economic conditions (e.g., area studies). Some specific objects used as sources of information are—

a. Physical Evidence. Before the insurgent becomes firmly established in an area, he craves anonymity. Indicators which betray his presence, however, are—

(1) New trails and campsites in remote areas.

(2) Apartments or homes which are occupied at irregular intervals by strangers who keep odd hours or act in a suspicious manner.

(3) Caches of food, weapons, ammunition, transceivers, clothing, and medicine.

(4) Captured insurgent documents regarding such subjects as—

(*a*) Insurgent cadre members and their supporters (both foreign and local).

(*b*) The insurgent organization.

(*c*) The insurgent routes of communication, camps, caches, and "safe houses."

(*d*) Local insurgent targets.

(*e*) Insurgent plans.

(*f*) Insurgent doctrine and methods of operation.

(*g*) Adjacent insurgent units.

(5) Propaganda reveals targets (government agencies, official programs, unpopular local conditions) which the insurgent intends to attack. Analysis of the propaganda message may reveal segments of the local populace to which the propaganda is addressed and may help to determine the origin.

(6) Photographs are excellent sources of information, alone or as supplements to oral or written reports. Typical photographs which provide valuable information are—

(*a*) Photos of insurgents which provide positive identification.

(*b*) Photos of known insurgent bases, caches, and meeting sites.

(*c*) Chance or intentional photos of insurgents engaged in illegal activity.

(*d*) Photos of demonstrations, riots, and strikes which may provide positive identification of insurgent agitators present at these events.

(*e*) Photos of the results of insurgent terroristic acts which provide vivid pictorial evidence that can be used psychologically against the insurgents.

b. Documents Concerning the Local Situation.

(1) *Maps.* Detailed topographic maps will indicate the local areas best suited for insurgent bases and routes of communication. If the locations of the insurgents' activities are known, they may be plotted on maps to enable the intelligence officer to deduce patterns and thus anticipate future insurgent moves.

(2) *Official publications.* Official publications prepared by government agencies or private organizations under government contract, provide a wealth of information to stability operations planners. Examples of publications which may exist are—

(*a*) Statistical studies concerning the crime rate and types of crimes committed.

(*b*) Studies of the local economic situation.

(*c*) Reports on local public health and sanitation.

(3) *Books.* Books written about the local area should not be overlooked as possible sources of information, particularly if they are factual texts. These books may be useful as background material for more detailed area studies or may explain the causes of racial, religious or other tensions.

(4) *Newspapers.* Newspapers may contain valuable information which has not yet come to the attention of the government. Newspaper reporters frequently have an excellent informant network which enables them to obtain new information as early as possible.

7–15. Indigenous Government Collection Agencies

a. Most indigenous government agencies collect information in the performance of their governmental functions. All national and subordinate level governmental agencies, therefore, with a capability to collect information should be considered by internal defense intelligence planners in planning the collection effort.

b. At the local level the police are often the best information collection agency. In performing their law enforcement role they develop a thorough knowledge of the local environment. The type and quantity of information the police can collect is almost limitless. This collection capability is more easily understood when one recognizes that police units usually are recruited from the local population and remain assigned to the same area. By operating in the same area for years, police accumulate detailed data on such useful information as the local social, economic, political, and religious conditions, the attitude of the people concerning the government and the insurgents, and insurgent organization and activities. They also are usually completely familiar with terrain features of the areas in which they are stationed.

(1) Routine patrols afford the police an excellent opportunity to collect information by associating with the people, observing events along the patrol route, and investigating suspicious activity. Surveillance of suspected persons, places, and things discloses the existence of insurgent activities and reveals the identities of those engaged in such activities. Investigation of crimes may also reveal a relationship between the crimes and the insurgents.

(2) Informants, routinely employed by the police to detect criminal activity, are often knowledgeable of insurgents as well, and interrogation of known or suspected insurgents may yield detailed information on aspects of the insurgent movement. Searchers of suspected buildings and locations, and seizure of their contents, may produce individuals and/or items of intelligence value. Finally, police checkpoints, both stationary and mobile, may detect the movement of insurgent personnel and supplies and lead to the discovery of insurgent routes of communication, bases, and caches.

(3) Although the police are capable of collecting a great deal of information, certain factors often limit their information collection capability. Good relations with the people are often lacking and local police forces frequently do not have sufficiently trained manpower to operate effectively. Adequate funds usually are not available to support operations effectively. Also, police forces usually lack sufficient equipment to provide mobility and rapid communication; police records and files usually are rudimentary.

c. When a national intelligence service exists apart from police and military intelligence, it may have the best human, finanial, and material resources to enable it to engage in overt and covert information collection.

d. Other specialized government agencies will often possess a useful collection capability. Examples of such agencies are—

(1) *The Ministry of Agriculture.*

(*a*) Agricultural agents can obtain such information as—local agricultural conditions and problems; irregularities such as theft or diversion of crops and livestock from the open market to the insurgents; and the attitudes and grievances of local farmers. This information may be collected in the following ways: personal observation of local conditions by field representatives, interviews with local farmers and agricultural specialists, and casual conversation with local farmers while providing them assistance.

b) The limitations based on the above capabilities and employment are that sufficient agricultural specialists usually are not available to cover all rural areas, and these specialists, when they exist, must be trained to collect the type information needed by internal defense forces.

(2) *The Ministry of Public Health.*

(*a*) Representatives of this organization can collect data on local health and sanitary conditions, theft of drugs and other medical supplies from government facilities by insurgents, the attitude of the people toward government health and

sanitation programs, and the effectiveness of these programs. Information of this type can be collected by field representatives of the Ministry of Public Health in the following ways: personal observation of local conditions, interviews of local medical personnel and patients, and casual conversations with medical personnel and patients.

(*b*) The limitations of the Ministry of Public Health are the same as those of the Ministry of Agriculture.

(3) *The Ministry of Communications.* This ministry can be a source of information on establishment of new commercial and amateur radio stations; evidence of use of unauthorized frequencies, and unusual traffic patterns on commercial communication systems.

7–16. Insurgent Countermeasures To Deny Information

a. Insurgent cadre entering an area for the first time often pose as legitimate workers, refugees, and settlers. They will be extremely security conscious and organized into small cells which often will not openly associate with one another. Insurgent communications will be covert, and almost all insurgent information collection activities will be conducted clandestinely. Insurgent propaganda will be so worded as to disguise the relationship between the propaganda and the insurgent movement; front organizations established by the insurgents may appear as legal organizations whose stated aims openly support—but covertly subvert —the government.

b. Insurgent activities such as assassination and robberies may be executed in such a way as to appear to be the work of common criminals. Insurgent installations in urban areas will be disguised or hidden. In rural areas insurgent bases, caches, and supply routes will be located where they are not likely to be discovered by patrols or aerial reconnaissance.

Section IV. PROCESSING OF INFORMATION

7–17. General

Processing is the step in the intelligence cycle whereby information becomes intelligence and consists of recording, evaluation, integration, and interpretation. The processing of information is discussed in FM 30–5. There are certain considerations, however, which are unique to the internal defense environment. In order to properly determine insurgent capabilities and courses of action and to provide the intelligence necessary for all facets of stability operations, the intelligence officer must be guided by an awareness of these considerations.

7–18. Recording

As in conventional tactical situations, stability operations will be characterized by the accumulation of vast amounts of information on a continuous basis which must be promptly compared with existing information and intelligence in order to determine its significance. The extent of the recording effort will depend to a large degree upon the insurgent activity in the area, and the personnel available to maintain and analyze the recorded information All of the recording aids mentioned below, however, serve a unique and useful purpose in the overall intelligence production effort. FM 30–5 gives a detailed description of the journal file, intelligence journal, and intelligence workbook. FM 101–5 gives an example of a staff journal. Variations in recording devices which are unique to stability operations occur in the use of annotated maps and working files. These are discussed below:

a. Annotated Maps. Depending on the echelon of responsibility, the state of insurgent activity in the area, and the degree of knowledge of the enemy, the graphic representation of current intelligence will require the maintenance of at least two annotated maps—the incident map and the insurgent situation map. Each of these recording devices normally will take the form of a transparent overlay covering a large scale topographic map of the area. Unlike the workbook, which is maintained for individual use, the incident and situation maps provide a ready guide to associates and a meaningful aid for briefing the commander, the civil authorities, or other interested parties. If activity in a particular area is limited, consideration may be given to the combination of these two maps. Other annotated maps may be valuable aids for the recording of information or intelligence, depending on the needs of a particular headquarters' tactical area of responsibility. These special-purpose maps may include records of mining and boobytraps incidents; enemy names or codes for local terrain features, villages, areas, trails, etc.; and reports of other enemy activity. It may be necessary to enlarge certain areas of interest

either by drawing portions of the map to a larger scale, with the addition of significant detail, or by making a mosaic from aerial photos. The important factor is that past, present, and potential insurgent activity must be visible in terms of a detailed and thorough understanding of the environment. Comparison of the several annotated maps maintained will often assist the intelligence officer in estimating the enemy's intentions and capabilities or to establish trends.

(1) *Incident map.* The incident map provides historical cumulative information to trends and patterns of insurgent activity. Properly maintained, the distribution of entries will enable the intelligence officer to make judgments as to the nature and location of insurgent targets in the area, the relative intensity of insurgent interest in specific areas, insurgent control over or support from the population, and potential areas of insurgent operations. Judgments concerning the latter also require knowledge of terrain factors and insurgent limitations.

(2) *Insurgent situation map.* The situation map represents finished intelligence, much of it built around the information recorded on the incident map. It will be difficult to pinpoint insurgent installations and dispositions with the same degree of confidence as in a conventional tactical situation. The insurgents can displace on short notice, making a report outdated before it can be confirmed. While the situation map presents an uncertain and hypothetical picture, composed less of firm information than of reports or fleeting targets, estimates, and abstractions, it may substantiate in graphic terms the trends or patterns derived from the incident map resulting in improved economy and effectiveness of the surveillance and reconnaissance effort.

(3) *Trap map.* This map is used if the insurgent has a capability for sabotage or terrorist action. It can be constructed by direct annotation of the map on which the situation overlay is placed, or it can be kept separately. This map will portray locations in the area of responsibility which present particularly attractive targets for insurgent sabotage or terrorism, such as road and railroad bridges, communications centers, theaters and assembly halls, and places where the terrain favors ambushes and raids. Such areas should be identified and analyzed as part of the area study, but they should also be plainly marked on this map with attention directed to possible insurgent access and escape routes. Photographs which are keyed to the map can also supplement this effort.

(4) *Population status map.* This may consist simply of an overlay in the situation map. Essentially, this map will portray the attitudes of the population whether disaffected, loyalist, or doubtful. Colors can be used effectively to designate these conditions.

(5) *Personalities and contacts map.* What is known initially about the insurgent situation may consist primarily of information concerning locations and activities of individual agents of espionage, agitation, organization, and liaison. The appearances, movements, meetings, and disappearances of these personalities should be recorded on a personalities and contacts map. A large-scale map will be required for this purpose (a city street map or town plan if an urban area is involved). Deviations from regular patterns of movement can be detected in this manner. Depending upon the number of personalities under surveillance, the regularity of their habits, and the variety or reports received on them, it may be necessary to maintain a separate overlay for each subject. Old overlays should be filed for comparison. Each subject's route should be portrayed in a different color, and regularly traveled routes distinguished from new routes. Observations should be dated and incidents noted by symbol, if possible. Depending upon the amount of insurgent activity in the area of responsibility, this map may be combined with the incident map.

b. Working Files. The intelligence worksheet and the annotated maps serve to isolate problem areas and formulate relationships among the information and intelligence collected. Extensive research material is required, however, to analyze these problem areas. In the early phase of an insurgency, the enemy is building his own organization. His organizational procedures and tactics will, therefore, be unique, and familiarization of the part of the intelligence officer will require study of personalities and painstaking analysis of incidents. This necessitates the keeping of extensive working files, types of which include:

(1) *Hot file.* The most important working file will be the hot file. This will include all available material pertaining to an incident or groups of possibly related incidents which are of current interest. Also included will be material relating to persons or places likely to be involved in insurgent activity, together with material on agents or suspects who may be involved. A reported sabotage plot, for example, could initiate a hot file on the subject. The hot file remains active until the

report is refuted, the incident occurs, or the attention of the insurgent is diverted elsewhere.

(2) *Current propaganda and PSYOP file.* If propaganda constitutes a major part of the insurgent effort in the area, a file maintained by the analyst should contain all pertinent literature, background material and analyses available, to include copies of propaganda literature, transcripts of propaganda speeches, and analyses of local grievances being exploited or subject to exploitation by the insurgents.

(3) *Personality and organization files.* Attempts should be made to develop and maintain as detailed a local file on each insurgent personality as is possible. If surveillance is carried out by the local police, basic identifying and biographical information can be transferred from police dossiers to a card file. This file will support training of friendly surveillants in their ability to recognize key personalities on sight. The organization section of this file should include information on the history and activities of the insurgent organizations in the area and on fronts or other subversive or suspected groups. Officers and memberships, overlapping directorates and memberships, and liaison among these organizations should all be recorded and kept up to date.

(4) *Area study files.* Area study files should be established to maintain up-to-date and pertinent data in the geographic, political, sociological, economic, and cultural fields. In stability operations, even the lower echelon tactical commander, particularly when operating in the same general operational area over extended periods of time, has a definite requirement for such information. The intelligence staff officer should, therefore, have ready access to such data. The topical breakdown of such files should be oriented toward events and activities of continuing significance. Thus, for example, if rice is the basic staple in an economy, the topical breakdown in the economic portion should include files on rice production, distribution and marketing, price levels, black market and pilferage, etc. Since this key economic indicator will have continuing influence on friendly military operations as well as on the insurgent forces who depend on this staple for survival, careful analysis of this data over a period of time may provide patterns based on which insurgent actions could be anticipated and their capabilities predicted.

(5) *Resource file.* A resource file should include all material which may be of importance but not of immediate value. It can include inactive incident files, inactive personality and organization files, and photography. The latter material may be particularly useful. Air or ground photographs of places of interest should be arranged chronologically by location and should be readily available for use in conjunction with hot files, incident maps, trap maps, and the like.

(6) *Reference material.* A library should be maintained of reference publications such as manuals on doctrine and method, books on the area and on the insurgent threat, files of newspaper and magazine clippings, and any other material which may be of use. This material may be kept at a central library serving the entire staff and located at the area coordination center.

7–19. Evaluation

Evaluation involves the examination of information to determine its intelligence value. In evaluating information the knowledge and judgment of the intelligence analyst play a major role. In considering whether a fact or event is at all possible, it must be realized that certain events are possible despite the fact that they have not previously occurred and have been deemed unlikely to occur. While confirmation of information by other sources and agencies is always desirable, it is not always possible to obtain. Initially, intelligence production commences with unconfirmed information which is subsequently supported, confirmed, or denied by the collection of additional and related information. As more information is obtained, the insurgent situation, capabilities, and probable courses of action become increasingly clear. As the body of intelligence expands, information that is not compatible with the current insurgent situation and is not consistent with the recent pattern of insurgent activity is suspect. The process of evaluating information is discussed in detail in FM 30–5. Procedures governing the assignment of evaluation ratings to sources and agencies have equal application in the internal defense environment.

7–20. Integration

a. Evaluated information becomes intelligence only after it has been integrated with other information and interpreted to determine its significance. Integration involves the combining of selected data in order to form a pattern which will have meaning and establish a basis for interpretation (see para 7–2). It is important that the intelligence analyst be sufficiently perceptive to recognize all the possible patterns that may be formed.

An example will serve to illustrate the mental process of integration. The intelligence section of the area coordination center receives information that a prominent labor leader has been murdered. In a search for related information the intelligence analyst checks the incident file, the friendly and suspect personality files, and the organization file.

(1) The incident file reveals a series of murders that have been linked with the insurgent, with the primary victims being government officials, prosperous merchants, and large landholders who opposed insurgent objectives.

(2) The suspect personality file reveals the labor leader's controlling position within a union that has recently intensified its criticism of the government. The personality file also reveals the labor leaders' close association with several government officials and his recent extensive travel throughout the nation.

(3) The organization file indicates that the union has recently begun to disseminate antigovernment leaflets and has threatened to call a strike if demands for representation in a popular front government are not met. The organization file also indicates that a struggle for power has been taking place within the union. The other primary contender for union leadership is a relatively unknown newcomer.

b. Once the intelligence analyst has obtained all related items of information from the intelligence files, he begins to assemble the available information to form as many logical pictures or hypotheses as possible. Alternative methods of assembly are an essential prerequisite to any valid interpretation. Assembly of information to develop logical hypotheses requires good judgment and considerable background knowledge. In formulating hypotheses the intelligence analyst must avoid the limitations which result from preconceived opinions. In the example of the murdered union leader, the new information can be integrated with existing intelligence in several different ways. By combining the murder with one set of facts, the labor leader might be pictured as a loyal supporter of the government who became the victim of a campaign of selective terror undertaken by the insurgents. On the other hand, by combining the murder with another set of facts, the labor leader might be portrayed as a member of the insurgent organization who was murdered for reasons unconneced with the insurgency. As a third possibility, he may have been a member of the insurgent organization who was eliminated by the insurgents and, finally, there is a fourth possibility that both the labor leader and his murder are unconnected with the insurgency.

7–21. Interpretation

a. Interpretation is the result of making deductions as to the probable meaning of new information and determining its implications with respect to future insurgent activity. The meaning of the information is determined in relation to the insurgent situation and the insurgents' probable courses of action.

b. For example, in the case mentioned above, if the labor leader was loyal to the government and was murdered for opposing insurgent control of the union, it may reasonably be expected that further consolidation of insurgent control over the union, increased antigovernment agitation by the union, and possibly an extension of insurgent terrorist activities will take place.

c. If however, the labor leader was a member of the insurgent organization and was murdered by the insurgents, it may be conjectured that he was eliminated because he was considered unreliable or was progressing too slowly toward the achievement of insurgent objectives. In this case, the prompt emergence of another insurgent union leader who will insure more rapid progress toward insurgent objectives may be expected. It may also be inferred, however, that the labor leader was murdered as a result of a struggle for power within the insurgent organization. In this case, weaker insurgent control of the union may be expected due to the dissension among the insurgents.

d. Finally, if the labor leader had no connection with the insurgent organization and was murdered for reasons unconnected with the insurgency, this event has no significance from an intelligent standpoint.

e. Additional discussion of the interpretation function to include analysis, deduction, and bearing on the current intelligence estimate of the situation can be found in FM 30–5.

7–22. Order of Battle

a. The production of order of battle intelligence is discussed in FM 30–5. There are certain order of battle considerations, however, which are unique to the insurgent enemy. Order of battle intelligence is equally as important in an insurgency as in conventional combat operations. How-

ever, some differences in nomenclature and approach must be recognized. The applicability of the various order of battle factors will differ somewhat in an insurgency from conventional operations and there will also be differences in applicability between Phase I and Phase II insurgency situations. The elements of order of battle intelligence (order of battle factors) are not independent of each other; they are closely related and must be considered as a whole. Information on one of the elements will often lead to a re-evaluation or alteration of information previously received on another element. Furthermore, the general rule, whereby order of battle intelligence is developed and maintained down to and including two echelons below the analyst's own level of command, does not apply to stability operations. Due to the nature of the insurgency and the phased development of the insurgent forces, order of battle intelligence must be produced in much greater detail and pertain to much lower echelons (even down to squad) than in conventional combat operations.

b. A listing of the order of battle factors follows, together with a brief explanation of their applicability and means in the context of insurgency situations.

(1) *Composition.* In some insurgent movements, military force is only one of several instruments through which the insurgent movement seeks power. Development of a military force has the lowest priority during the early stages of an insurgency. As long as the party core and civil organizations are established and move effectively toward the goal of the insurgency, the military arm may either lie dormant or simply exist in cadre form until needed as a supporting force. See appendix B for further details on the composition of a type insurgent armed force organization.

(*a*) *Phase I considerations.* Rather than information on the identification and organization of specific enemy units, we are concerned with the types and internal workings of insurgent activity groups. Knowledge of the composition of insurgent groups can be a key to the entire planned course of the insurgency. Details of composition may include the appearance of new organizations, the relative amount of enemy effort expended in rural and urban operations, the internal chain of command and control, and the manner in which insurgent groups are organized for operations.

(*b*) *Phase II considerations.* The intelligence analyst will be concerned here with determining the composition of insurgent combat units, to include their organization and chain of command. The degree of sophistication encountered will be indicative of other factors, such as training logistics, strength, etc. Armed platoons or small terrorist cells would indicate that the overtly military portion of the insurgents' plan is just beginning; armed battalions and large urban terrorist groups indicate that there is a serious menace to the government in power.

(*c*) *Political structure.* At the center of some insurgent movements may be found a tightly disciplined party organization formally structured to parallel the existing government hierarchy in the country. In most instances this organizational structure will consist of committed organizations at the village, district, province, interprovincial, and national levels. Within major divisions and sections of an insurgent military headquarters totally distinct, but parallel, command channels exist. These are the military chain of command and the political channels of control. Whether it is through a political division of an insurgent military headquarters, a party cell or group in an insurgent military unit, or a unit political officer, the party insures complete domination over the military structure by use of its own parallel organization.

(*d*) *Combat forces.* The organization of insurgent combat forces is dependent upon the need, the tactics to be employed, and the availability of personnel and equipment. Frequently, subordinate elements of insurgent units are employed independently. The intelligence analyst who receives a confirmed report of a subordinate element of an insurgent unit operating in his area cannot, therefor, assume that the parent unit is also present. Identification of insurgent units may be by number, commander's names, nickname, code designation, and/or the name of the area in which it operates. Further, designations are frequently changed and multiple designations are used to confuse friendly intelligence. It follows that the intelligence analyst may not be able to make a determination of the size and strength of an insurgent unit merely by obtaining a unit identification.

(2) *Disposition.*

(*a*) *Insurgent forces.* Determination of the disposition of the insurgent involves the location of his operational bases, training bases, supply bases, lines of communication, and areas of political control. The intelligence analyst can arrive at potential dispositions of the insurgent combat forces by developing patterns of activity based upon map study and knowledge of insurgent tac-

tics. Insurgent base areas, for instance, normally are located near areas politically controlled by the insurgents, thereby providing an early warning system. By plotting insurgent sightings and combining this information with weather conditions, time factors, detailed investigation of insurgent incidents, and after action reports, the analyst can best select possible enemy dispositions as well as possible areas of tactical deployment. Consideration should also be given to areas where no insurgent activity has been reported. These areas, while appearing to be under the control of internal defense forces, may be under the political control of the insurgents.

(*b*) *Phase I considerations.* The location, deployment within this location, and any movements of insurgent organizations or personnel are of concern here. The enemy's strength and tactics may be revealed to some extent by discovering whether this effort is concentrated in a few places or dispersed throughout the target nation. If his effort is initially concentrated in one city or in one rural area, then the extent and rapid spread of the insurgent organizations are a key to how long he has been operational, how successful he has been, and, in part it is an indication of his appraisal of friendly strength. In a nation which he considers a relatively easy conquest he may begin with many operations rather than a few. By studying the other available elements of order of battle intelligence the intelligence analyst may determine such things as whether the movement of an enemy cadre or group is an advance toward new goals or a retreat from an unprofitable operation.

(*c*) *Phase II considerations.* The manner in which the insurgent forces are deployed can indicate whether the enemy is making a widespread show of strength with units scattered about the country or is concentrating them around a few key targets. It can also show whether he is going to concentrate on such activities as interdicting transportation or actively seeking battle with government forces.

(3) *Strength.*

(*a*) *Insurgent forces.* The strength of the insurgents must be thought of in terms of the combat forces, political cadres, and popular support. Conventional methods of strength computation can be applied in the determination of insurgent strength. The analyst should be aware, however, that the insurgent will attempt to have his strength overestimated by stability operations forces. In order to give this false impression, he will employ rapid movement of his units and use multiple designations for a single element. Reports from the populace concerning the strength of the insurgent forces should be viewed with caution and the importance of actual counts of enemy personnel stressed. Certain insurgent initiated incidents can provide useful indicators of the strength of the insurgents in a particular area. Examples of these are an increase in kidnapping or an increase in raids with subsequent loss of weapons. The determination of popular support for the insurgents is a more difficult task and can be stated best in terms of the percentage of an area under government control as opposed to the percentage under insurgent control, with both viewed together in terms of population density. A useful indicator of the extent of insurgent political control is the willingness of the populace to report information concerning the insurgents.

(*b*) *Phase I considerations.* The cadre who are used to organize and activate the movement usually are highly trained, aggressive professionals who exercise an influence out of proportion to their actual numbers. The analyst is also concerned with the number of enemy units in existence, which in Phase I means identifying and evaluating new groups and organizations which have appeared in the nation and any changes in the size of existent groups. While weapons are not a matter of paramount interest, other equipment is. A printing press in Phase I may be a deadlier weapon than a battalion of artillery in Phase III.

(*c*) *Phase II considerations.* The actual number of men available to the insurgent now assumes the importance it lacked to some degree in Phase I. By knowing also the amount of weapons and equipment he possesses, estimates of capabilities against friendly forces can be formulated. The degree of popular support for the insurgent will manifest itself in such areas as recruiting for his forces.

(4) *Tactics.*

(*a*) *Insurgent forces.* Tactics include both enemy doctrine and his conduct of operations in accordance with that doctrine. Insurgents may be more flexible in their application of doctrine than regular military organizations. The doctrine which guides the insurgent must be known and understood by friendly forces if they are to effectively counter enemy efforts. The careful examination of his tactics, or actual operational techniques, may reveal changes in doctrine as well as indications of the personality and competence of the insurgent leader. Again, his choice and application of tactics is a reflection of insurgent ap-

praisal of friendly strength as well as of his own. A continuing estimate of relative strengths is a very basic part of Communist operational planning and has an immediate effect on tactics. Tactics of the insurgent will involve political, military, psychological, and economic considerations, all closely integrated. They will vary with the phase of the insurgency. The political goal of the insurgents will be to undermine and discredit the established government. Military tactics are characterized by speed, surprise, and heavy application of firepower and mobility.. The capabilities and vulnerabilities of the insurgents are discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 4.

(*b*) *Phase I considerations.* Phase I insurgency is characterized by an absence of strictly military operations and an emphasis on subversion and organizational development. Although instances of terrorism may begin to occur in the later stages of Phase I, military activity usually is limited to recruiting and establishment of military cadres.

(*c*) *Phase II considerations.* An increased emphasis on the study and evaluation of the insurgent military tactics is required during this phase. Tactics during Phase II generally are limited to ambushes, raids, sabotage, and terrorism. These activities provide the insurgent with supplies, experience, and self-confidence, while at the same time they erode friendly morale and reduce friendly economic and military capabilities.

(5) *Training.*

(*a*) *Insurgent forces.* Insurgent training will be closely related to the tactics being employed and will include vigorous indoctrination in political affairs. Both the combat forces and the people within an area under the political domination of the insurgents receive training. Individual operations and phases of movement are carefully planned and trained for by the insurgents. A careful analysis of an area with respect to the type of training taking place can provide a useful indicator of the probable courses of action that will be employed against stability operations forces.

(*b*) *Phase I considerations.* During Phase I the insurgent will train and indoctrinate his own cadre as well as newly accepted or recruited indigenous personnel. Training will consist of a great deal of political indoctrination along with techniques of propaganda, communications and intelligence collection. Training and effectiveness go hand in hand; the type, amount, and validity of training received by the insurgents may be determined to some degree by any observed increase in the effectiveness or size of the insurgent movement. Some training normally will be conducted in another country and may be indicated by a change in number and type of personnel traveling to that country.

(*c*) *Phase II considerations.* Much attention must now be devoted to locating training camps and areas, identifying training cadres, and interdicting the movement of insurgents to and from out-of-country training areas. Some insurgent units may be identifiable as having been trained for special missions such as reconnaissance or demolition.

(6) *Logistics.*

(*a*) *Insurgent forces.* In an insurgency, as in a conventional warfare situation, the effectiveness of the insurgent is very much dependent on his logistical support. In the early stages of an insurgency the requirements for military equipment and supplies are less than in the later stages. Accurate intelligence on the insurgent's sources and availability of supplies and equipment is essential to determine his capability to maintain and expand the insurgency.

(*b*) *Phase I considerations.* Two particular items have always been essential to the Phase I insurgent—money and a printing press. If the insurgent is highly successful in the establishment and motivation of his power base, he may never really have a requirement for the usual items of military supply. Money is often supplied from abroad, but such occurrences as bank robberies, unusual or excessive fund drives, payroll deduction requests, or sudden affluence among suspect government officials are cause for suspicion. Equipment for the production and dissemination of propaganda, such as printing presses and radio sets, is of a special nature, and its purchase and use can be controlled by the friendly government to a large degree.

(*c*) *Phase II considerations.* Logistics is now a larger and more elaborate requirement for the insurgent. He must now procure, store, transport, and maintain such items as weapons, ammunition, explosives, signal equipment, and medical supplies. A much larger number of people are required to operate the logistical system. Insurgent supply caches and supply lines become items of critical concern to friendly forces. Borders and coastlines must be controlled and aerial surveillance of remote areas or areas known to be used by the insurgents must be instituted in order to detect or deter his movement of supplies.

(7) *Effectiveness.*

(*a*) *Insurgent forces.* Effectiveness describes the qualitative ability of the insurgent to achieve his political or military purposes.

(*b*) *Phase I considerations.* In Phase I the term "combat effectiveness" usually is not applicable. While words such as "struggle" and "front" are used by the insurgent, they do not connote the use of armed force. The overall effectiveness of the insurgent effort is sometimes made very obvious by spactacular successes (antigovernment victory in an important election) or failures (collapse of a new factory-workers organization known to have been backed by the insurgent). A continuing decline of governmental influence in a certain area or among a certain group of people may well indicate a corresponding increase in insurgent influence. The leaders may forbid overt or easily detectable actions until they feel that their movement is in position to make a serious bid for power; in this case, the insurgent's real effectiveness may remain unknown until it is too late for anything but a historical account of it. There usually will be overt indications of the effectiveness of the insurgent operation, and information on it may be gathered by careful observation of organizations, movements, and elections at all levels. Penetration of these activities by government agents is very desirable and can make a significant contribution to the order of battle picture.

(*c*) *Phase II considerations.* The factor of effectiveness now expands to include combat efficiency of insurgent military forces. By carefully evaluating the other order of battle factors, plus taking note of actual combat experience, we can evaluate the insurgent's combat effectiveness or lack thereof. We can determine his strengths and weaknesses and from this calculate his capability to follow various courses of action.

(8) *Personalities.*

(*a*) *Insurgent forces.* Personalities are not listed as a separate order of battle factor in a conventional situation. They are of greater importance in an insurgency, however, and are therefore listed as a separate factor.

(*b*) *Phase I considerations.* In Phase I personalities are an extremely important factor. During this phase, when the insurgency is just beginning to organize, function, and attempt to spread its influence, the loss of a comparatively small number of men can practically destroy it, or at least set back its progress. Unfavorable publicity attached to the movement as a result of the exposure of the insurgency renders its success less likely. The apprehension, compromise, or exposure of its leaders may destroy the insurgency completely. Knowing who the insurgent leaders are can also furnish a valuable indication of how tactics and training will be conducted and how effective the overall effort will be.

(*c*) *Phase II considerations.* As in Phase I, personalities are important enough to warrant being considered a separate factor. Many insurgent units will be called by their commander's name, rather than having a conventional designation.

(9) *Miscellaneous.*

(*a*) *Insurgent forces.* Any other items which contribute to knowledge of the insurgent, his goals, and methods are considered here.

(*b*) *Phase I considerations.* This category can include such items as historical studies of people and parties involved in the insurgency, code names or numbers, and any other information which does not fit under the other eight categories. This type of information should not be slighted, as seemingly superfluous items may well become useful and important.

(*c*) *Phase II considerations.* Several miscellaneous items now come to the fore as vital adjuncts to the other factors. Weapons, insignia, code names and numbers, types and colors of uniforms and flags—all these things aid in the identification of enemy units, the source of outside aid, the source of weapons and equipment smuggled into or purchased in the target nations, and the morale and effectiveness of the insurgent armed forces.

c. There are several points to remember in the application of order of battle factors to an insurgency.

(1) Insurgents' methods may change, but their principles are unchanging.

(2) The nine order of battle factors previously discussed are closely interrelated and cannot be analyzed separately.

(3) When an insurgency escalates to a Phase II situation, the order of battle effort must be expanded considerably. The enemy combat units must now be considered in addition to the various Phase I organizations and activities which will still be active.

Section V. DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

7–23. General

Factors which influence the ultimate selection of a method for the dissemination of intelligence are discussed in detail in FM 30–5. The most secure means of dissemination which is consistent with the need for timeliness should be chosen. There are three general methods of dissemination—personal contacts, messages, and intelligence documents. The latter will be discussed in further detail.

7–24. Intelligence Documents

a. In the initial phase of an insurgency, government agencies require documents containing large amounts of specific intelligence to serve as a basis for their estimates, plans, and operations. In all stages intelligence documents represent an important means of disseminating current intelligence. Documents used in the dissemination of intelligence and information are discussed in detail in FM 30–5.

b. Certain basic documents should be prepared in all cases when an insurgency condition exists.

(1) *The area study.* A document which is basic to all government agencies involved in internal defense operations is the local area study. This document describes in a general manner all conditions within an area related to the geography, topography, weather, economy, sociology, system of government, political institutions, and insurgent organization and activities. The area study serves the following purposes:

(*a*) Familiarizes newly assigned personnel with the prevailing conditions within an area.

(*b*) Aids collection planners by indicating areas in which more detailed information is required.

(*c*) Aids those involved in the production of intelligence by allowing a comparison of information in the area study with newly obtained information.

(*d*) Aids those involved in stability operations by pinpointing conditions exploitable by the insurgents.

(2) *The estimate of the insurgent situation.* This document has utility even during the early stages of insurgency when there is limited insurgent activity and little may be known of insurgent organization and plans. To be effective, the estimate must be kept current. Updating should be accomplished when significant activity occurs which invalidates existing information and intelligence. Insurgent activity or the lack thereof may be significant in the determination of insurgent weaknesses, capabilities, and probable courses of action. An example of a format for an estimate of the insurgent situation is contained in appendix D.

c. The following documents will assist the intelligence officer in determining the type intelligence documents needed.

(1) *Police reports* are especially valuable during the early phases of an insurgency because detectable insurgent activity at this time will take the form of murder, theft, kidnapping, extortion, rioting, formation of subversive organizations, terrorist acts, and dissemination of antigovernment propaganda. Each criminal act will have to be examined to determine in what way, if any, it is related to insurgent activity.

(2) *Biographical data* on suspected insurgents, information concerning subversive organizations, and a listing of dissident groups permit a close watch to be maintained on potential insurgents and their supporters and provide the opportunity for their neutralization.

(3) *Lists of suspected insurgent targets,* whether they be individuals, organizations, government agencies, buildings, or other features, permit stability operations forces to plan for, and implement, programs aimed at providing adequate defense for these targets against any insurgent attack.

d. Intelligence documents which support nontactical stability operations will be closely related since all internal defense programs and operations have basically the same goals.

(1) Intelligence documents which take the form of studies of local economic, social, and political conditions are necessary for the planning and execution of successful civil affairs, internal control, and psychological operations. These studies should present an objective view of the local situation, with respect to strong points and weak points, and should contain recommendations for operations aimed at the elimination of the causes of discontent.

(2) Detailed reports reflecting the status and effectiveness of government projects are required. Unless the causes of discontent within a society are eliminated by effective government action, insurgents will continually regroup and resume

their subversive activities despite severe losses and defeat by government forces.

7–25. Dissemination by the Area Coordination Center

a. The area coordination center should contain a communications section which has secure communication facilities for the dissemination of information and intelligence reports to higher, adjacent, and lower organizations and a message center which distributes information and intelligence to sections within the area coordination center.

b. When the area coordination center is staffed by a large number of people it will be necessary to have simplified procedures in order to achieve timely and proper dissemination of information and intelligence produced by the center. A possible method would be to have all information and intelligence reports coming from the production section given directly to the communications section for dissemination both internally and externally. The communications section would then disseminate according to an SOP listing the recipients and priorities of all reports normally produced by the area coordination center. Special or unusual reports not covered in the SOP would be directed to the chief of the intelligence element of the center for a determination as to recipients and priority of dissemination, since he will be most familiar with the intelligence needs of the various organizations. Reports handled by a minimum number of personnel will help promote rapid dissemination with a minimum of errors. Higher officials within the area coordination center are relieved of the burden of personally reviewing all reports in order to determine proper dissemination.

c. Other procedures may work equally as well. Small organizations such as a village level area coordination center might have a much less formal procedure for dissemination, while large organizations such as a regional level center or the NIDCC would require detailed regulations and procedures governing dissemination due to the wide variety of information and intelligence reports which they must disseminate to many subordinate organizations. In order to achieve timely and proper dissemination, individuals at all levels who are placed in charge of dissemination must be thoroughly familiar with all internal defense and development organizations as well as operations requiring information and intelligence.

CHAPTER 8
COMBAT SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

Section I. GENERAL

8–1. Introduction

Methods and techniques for combat surveillance and reconnaissance during stability operations are basically no different than any other type of warfare; however, their scope is broader. Battlefield surveillance in the internal defense environment is extended over the entire area of interest, possibly the entire host country, rather than being primarily limited to the battle area. Except for this enlarged area of coverage, all other doctrine for combat surveillance and reconnaissance as defined in FM 30–5 and FM 30–20 remains valid.

8–2. Factors Affecting Combat Surveillance and Reconnaissance During Stability Operations

a. It cannot be assumed that all villagers are insurgents, nor should they be treated as such simply because they live where insurgents are active. Thus, insurgents become much more difficult to identify. Techniques of surveillance employed, therefore, vary with the degree of loyalty of the people to the government and with the degree of insurgent pressure on the area. Valuable information is derived from watching the actions and attitudes of the people. Any observed variation from their normal pattern of living, their willingness to cooperate, the presence or absence of children and young men in the villages, or the presence of people in areas where they normally are not found should be reported to the intelligence element as quickly as possible.

b. Elements of the insurgents' village militia are much more difficult to detect and identify than elements of main force and regional force units because the village militia attempt to remain indistinguishable from the general public by taking on the appearances, habits, and common practices of the people of the area in which they are operating. In fact, they usually are indigenous to the area in which operating. They also normally remain dispersed to avoid detection and to minimize their value as a target for internal defense forces.

c. Insurgents, however, can be detected through indirect, as well as direct, evidence of their presence. Direct evidence—such as easily recognized uniforms, equipment, military-type vehicles, deliberate field fortifications, logistical facilities, and large troop movements—normally is difficult to gather in stability operations. Probably the first indication of insurgent presence will be furnished by indirect evidence. Some examples of indirect evidences are—

(1) Ostensible civilian activity in isolated areas or in areas where activity normally has not been observed.

(2) Unexplained increase in dwelling densities of villages.

(3) Built-up areas not shown on official maps or which newly appear in comparative photography of the area.

(4) Unexplained movement of local inhabitants from one location to another or across international boundaries.

(5) Unexplained abandonment of villages, cultivated areas, equipment, or food sources.

(6) Isolated open areas being prepared for, or under cultivation with, food crops or small areas of forest being cleared of underbrush and thick foliage for no apparent reason.

(7) Logging and charcoal production in areas previously unworked or not easily accessible to people of the area.

(8) Roads, cart trails, and footpaths that are inconsistent with the population and the agricultural practices of the area.

(9) Other unexplained disturbances to the normal vegetation cover of the area.

(10) Fires in remote or burned out areas that have not been caused by local ground clearing operations or indigenous cultivation.

(11) Fishnets located in isolated areas or areas previously unfished.

(12) Abnormal traffic on established roads or waterways.

(13) Unidentified or suspicious activity detected by infrared (IR), radar, or other sensory devices.

d. Bad weather limits all surveillance and reconnaissance means. When the weather permits aerial observation, the insurgent usually will act in a way that makes his presence unknown. When the weather precludes normal aircraft operations, the insurgent force will move and strike more openly. Because weather conditions change rapidly, airborne and ground surveillance measures are preplanned so they can be implemented as soon as the weather breaks. In this way insurgent forces are exposed or caught in activities they reserve for periods when they think they cannot be observed. Because visibility and air and ground vehicular movement are adversely affected by bad weather, alternate foot-mobile reconnaisance is planned. Good communications are required for an effective surveillance plan. Communications problems caused by bad weather should be anticipated and alternate plans developed to cope with them.

e. Terrain frequently limits line-of-sight observation. In addition, insurgents use natural cover and concealment to hinder friendly observation. To overcome these obstacles, aerial and ground observation are extended in variety, depth, and frequency of coverage. Often it will be necessary to put personnel on the ground who can travel beneath jungle canopy and across areas that cannot be watched from observation points. Reconnaissance missions will include the requirement for patrols to stay in an area for extended periods of time and to react positively to any insurgent activity encountered. Increased emphasis must be placed on remotely monitored sensors.

8–3. Development of Combat Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capabilities

a. Basic intelligence data must be gathered to support combat surveillance and reconnaissance operations. The minimum intelligence requirements to support stability operations are listed in appendix C. These requirements must be satisified in as much detail and accuracy as possible to insure an effective surveillance and reconnaissance effort.

b. The following actions and special training are begun in Phase I, to be continued, as required, so long as the insurgency lasts.

(1) Tactical targeting throughout the area of interest.

(2) Continuous improvement of host country communications facilities.

(3) Combat surveillance and reconnaissance training of both host country and U.S. personnel, with emphasis on—

(*a*) Calling for and adjusting friendly fires.

(*b*) Map reading and land navigation.

(*c*) Employment of long-range and stay-behind patrols in gathering intelligence information.

(*d*) Visual aerial surveillance; photographic interpretation.

(*e*) Communications equipment and procedures.

(*f*) Use and maintenance of surveillance equipment available to the host country.

(*g*) Proper reporting procedures.

(4) Tasking out-of-country resources such as COMINT.

8–4. Requirements for Effective Combat Surveillance and Reconnaissance

a. Combat surveillance and reconnaissance is required throughout all phases of an internal defense program. Requirements differ at each level —national (NIDCC), subnational (Area Coordination Center), and tactical unit—according to the particular phase of insurgency involved. When more than one phase is in effect simultaneously, surveillance requirements are more numerous and varied than in single-phase situations. The minimum requirements for combat surveillance and reconnaissance, by phase at each level, are shown in appendix G.

b. The role of combat surveillance and reconnaissance in stability operations is much broader than in other types of warfare. Since the enemy does not occupy fixed positions or fixed terrain, locating him will depend in large part on the full utilization of the capabilities of the collection means that are sent out to locate him. During stability operations, mission requirements are broadly stated to allow units engaged in surveillance and reconnaissance maximum initiative and responsiveness to changing situations.

c. Combat surveillance and reconnaissance functions are under the staff supervision of the intelligence officer. By close coordination and cooperation he makes certain that combat surveillance and reconnaissance is integrated into the overall

intelligence collection plan. Further, he closely coordinates with sources of information other than intelligence collection agencies. This coordination includes operations and fire support coordination personnel, host country civilian, paramilitary and military personnel, and other US military and civilian organizations and agencies in-country.

Section II. GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

8–5. General

a. Ground surveillance integrates all available means of surveillance (both human and mechanical) to cover the area of interest. Mechanical surveillance devices are employed to take advantage of their all-weather, day-and-night capability.

★*b.* Ground reconnaissance utilizes most of the same human and mechanical means as ground surveillance. However, reconnaissance missions are directed to satisfy commander's intelligence needs in special geographical areas. Reconnaissance missions collect in response to specific EEI or OIR; surveillance missions have a much broader scope.

8–6. Agencies

a. Combat Units. Ground surveillance reconnaissance is part of the unit mission. It will be accomplished as part of the unit SOP or as a result of the commander's specific intelligence needs. Effective ground surveillance and reconnaissance in stability operations is more difficult to provide because units frequently fight in relative isolation without flank support. (For details on the role of armor and infantry units in reconnaissance and security operations, see FM 31–16, FM 17–1, and FM 7–20.)

b. Patrols.

(1) Patrolling is of paramount importance in stability operations. Regardless of the type of patrol or mission assigned, the collection and reporting of intelligence information is a continuing responsibility for all patrols. Combat patrols as well as reconnaissance patrols should be trained to observe and report negative as well as positive evidence of past or present enemy activity; newly developed trails; vacated assembly areas; locations of fortified and boobytrapped areas; cache sites, whether active or not; current effects of weather on terrain; trafficability and the location of potential landing zones and drop zones. Patrol training should place emphasis on the detection and attack of enemy ambushes, the detection and disarming of boobytraps, knowledge of insurgent delaying devices, the use of deception and knowledge of enemy deception practices, tracking techniques, and procedures for requesting fire support.

★(2) Patrolling in stability operations involves much more than just looking for the enemy. It also involves making contact with the people who inhabit the area of interest. Patrols will be required also to contact local police, local authorities, and friendly paramilitary units as part of their missions. They must be able to observe and report on the items of intelligence interest enumerated in paragraph 8–2. Contact with civilians will require that patrols include personnel who are language trained. When available, qualified US military linguists who are language trained can be used; however, often this type of personnel will not be available for everyday operations. In that case maximum utilization should be made of host country soldiers who are proficient in the English language and have been fully trained in all aspects of insurgency patrolling procedures. Employment of indigenous civilians or members of allied forces to serve as interpreters and translators should be exercised with caution. Utilization of such personnel hinges on proper security checks or clearances as well as other appropriate qualifications. See FM 30–15 for guidance on use of interpreters.

★(3) The Airborne Infantry Ranger Company (Corps), operating under the staff supervision of the G2, makes important contributions to the ground surveillance and reconnaissance plan by reporting information concerning remote portions of the area of interest. Insurgency terrain inaccessible to other surveillance or reconnaissance means can be exploited to some degree by long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP). Indigenous LRRP, clothed and armed like the insurgents, are dispatched to work close to or among insurgent troops. Indigenous LRRP are requested on a support or attachment basis and should be under the operational control of the commander requesting them. In stability operations this is at a tactical level lower than in other types of war. LRRP units should be formed and commence op-

erations in Phase I. The number of LRRP should be increased as necessary in Phases II and III to satisfy requirements of US major tactical units.

c. Other Sources. Other intelligence sources furnish excellent ground surveillance and reconnaissance support. They assist in gathering information for future requirements as well as make available information already in their possession which may be of value. Available intelligence sources are indicative in (1) through (8) below.

(1) Counterintelligence units can provide a good source of contact with local civilians and investigate suspicious activity that occurs both inside military areas and within civilian communities. They also maintain files on people and organizations that may serve as further contacts for ground reconnaissance elements.

☆(2) Agent operations can provide a source of information from within the enemy area. Often agents can penetrate an area and gather information not otherwise obtainable or which could only be procured by indigenous personnel.

(3) Interrogation efforts by interrogation sections on prisoners, suspects, defectors, and refugees can produce much new information or can assist in confirming or refuting information gathered from other sources.

☆(4) Stay-behind units can observe insurgent forces and furnish scheduled reports of their sightings. In addition, stay-behind units may be able to maintain observation for extended periods and provide highly reliable information.

☆(5) Technical intelligence specialists and document translators can provide valuable information gathered from enemy documents and materiel. Items brought back from reconnaissance patrols may furnish additional information once it has been identified and analyzed by one of these specialists.

☆(6) Recovered US personnel can provide valid information when properly debriefed by intelligence personnel. The fact that he has been trained to observe and retain information of intelligence value, and has physically passed through insurgent territory, makes the US returnee an excellent source.

(7) Communications intelligence resources can provide an all-weather, day and night surveillance of enemy communications.

☆(8) Police intelligence files can provide an excellent source of information. Police intelligence relies heavily on information supplied by informants. Many of these informants represent the lowest order in the society, particularly in the more densely populated areas. The police, by their very nature, must maintain contact with this element of society to collect information. Planned surveillance, observation reports, and infiltration of subversive organizations are other techniques which contribute to police intelligence. As a minimum, these files should include the city or village building and street plan; subterranean sewer and transportation systems; location of suspected insurgents, sympathizers, and criminals by building or house; known establishments used for criminal or insurgent activities; shops, businesses, and plants that handle commodities of critical value for criminal or insurgent activities; and an up-to-date census of the area to include names and number, by sex and age of personnel in each building or house. (See FM 19-50 for detailed information.)

d. Specialized Organizations. There are other specialized organizations that can furnish assistance in gathering information. While their primary mission is not intelligence, their operations do place them in strategic positions. Some of these organizations are—

(1) Special Forces units in-country which may be strategically located astride LOC, adjacent to border crossing points, and near identified or suspect insurgent areas of operations. They usually are placed within or adjacent to civilian occupied areas. One of their major missions is to advise indigenous troops on patrols and combat operations within their local area. Constant contact with the land, its people, and the various insurgent forces makes these units a lucrative source of current intelligence information.

(2) US aid-type missions that provide assistance to the indigenous personnel of an area. These organizations have contact with all types of civilians at each level down to the local village and hamlet. Their own personnel are actively engaged in travel around the country. Their reference material, contacts, and personnel all provide a vast amount of useful information.

(3) The host country government has many of its own sources of information. The most important of these sources are those which extend through all echelons of the governmental structure. The major organizations in this category

include host country military and paramilitary forces, civilian police, local governmental organizations, and religious groups.

★8–7. Security Considerations

★*a.* Frontlines and secure rear areas usually are not established during stability operations. Tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) are assigned to units within which a base camp is established and permanent responsibility for military control and security is assigned. Subelements are assigned an area of operation (AO) within the TAOR. All terrain within the TAOR cannot be physically occupied due to the vast size of the area involved. Nor is occupation of terrain an objective of stability operations. As an alternative to physical occupation of the ground, aggressive ground surveillance and reconnaissance must be utilized to effect security.

★*b.* For military operations outside of a unit's TAOR, another area of operation may be assigned, which may or may not be at some distance from the TAOR. A unit moves into this type of AO on a temporary basis to conduct tactical operations. Once these operations are accomplished, participating units return to their TAOR or depart directly to a new AO outside the TAOR for further operations. However, even when the bulk of a unit is physically separated from its TAOR, the unit remains responsible for its security. Rear elements of the unit continue operations within their capabilities, or they may be augmented by other forces, to prevent deterioration of the security situation in the TAOR.

c. Security for a TAOR or AO requires all-around coverage, mostly by visual observation and patrolling especially during periods of reduced visibility. Special sensors and mechanical devices, such as ground surveillance radars, anti-intrusion devices, night vision scopes, and searchlights can complement this effort, but all such equipment has certain limitations, the most common of which is the requirement for ground line-of-sight. Ground surveillance plans will require the coordination and employment of all available surveillance

means, with the preponderance of emphasis on human resources.

d. Tactical stability operations are oriented on the enemy rather than on the terrain. Their main purpose is that of defeating the enemy and allowing for the extension of friendly control into the area. A large insurgency area precludes a continuous and complete surveillance coverage of the entire area of interest. Tactical operations conducted to locate insurgent forces, such as search and seize operations, clearing operations, and securing operations are either ground reconnaissance type operations or depend largely on aggressive ground reconnaissance to achieve success. Their effectiveness will be greatly enhanced if all means of ground reconnaissance are employed by the troops engaged or in a direct support role.

Section III. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

8–8. General

a. Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance is the means whereby the Army extends its capability to perform surveillance and reconnaissance operations over large areas beyond the ground line-of-sight limitations imposed on both the human eye and ground sensory equipment by distance, mountainous terrain, dense jungle, adverse weather, and poor illumination. A general definition of aerial surveillance and reconnaissance missions and a discussion of those agencies which support the Army's aerial surveillance and reconnaissance requirements in stability operations remain the same as presently described in FM 30–5 and FM 30–20.

b. Basic Army operational concepts for aerial surveillance and reconnaissance do not change in stability operations; but available assets may be used in unique ways. In general, aerial surveillance and reconnaissance techniques apply with equal validity to stability operations and other tactical situations.

8–9. Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations

General considerations and peculiarities of planning, conducting, and coordinating aerial surveillance and reconnaissance operations in an internal development environment are discussed in detail in chapter 11, FM 30–20. As indicated in paragraph 8–4 above, aerial surveillance and reconnaissance operations should be conducted as early as possible in Phase I. Maximum use must be made of comparative cover through integration of all sensors and sensor modes over a period of time up to several years of duration. During Phase I, the insurgent is likely to develop the physical aspects of his base area system without much fear of host government reprisal arising from discovery by aerial observation. For example, photographs taken of unpopulated and isolated areas during Phase II may not disclose any insurgent activity or presence of insurgent installations. A comparison with identical aerial photo coverage flown several years earlier during Phase I, however, may disclose signs of construction, excavation, and tracks which, due to the vegetation regrowth, can no longer be identified in Phase II.

8–10. Airborne SIGINT Operations

The use of airborne SIGINT operations is considered during all phases of stability operations. Their use usually provides a highly effective communications surveillance system.

CHAPTER 9
INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

9–1. General

Intelligence training guidance provided in FM 30–5 is as valid for stability operations as it is for other U.S. Army operations. It is important that the established intelligence training requirements are strictly observed since heavy emphasis is placed on intelligence activities during a subversive insurgency.

9–2. Fundamental Requirements

a. The range of intelligence training requirements for the internal defense environment will vary with the levels of responsibility and specific duties of the personnel to be trained. But whatever their duties or levels of responsibility, there are certain fundamental points requiring emphasis in the training of all intelligence personnel:

(1) Intelligence personnel must acquire a working knowledge, commensurate with their intended duties, of the host country, its people, its culture, its principally spoken language, and its geography. An adjunct to this training should include familiarization with "in-being" U.S. and host country intelligence SOP, as well as the permissive and restrictive features of existing bilateral agreements as they affect in-country intelligence operations.

(2) Intelligence personnel must gain a thorough knowledge of the insurgent enemy, his doctrinal concepts, his organizational structure, and his phase of development within the host country.

(3) All personnel, whether assigned intelligence duties or not, must be made aware of the insurgent's prime requirement for intelligence and must become imbued with the firm knowledge that it is only through strict observance of basic security practices that the insurgent can be denied stisfaction of that key requirement. This point demands emphasis through integration in all types and levels of training.

b. Acquisition of the knowledge prescribed in *a*(2) above, is time consuming. This factor, coupled with that of the relatively short tours of in-country duty normally performed by U.S. Army personnel, limits the opportunities for gaining the requisite knowledge through on-the-job training. Thus, intelligence personnel who are intended for such duty should undergo intensive training in those subjects prior to their arrival in-country.

9–3. Training for Intelligence Advisor Personnel

Intelligence advisors frequently will find themselves in situations requiring a professional knowledge of the full range of intelligence functions and duties. In fact, this normally will be the rule rather than the exception, and it underscores the requirement for development by the individual of a broad base of professional knowledge, extending beyond that normally acquired through study and experience in only one or two intelligence specialty areas. Intelligence advisor training programs should recognize this need by incorporating orientation periods covering the full range of the intelligence field. But this offers only a partial solution. Full satisfaction of this professional requirement can only be made through individual efforts of the personnel concerned.

9–4. Intelligence Training for Host Country Personnel

a. An intelligence training program for host country military and paramilitary personnel is described in appendix H. The program is designed for application in the training of host country personnel, but it may be adapted for the training of U.S. Army personnel as well. When implemented for host country training, the program should be supplemented with orientation lectures and conferences covering the basic conceptual and organizational features of the government of the United States, U.S. Army organization and methods of operation, and other material which would better allow host country personnel to understand and work with U.S. intelligence personnel. When adapted for U.S. Army use, the training program should be supplemented, as ap-

propriate, with subjects outlined in paragraph 9–2

b. During the training program an understanding must be developed of what intelligence is, and what it can and must do to assist in the prevention or defeat of subversive insurgency. It should focus particular attention upon the nature and scope of intelligence needed to support the various operational programs of the host country which are designed to maintain or restore internal security. In order to build this common understanding of intelligence, training programs should include consideration of the basic axioms described below.

(1) *Intelligence is essential to internal security.* Intelligence can provide advance warning of insurgent activity. It can provide the requisite detailed knowledge of the insurgent organization, its personnel, its plans, and its tactics. It can pinpoint the roots and mechanisms of subversion while at the same time identify the causes of popular discontent which the insurgent traditionally exploits. It can ascertain popular reaction to both insurgent activity and governmental programs. In short, intelligence provides the critical information which the government needs to prevent or detect insurgency.

(2) *Intelligence is essential to all operations.* The government of a nation faced with subversive insurgency must initiate a carefully planned, fully coordinated, and intensively executed program to maintain or restore internal security.

(3) *Intelligence is a responsibility of all governmental agencies.*

(*a*) The clandestine nature of subversive insurgency requires a thoroughly coordinated and controlled intelligence effort on the part of the government. *All* government agencies must contribute to the intelligence effort to collect the detailed information and produce the comprehensive intelligence that is required for internal defense, internal development and psychological operations. Much of the information required for intelligence purposes can best be provided by civilian governmental agencies which are primarily concerned with public administrative activities such as law enforcement, public health, public education, and revenue collection.

(*b*) Military intelligence activities must be integrated within the overall intelligence program of the government in much the same manner that military police operations, military tactical operations, military civic action, and military psychological operations must be integrated within the overall government program. The intelligence capabilities of the military and paramilitary forces should be used to augment and supplement the intelligence capabilities of the police and other civilian agencies during the first phase of insurgency. Maximum integration of the intelligence effort is necessary in order to prevent gaps in coverage, avoid duplication of effort, and produce intelligence that will meet the needs for all operational elements.

(4) *Intelligence of the government must be superior to that of the insurgent.*

(*a*) The struggle between a subversive insurgent organization and the constituted government of a nation is in every sense an intelligence war. Throughout the entire development of insurgency, the insurgent relies heavily upon intelligence to plan and execute measures designed to disrupt, paralyze, and overthrow the constituted government. In fact, effective use of intelligence by the insurgent is the key to his survival. The government must not only deny the insurgent the intelligence he needs to succeed, but it must also obtain positive intelligence concerning the insurgent organization and all factions within the population in order to identify and locate subversive elements.

(*b*) From the standpoint of government intelligence and counterintelligence activities, it is most important to detect the first phase of insurgency. The earlier the government intelligence effort is mobilized and directed toward defeating insurgent activity, the greater will be the probability of success. Superior intelligence during the first phase of insurgency can enable the government to eliminate the insurgent movement before it erupts into open violence and to initiate reforms designed to alleviate popular discontent.

(*c*) It must be noted that the results of any intelligence effort are cumulative. If the government intelligence effort is organized and coordinated during the first phase of insurgency, the proper groundwork for further expansion of intelligence activities during the second phase of insurgency will have been provided in the event this becomes necessary.

APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

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(C)10–122	United States Army Security Agency (U).
(C)105–87	Electronic Warfare (Electronic Countermeasures and Electronic Counter-Countermeasures) (U).
310–25	Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
320–50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
380-series	Military Security.
381-series	Military Intelligence.
551–50	Training of Foreign Personnel by the U.S. Army.
(S)580–5	Project PARASOL: Support of Paramilitary Forces in Special Operations (U).
604-series	Personnel Security Clearance.
633–50	Prisoners of War; Administration, Employment, and Compensation.
633–51	Civilian Internees; Administration, Employment, and Compensation.

A–2. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam)

27–1	Treaties Governing Land Warfare.
(S)30–20-series	Counterintelligence Trends and Development (U).
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380–1	Commander's Handbook on Security.
(C)381–1	Combat Intelligence Field Army, 1965–1975 (U).

A–3. Field Manuals (FM)

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3–12	Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense.
5–20	Camouflage.
5–30	Engineer Intelligence.
6–121	Field Artillery Target Acquisition.
19–20	Military Police Investigations.
19–30	Physical Security.
19–40	Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
19–50	Military Police in Stability Operations.
21–26	Map Reading.
21–30	Military Symbols.
21–31	Topographic Symbols.
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21–76	Survival, Evasion, and Escape.
(S)21–77A	Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U).
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24–16	Signal Orders, Records, and Reports.

24–18	Field Radio Techniques.
27–10	The Law of Land Warfare.
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31-series	Special Operations.
(C)32–5	Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U).
33–1	Psychological Operations—U.S. Army Doctrine.
33–5	Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures.
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41–10	Civil Affairs Operations.
(C)100–20	Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Development (U).
101–5	Staff Officers Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure.

A–4. Training Circulars (TC)

3–16	Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, Antiplant Agents, and Personnel Detectors in Counterguerrilla Operations.

A–5. Technical Manuals (TM)

30-series	Military Intelligence.

A–6. Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE)

30-series	Military Intelligence.

A–7. Other References

Public Law 87–195	Foreign Assistance Act, 4 September 1961, as amended. DOD Military Assistance Manual (MAM).

APPENDIX B
TYPE COMMUNIST INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

Section I. PARTY CORE

B–1. General

The typical Communist insurgent organization is composed of three major elements: Party Core, Mass Civil Organization, and a Military Force. These elements are organizationally interlocked to insure that the Party exercises complete control over its activities. Figure B–1 depicts an optimum type Communist insurgent structure. While the exact organizational relationship of its elements may vary in detail from one insurgency to another, all will employ an "interlocking directorate," or an infrastructure arrangement which insures absolute control by the Party over the entire organization.

B–2. The Party Cellular Organization

a. At the base of the Party command structure exists the "cell." The cellular structure of any Communist Party, legal or illegal, is its most critical characteristic.

b. A Communist Party member normally belongs to two or more cells; the member's Party cell and one or more functional cells which exist in his place of daily employment. It is the Party cell which molds the recruit into a disciplined Party subject, while the functional cell serves as the basic organizational unit for the accomplishment of some task or mission.

c. In an insurgency, Party cells normally will contain from three to seven members, one of whom is designated "cell captain" or "secretary." Initially, a new unit will be expected to maintain regular liaison with its superior body, assume responsibility for the distribution of Party literature, issue its own leaflets and agitational materials, and to maintain its own fiscal record of dues, contributions, and money raised by other means. These functional responsibilities, however, are of secondary importance to the principal reason for the cell's existence—to maintain Party integrity and discipline in an environment in which its members are in daily association with society at large.

d. Regardless of the level of Party organization, the importance of the individual or the functional roles performed, all Party members are simultaneously cell members. Each must have a cell in which he is officially enrolled as a member. At the lower levels of Party organization this poses no difficulty since the cell normally functions as a unit. But, at higher levels in the Party, as organization and responsibility increase and become more complex, the member is concurrently a cell member and a working member of a Party Committee. In this situation the Party cellular organization is designed to maintain internal discipline, exploit the full potential of the individual, and strengthen Party leadership over the Party membership. At the same time the Party Committee, of which cell members are an integral part, executes the day-to-day functional duties of prosecuting the insurgency.

e. Unlike Party cells, which are primarily political in character, functional cells serve to protect the identity and roles of personnel engaged in insurgent activities. The degree of cellular compartmentalization usually will depend upon the size of the organization, the popular support given, the government's security forces, and the probability of detection by security forces. In short, the structure of insurgent functional cells usually reflects a compromise between the requirements for organizational efficiency and the need for security. If the security forces have neither instituted population control and surveillance nor tried to infiltrate the insurgent apparat, the degree of compartmentalization is usually small. At the other extreme, if the population supports the government and willingly informs it about subversive activity, compartmentalization will necessarily be complete.

f. Where two or more Party cells exist within a single functional committee of an insurgent organization, Party Groups normally are created to



Figure B–1. Type Communist insurgent organization showing channels of command and control.

control and coordinate their activities. Under this arrangement, the Cell Captain is responsible to the First Secretary of his respective Party Group, which also consists of an Assistant Secretary and an Executive Committee. Party Groups, in turn, are responsible to yet another office which exists at each echelon of the Party hierarchy. This office is known as the Inter-Party Committee and it is the supreme Communist organ at its particular level of organization, responsible only to its counterpart office at the next higher echelon. Like the Party Group, it also is composed of a First Secre-



Figure B–2. Communist Party cellular organization.

tary, Assistant Secretary, and an Executive Committee. The chain of command within the overall Party structure is from the Central Committee of the Communist Party at national level to each of the Inter-Party Committees at interprovincial, provincial, and district levels. Figure B–2 depicts a type Party cellular organization.

B-3. The Party Committee System

a. Although all authority within a Communist insurgency movement stems from the hard core Party cellular organization, functional committees, composed of both Party and non-Party members, are required to carry out the Party's day-to-day activities. The primary organization used for this purpose is the Party Executive Committee, commonly referred to in times of insurgency as the Party Revolutionary Committee. Like the Party's cellular organization, these committees normally exist at national, interprovincial, provincial, and district levels. Below district level, clusters of cells perform their daily functional tasks under the direction of local village committees. At national level, control is exercised by the Secretariat of Central Committee.

b. The Revolutionary Committee may develop into a highly sophisticated structure under the direction of a secretary, his assistant, and executive officer. Under these officials will function a Permanent Standing Committee, composed of perhaps four to ten persons including the secretary and his two principal officers. Subordinate to this body a number of subcommittees or sections will function, employing 20 or more individuals some of whom may be in positions of limited responsibility. This committee system, together with its specialized elements, may be conceived as the "directing organ" of the insurgency.



Figure B-3. A type Communist Party youth organization.

c. At each hierarchical level of operation, the hard core Party cellular organization, and its counterpart Revolutionary Committee, exist side by side in interlocking fashion. All Party members in a given branch or section of the Revolutionary Committee will be concurrently members of a cell in the Party organization. Since the first allegiance of the Party member is to his cell, Party Group, and Inter-Party Committee, this latter body exercises authority over its counterpart Revolutionary Committee. To insure that the hard core Party apparatus retains this authority, the First Secretary of the Inter-Party Committee normally will act in the dual position as First Secretary of the Revolutionary Committee; however, below this level, status in the Party organization does not necessarily equate with that in the committee.

B–4. The Party Youth Organization

a. The Party Youth Organization is the third parallel structure within the Party Core control apparatus and is an indispensable affiliate of any Communist Party. The youth organization is a "halfway" house into which likely future Party members may be drawn in their early youth before they reach the required age for candidate membership in the Party proper. This age varies between 18 and 26 years.

b. A Youth Organization exists at each operational level of Party organization and the junior body is structured in a manner similar to its parent cellular organization at each echelon. The lowest element is the subcell, composed of from three to eight youths; three or more subcells compose a cell; three cells are formed into a Youth Group Committee; and two or more Youth Group Committees constitute the highest operational order, the Youth Inter-Group Committee. Figure B–3 depicts a type Party Youth Organization.

c. Party youth members may engage in most of the activities conducted by actual Party members in an insurgency, since the youth organization is considered a school of training and preparation for the assumption of inner-Party responsibilities at a later date. Therefore, Party youth members will be employed to the maximum extent possible in a manner similar to their more experienced seniors in order for them to acquire that invaluable experience in the multiple phases of Party work which will make it possible to draw them into the hard core of the organization by the time they are of eligible age.

Section II. THE MASS CIVIL ORGANIZATION

B–5. General

a. Lenin's doctrine was that two elements working together were necessary to effect a subversive political revolution—a small elite group of professional revolutionists and large popular organizations. Neither group could be totally effective alone, Lenin maintained. The professional revolutionists would be but an "isolated band of terrorists" without mass organizations. Mass organizations, on the other hand, would be incapable of maintaining the secrecy necessary for subversive activity. What was required, then, was to strike a balance in the working relationship between these two entities.

b. Communists have never aimed at the conversion of great masses of people to Communist Party membership. Their whole concept is that of a small Party—compact, mobile, disciplined, dedicated, and consisting largely of an intellectual elite. It is the task of this small group to utilize scientifically the social forces that move and direct the masses so that the Communist Party may come to power over them and impose forcibly the Communist program. The Communist aim, then, is to recruit in the service of the Party great numbers of individuals, most of whom are unconscious that they are serving the Communist cause.

c. Mass organizations serve the Party leadership in at least five distinct ways. First, they provide the Party with a seemingly legitimate front which by outward appearances represents the interests of the population. Second, they provide a cover which diverts attention away from the Party and its operations. Third, they provide a means of diverting the allegiance of the population away from the legal government and mobilizing its support in behalf of the insurgency movement. Fourth, they constitute a means of social control. Last, they provide the apparatus for establishing a "shadow" or actual government, competing with or replacing that of the legal government.

d. In revolutionary context, Communists consider three separate organizational elements as constituting the Mass Civil Organization. These are—

(1) Popular Organizations;
(2) Special Interest Groups; and
(3) Village Militia (popular guerrilla) Units.

PopularOrganizations are the most significant of the mass organizations in that they are organized on a nationwide scale with committees at the national, interprovincial, and district levels with basic units in the villages and hamlets. These organizations seek to appeal to a broad segment of the population, particularly workers, farmers, women, and youth. Special Interest Groups are more narrow in scope than Popular Organizations and include those groups whose focal concerns and activities are oriented on special issues. Examples of Special Interest Groups are medical associations, sporting clubs, and teachers' groups. Literally any organization created expressly to further the special interests of a parochial group falls in this category. Surprisingly, the Village Militia is also considered as an element of the mass civil organization, although it is often construed as a part-time and inferior arm of the military. The more correct perspective, however, is to view the militia elements as elite formations among the multiple mass organizations.

B–6. Infiltration

a. Communists employ two principal methods to gain control over and direct the masses: infiltration or penetration of existing non-Communist organizations, and the creation of "fronts." Each of these methods involves specialized techniques and each is designed to achieve similar, although somewhat distinctive, objectives. A distinction exists between the meaning of the words "infiltration" and "penetration." Infiltration is the word used to denote the introduction into a group or organization of an individual or individuals for purposes of monitoring or controlling its activities. Penetration, on the other hand, may be accomplished by either introducing a person from the outside or by recruiting individuals already inside the group or organization.

b. Principal Communist objectives in infiltrating and penetrating mass organizations are to neutralize existing agencies which support the government, justify and legitimatize causes which can be exploited by the subversives, and mobilize and manipulate mass support.

c. In practice infiltration and penetration operations are carried out partly by direction from above, partly and spontaneously as the opportunity arises, and partly by the in-place conversion to Communism or Communist control of individuals holding positions in legitimate organizations. Regardless of which insurgent elements perform the missions of infiltrating or penetrating popular mass organizations, this activity is always preceded by investigation.

d. Comprehensive investigations are conducted on all organizations of potential value to the insurgency movement in order that a determination can be made of the most appropriate action which should be taken to solicit or coerce support for the insurgency. These investigations usually involve the clandestine spotting, assessment, and cultivation of "target" personalities. Extensive dossiers are developed on each, which among other things, reflect his interests, motivations, personal weakness and vulnerabilities, and his susceptibility for being recruited in place. In nearly all cases, the recruitment approach is carefully tailored to each target personality. Such individuals may be subsequently recruited into serving the Communists on the basis of ideological appeal, bribery, blackmail, or other forms of coercion.

e. The principal Party elements involved in this type of operation are known as "fractions." A fraction consists of part or all of a cell whose members have been especially selected and trained to work within existing legitimate organizations. These fractions are made up of professional organizers whose responsibility is to learn the interests, language, and attitudes of the organization and its personnel. They also identify and investigate individuals who may be sympathetic to the Party and recruit and organize them. In general, the mission of fractions is to disseminate the Party line, attract new members to the Party, and aid in developing a power base for the Party.

B–7. Fronts

a. The term "front" commonly refers to political activities carried out behind the façade of an apparently non-Communist organization. Fronts normally are created when the Party—

(1) Is unable to infiltrate existing organizations.

(2) Desires to use people who are sympathetic with causes which the Party promotes, but who do not possess the necessary degree of responsibility for membership in, or who cannot be persuaded to join the Party.

(3) Desires to proselyte the membership of rival organizations by creating a competitive group with greater popular appeal.

(4) Desires to indoctrinate an unsuspecting segment of the population with views and programs inimical to the established order.

(5) Desires to create organizations where none presently exist; calculate to appeal to certain segments of the population.

(6) Desires to avoid proscription in countries where the Communist Party has been outlawed as subversive.

(7) Desires to raise funds for Party activities through ostensibly non-Communist organizations.

b. In general, Communists establish fronts as devices for establishing access to and control over unorganized sectors of the population. In creating such organizational weapons, the Communists seek to create a useful "mass" by transforming an unstructured segment of the population, such as youth, unemployed, intelligentsia, into one which has an established leadership and effective channels of communication and mobilization. In most instances fronts employ organizational titles and advocate causes which appeal to the population and are not commonly associated with Communism. In many instances these fronts may be headed or endorsed by respected citizens who are unwittingly aiding and abetting the Communist movement.

B–8. The United Front

a. The term "United Front" refers, essentially, to the alinement of all popular mass organizations against an enemy. It has a separate and distinct meaning from the word "front" which is derived from the architectural idea of a deceptive façade. The United Front may be formally defined as an organizational arrangement whereby Communists and non-Communists work together to control an organization, agency, or government. In the last named case, the United Front has come to be known as "collection government." In essence, however, the United Front consists of Communist-dominated organizations, organizations in the process of becoming Communist-dominated, and organizations which are targets for Communist domination or elimination.

b. The United Front, as it evolved from a relatively straight forward instrument of cooperation with other working class parties and organizations in the furtherance of mutual objectives, was, from the start, doomed to failure. This failure stemmed primarily from the very nature of Communism which causes it to vie and compete for the leadership of any group with which it associates as well as from the inability of Party members to conciliate or conceal their attitudes toward socialist groups which Party doctrine has branded as "evil" and the "mainstays" of capitalism. The second phase in the development of the United Front involved a short period where coalition with democratic or socialist forces was minimized. Association with such groups was conducted solely for the stratetic purposes of neutralizing the socialist leadership, and gaining access to the rank and file of these organizations. This phase also failed the Communist because it resulted in organizational and ideological isolation of Communists from the masses. The present United Front policy deception emerged from these experiences. Communists were directed not to worry about Party integrity as the basis of operations; rather Party members were admonished to go where the masses were and employ those conspiratorial methods required to accomplish Communist objectives. In short, the party retreated from open participation with other groups, relying more and more on the covert maneuverability of its cadres and the use of infiltration and fronts to mobilize and control the masses.

B–9. The Federated Front

a. In an active insurgency an organizational metamorphosis occurs within the Mass Civil Organization as it is transformed into the "Federated Front," commonly referred to by such titles as "National Liberation Front," "Peoples Front," and "Popular Front." In effect, this organization replaces the United Front and becomes a formally structured body with "Liberation Committees" at each echelon where the Communist Party exists. These Liberation Committees, composed mainly of non-Communist members, preempt local government administration at village, district, and province level, replacing *de jure* administration with *de facto* insurgent control.

b. The Federated Front normally appears when the Party has achieved some degree of military predominance and controls a majority of the population within a given area. Communist doctrine prescribes three prerequisites in any given area for activation of a Liberation Committee. First, insurgent forces must be stronger than those of government forces. Second, mass work has enjoyed success to a degree leading to a "popular disregard of enemy laws." Third, the Party Chapter organization has resolved the problems characteristically inherent in its first major expansion of membership and has been able to es-

tablish a viable cellular committee structure at the village level.

c. The Liberation Committee at village level is headed up by an Executive Committee of from three to possibly seven members. Care is exercised to insure that the committee composition includes a representative from each of the principal local mass organizations. In addition to the Executive Committee, a system of staff sections is established which serves to implement the decisions of the Liberation Committee. On the surface this organizational arrangement appears to be at least nominally representative of the desires of the local population; however, this is not the case. The Executive Committee, which ostensibly is charged with conducting the affairs of the entire Liberation Committee between its plenary sessions, is certain to include several Party members. In addition, the staff sections of the Liberation Committee will consist literally of those functional elements of the local Communist Party Chapter. In this manner, through the military, public health, education, economic, and other sections of the Liberation Committee, the Communist Party executes its revolutionary activities under the guise of the popular "will of the people."

d. Liberation Committees at district level and higher normally will be highly structured bodies composed of four elements—Central Committees; Board of Chairmen, Secretariat; and Current Affairs Section. The Central Committee normally will consist of representatives of various segments of the population to give the front an appearance of democratic representation. The members of this Central Committee are predominantly non-Party members representing mass organizations and lower Federated Front Organizations. The Board of Chairmen, appointed by the Central Committee, is composed of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Commissioner(s). This group presents to the public the image of the Front, and its Chairman (normally a non-Communist) will usually serve as the Committee's key spokesman. The Secretariat, appointed by the Board of Chairmen, is composed of a Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General, and Commissioner of the Secretariat. This body performs functions associated with the overall management of the Front's activities as well as translating into directives the instructions of the Central Committee or its agents. Finally, the Current Affairs Section, appointed by the Central Committee, maintains operational control over the specialized staff sections of the Front. The Current Affairs Section may be considered the principal controlling element of the Front. Normally, the main channel of communication within the Front apparatus will run from national to village level through the Current Affairs Section of each intermediate Liberation Committee. A chart depicting a typical Liberation Committee is shown in figure B–4.

e. A broad view of the Front leads to the following conclusions:

(1) The entire Party organization, with its multiple subelements and parallel channels of control and supervision, resides within the Front hierarchy obtaining cover and a popular "mass voice."

(2) Party authority within the Front structure is concentrated in two of the elements of any given Liberation Committee: the Secretariat, and the Current Affairs Section. It is normally the non-Communist Chairman of the Board and other well-known members of the Central Committee who figure in news releases, public speech-making, formal ceremonies, and official visits of front personnel to friendly foreign governments. As long as the Party is assured control over the Front it will stay in the background and allow others to articulate the propaganda.

(3) Any plan which seeks the destruction of the insurgent machine must concern itself primarily with the breaking down of an organization, not with the infliction of casualties. The military commander in the field charged with the mission of internal security must necessarily give priority attention to the destruction of insurgent military units; however, such operations must be conducted within a strategic framework, by which the insurgents would not be forced back into progressively less active forms of subversion, but by destroying the structure which would permit an orderly retreat into a temporary state of dormancy. This means that intelligence personnel must determine an insurgent member's Party, as well as Front status, and within the Party, his political cellular, as well as his revolutionary committee position. The importance of such information stems from the fact that the insurgency ends, not with the disappearance of the guerrilla, but with the destruction of the *apparat* which spawns the guerrilla.

B–10. The Village Militia

a. The Village Militia should not be thought of as inferior military forces which only work part-time, but rather as elite formations within the



Figure B–4. Type Liberation Front Committee.

mass civil structure. Three distinct paramilitary elements appear to exist in the Village Militia: the Self Defense Forces, Combat Guerrilla Unit (Liberation Troops), and the Secret Guerrilla Unit.

b. The Self Defense Force normally is organized for, and trained and employed in, the defense of villages and other insurgent facilities, whereas the guerrilla force constitutes the local instrument for both inflicting damage on the enemy and gaining and maintaining population control. The Combat Guerrilla Unit of the Village Militia is used by the Party in the support of regular insurgent military forces or independently in small operations. The Secret Guerrilla Unit, on the other hand, is used primarily in enforcing the will of the Party in a given area and is composed to a large degree of Party members.

c. The individual enrolled in a village guerrilla unit is normally a volunteer, although occasionally young men are coerced into service. In most small villages where there are few secrets, the identity of the members of the Village Militia undoubtedly is known to most of the inhabitants; however, fear of brutal reprisals keeps them quiet. The village guerrilla is, therefore, not readily identifiable to government forces. He operates in or close to his home village, sometimes in conjunction with regional and main force units. By day, he works at his normal job; at night, or in emergencies, he is available for assignment by his Party superiors.



Figure B–5. Type village guerrilla platoon.

The insurgent leadership likes to have at least 5 to 10 guerrillas in each village. In those villages under insurgent control, a full squad of 10 to 17 personnel or a platoon of from three to four such squads is usual. A type village guerrilla platoon is shown in figure B–5.

d. In the early stages of his development, the village guerrilla does not receive much formal military training and participates in military action only in emergencies or when specifically required to play a supporting role to regional or main force military activities. The majority of his training is committed to political indoctrination. He is taught to obey unquestioningly. He provides an effective intelligence screen by passing on all information available concerning the movement of government forces and is in fact the "eyes and ears" of the insurgent movement within the village community in which he lives. He provides a labor force for the transport and storage of food and equipment, thereby playing a part in the very flexible insurgent logistical system. He is responsible for the protection of Party cadres visiting his village and the provision of assistance to regional forces or special Party groups carrying out sabotage, terror, propaganda, and murder in and close to his village. For a variety of reasons many individuals will not qualify for membership in the insurgent regular forces, but will continue to serve in the ranks of the local guerrillas indefinitely. Others will demonstrate a degree of political understanding and reliance and efficiency in their work which will insure graduation to the regional forces.

Section III. THE MILITARY FORCES

B–11. General

a. According to the Communist doctrine, the military forces are but one of several instruments through which the Party seeks to consummate its power. The Military Forces are considered the lowest in organizational importance of the three principal organizational elements of the Communist insurgent *apparat*. Communist planning provides for military reverses and the posssible need for retrenchment, restructuring, or even the temporary disbanding of its armed forces, should enemy strength prove overwhelming. Party strategy pragmatically is based upon the assumption that as long as the Party Core and the Mass Civil Organization remain intact, the military arm of the insurgent movement can be reactivated or replenished; however, without the Party nucleus and mass civil base, the movement cannot succeed.

b. Communist insurgent military forces usually consist of the following elements: Main Force, Regional Force and the paramilitary Village Militia. The Main Force is normally the best led, best trained, and best equipped of all insurgent forces. Main Force training may be conducted in the host country or external to its borders. It is considered a highly motivated, elite fighting group with many of its personnel being full or candidate members of the Communist Party. The Main Force usually is controlled at Interprovincial level. The Regional Force, on the other hand, is made up mostly of indigenous personnel, recruited directly from the Mass Civil Organization or promoted up from the ranks of the Village Militia. Units of this type usually operate in regions of no more than Provincial size.

B–12. Command and Control

a. Command and control over the insurgent military structure emanates from the hard core Inter-Party (cellular) Committee at each operational echelon. Authority flows from the Inter-Party Committee to the Party Revolutionary Committee to the Military Affairs Committee, or the latter body, and thence to the Headquarters of the pertinent Military Command. This chain of command flow is shown in figure B–6.

b. It is the Inter-Party (cellular) Committee and its counterpart Revolutionary Committee at Interprovincial level which normally has operational direction over the insurgent Main Forces. Receiving its instructions from the Central Committee at national level, the Inter-Party Committee in turn passes these orders on to the Interprovincial Revolutionary Committee whose Current Affairs Committee has the responsibility of planning and coordinating combined military/nonmilitary operations. One of the functional staff sections of the Revolutionary Committee, the Military Affairs Committee, is the body which actually directs the Main Force Headquarters and supervises the military units under its command. Consequently, at Interprovincial level, military commands must pass through some three layers of authority before orders reach the Military Headquarters.

c. A similar command and control arrangement exists at each subordinate operational level where Provincial and District Party Committees exercise operational control over Regional Forces through their counterpart Revolutionary Committees. This overall arrangement does not preclude orders being transmitted directly through military channels.

d. The seemingly sharp compartmentalization of command and control functions is smoothed over in practice by the very nature of the interlocking structure of the entire Communist insurgent organization where key personnel hold dual or multiple positions in several of these bodies.

B–13. The Main Force Structure

a. General. Within the major divisions and sections of a Main Force Headquarters totally distinct but parallel channels of control exist—the military chain of command and the Party channels of control. Military command channels stem from the major divisions, Staff, Political, and Logistics, and continue down through sections to subsections or to operational units. The Party insures complete domination over this military structure by use of its own parallel organization which includes, in addition to those Party elements already discussed, the "Inter-Party Committee of the Military."

b. Committees. Two such committees normally exist for each Interprovincial Maine Force. One embraces the Staff and Political organizational structure; the second has Party responsibility for the Logistics Division. Personnel serving on the Party committee hold dual positions and are an integral part of the military organization. In this capacity, these personnel have two reporting chan-



Figure B–6. Flow of authority through party bodies to military command.

nels, one for Party affairs and the other for military matters. These two channels, Party and military, merge at the Inter-provincial Inter-Party (cellular) Committee level. A schematic of this interlocking organizational arrangement is shown in figure B–7.

c. The Staff Division.

(1) In discussing the formal structure of a Communist military organization there does not appear to exist any standard structure which might universally serve to identify that particular staff office or operational unit which usually will



Figure B–7. Type interlocking party military organization.



Figure B–8. Interlocking Party/Military structure of a type Staff Division, headquarters, interprovincial military force.

perform a specific function. Even within a given insurgency, the composition of major headquarters, while similar, do differ. Highly pragmatic, Communist doctrine provides for centralized command and control and decentralized operations. This does not mean, however, that the Communist leadership cannot, when it wishes, intervene in the conduct of activities of subordinate units at any level without prior notice.

(2) Two major sections exist within the Staff Division of the Main Force Organization—the Combat Training and Body Guard Section (CTBG), and the Support Section. The CTBG has the responsibility for the basic training of recruits in Main Force units as well as for the administration and assignment of guard personnel. The Support Section performs those roles denoted in the titles of its subsections. Shown in figure B–8 are the Party channels of control in which Party Groups, assigned to certain sections and operational units, are directly responsible to either the supreme Inter-Party (cellular) Committee or the Inter-Party Committee of the Military No. 1. It will be noted in figure B–8 that three separate channels of Party control exist within the military structure. One leads directly to the supreme Inter-provincial Inter-Party (cellular) Committee; the second leads directly to the Inter-Party Committee of the military; and the third leads to the Party Group of the Staff Division. In other instances, Party Cells exist within other sections which are responsible to the Party Group situated within the Staff Division. This rather complex arrangement insures that the Party leadership can maintain absolute control over its Party apparatus as well as the military bodies in which this apparatus is imbedded.

(3) The Enemy Situation Section in a modified sense approximates the G2 or Intelligence Staff Section of a conventional military force; however, its responsibilities extend into other areas as well. It is here that the personnel of "Armed Propaganda Teams" may be found. The Communist Party, fully conscious that its ability to dominate the mass civil structure, maintains this capability by including terrorist elements in its military structure. The Enemy Situation Section, employing as its action units the Reconnaissance Company and the two or more Special Mission companies, performs this specialized role.

(4) The Artillery and Engineer Staff and operational units perform the conventional roles their titles denote.

(5) The Militia and Guerrilla Section and its counterpart, Guerrilla Warfare Research Center, engage in the conduct of research and experimentation in the use of guerrilla tactics by Village Militia Forces and conduct short training courses in guerrilla warfare.

(6) The Administration Section of the support section is similar to the G–1 or personnel and administration section of a conventional military headquarters. The Crypto Section is a small element concerned with the decoding of messages to be relayed in large part by radio. The Liaison and Communications Section exercises staff supervision over the Signal Company which is almost exclusively involved in the transmission of military orders and information—the Party's own communication network being used for Party communiques.

d. The Political Division.

(1) The Political Division of a Main Force Headquarters presents a strikingly simple organizational picture compared to the complexities characterizing the Staff Division. Figure B–9 shows a type Political Division. No one subsection contains Party elements higher than the cell, and all Party members are responsible to the same Party Group First Secretary who will also be the Division Chief. Thus, the Party and military command channels are fully in accord with one another and the reins of authority are vested in one individual. The Organization and Cadre Sections perform tasks pertaining primarily to Party activities within the military structure. The Organization Section prepares instructions and orders for Party and Party Youth Groups, maintains records and dossiers on Party military personnel, and officiates at public observances and ceremonies. The Cadre Section performs mainly personnel actions including assignments, promotions, and demotions of Party members.

(2) The Propaganda and Training Section is charged with the ideological education of troops as well as general literacy development. Closely allied in mission is the Security Section which investigates the loyalty and ideological purity of Party personnel singled out as suspect by the Propaganda and Training Section.

(3) The Enemy Troop and Civilian Propaganda Section engages in propaganda activities designed to win over the support of the civil population and to cause defection within enemy military ranks. It also has the responsibility for military civilian liaison and coordination.

e. The Logistics Division.

(1) The Party apparatus imbedded in the Lo-



Figure B–9. Interlocking Party/Military structure of a type Political Staff Division, interprovincial military force.

gistics Division is depicted in figure B–10. The Logistics Division is responsible to the Inter-Party Committee of the Military No. 2. The same distinctive interrelationship between Party and Military exists in this Division as in the other two staff divisions.

(2) With few exceptions, the tasks performed by the several sections of this division are ap-



Figure B–10. Interlocking Party/Military structure of a type Logistics Staff Division, Interprovincial military force.

parent from their titles. The Clothing Items Section, in addition to the role which would be clearly assigned to such an office, is also the source of currency issued to military units for the purchase of clothing which it cannot supply. The Finance Section has the additional duty of providing technical guidance on farmwork. Finally, the Equipment Section is charged with controlling a series of machine shops which manufacture much of the equiment needed by military field units.

B–14. The Regional Forces

a. Similar to the Main Forces, which normally are controlled by either the Interprovincial or a national level Party organization the Regional Forces are under the control of the Party's Provincial or District party apparatus. Normally consisting of units no larger than battalion in size, it is these Regional Forces which conduct most of the activities normally thought of as "guerrilla" warfare.

b. The Provincial Revolutionary Committee and its corresponding Military Headquarters approximate in organization their Interprovincial superior bodies, but will tend to be somewhat more simple in structure, depening upon the immediate tactical situation and the numbers of capable personnel available. Similar to the control exercised by the Party over its subordinate level organizations, the Provincial Military Headquar-



Figure B–11. Type insurgent independent battalion.

ters will control Regional Forces at the District level through channels comparable to those leading down from the Interprovincial Military Headquarters. This authority does not, however, extend down to the Village Militia which remains under the control of the Village Party Chapter.

c. The organizational structure of the actual operational units of the Regional Forces tends to conform with traditional western military units in that a staff exists to support three or four combat elements. The chart shown in figure B–11 is considered typical or an insurgent independent battalion.

d. Such a battalion normally contains four companies—three infantry and one heavy weapons. Although not indicated in figure B–11, the battalion headquarters may have attached signal, reconnaissance, and engineer platoons. Additional platoons may also function from this level to provide liaison with rear service agencies, and conduct special mission assignments and other requirements as the need arises. The companies, in turn, are divided into platoons, squads, and three-man military cells or elements. The lowest level of military organization—the cluster of three soldiers—should not be confused with the Party cell. Its members are not necessarily Party members, and, if they are, they will belong to a Party cell in addition to, not instead of, the military cell.

APPENDIX C

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS LISTING FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

C–1. Introduction

The intelligence requirements to support U.S. Army responsibilities for stability operations listed in this appendix are not intended to be all-inclusive, but rather to serve as a guide to assist in specific operational planning. They will have preparedness and operational applications for the Army in all of the six major missions associated with stability operations: advisory assistance, psychological, civil affairs, intelligence, and tactical operations. Coverage in all subject areas must have provincial and local orientation, as well as national data, if the intelligence is to be adequate for U.S. Army operational purposes. The nonmilitary intelligence requirements are generally similar to those of the civil affairs organization.

C–2. General

Section I of this appendix lists the political, economic, sociological, geographic, and military intelligence requirements primarily as they apply to basic U.S. Army needs. Section II pertains to intelligence requirements on the insurgent movement as they exist during the growth of the insurgency.

Section I. GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

C–3. Political Intelligence

a. The Government.
(1) History.
(2) Structure of the government.
(3) Laws and regulations.

b. National Policies—Foreign and Domestic Affairs.
(1) Policies and programs.
(2) Political groups.
(3) Political stability.

c. Internal Security.
(1) Public order and safety.
(2) Internal security establishment.
(3) Intelligence and counterintelligence establishment.
(4) Political party intelligence apparatus.

d. Biographics.

C–4. Economic Intelligence

a. Commerce and Industry.
(1) Business organizations.
(2) Manufacturing.
(3) Developing programs.
(4) Size distribution of firms.
(5) Channels of distribution.

b. Agriculture.
(1) Principal crops.
(2) Animal husbandry.
(3) Practices and techniques.
(4) Land ownership patterns.

c. Labor.
(1) Labor organizations.
(2) Labor policies and practices.
(3) Manpower.

d. Economic Organization and Activity.
(1) Finance and banking.
(2) Economic planning and control.
(3) Economic development.

e. Foreign Economic Relations.
(1) Foreign trade.
(2) Economic treaties.
(3) Foreign exchange.
(4) Foreign investment and foreign aid.

f. Natural Resources.
(1) Chemicals.
(2) Metals and minerals.
(3) Fuels and power.
(4) Agriculture, fisheries, and power.

g. Transportation.
(1) Highway transportation.

(2) Railway transportation.
(3) Inland waterway transportation.
(4) Merchant marine.
(5) Civil aviation.

h. Communications.
(1) Postal, telephone, and telegraph.
(2) Radio and television.
(3) Other.

C–5. Sociological Intelligence

a. Social Organization.
(1) Characteristics of the people.
(2) Customs and manners.
(3) Languages.
(4) Minorities and tribes.

b. Institutions.
(1) Religion.
(2) Education.
(3) Arts and letters.
(4) Cultural groups and movements.
(5) Public information.

c. Population and Manpower.
(1) Population data.
(2) Public opinion and attitudes.
(3) Displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.

d. Health and Welfare.
(1) Health, hygiene, and sanitation.
(2) Public welfare.
(3) Social problems.

C–6. Geographical Intelligence

a. Physical Geographical Studies, Maps, and Charts.
(1) Surface configurations and landforms.
(2) Surface drainage.
(3) Vegetation.
(4) Soils and trafficability.
(5) Key terrain features.
(6) Cultural features.
(7) Animal life.
(8) Safe area descriptions.

b. Military Geographical Studies, Maps, and Charts.
(1) Amphibious landing beaches.
(2) Landing and drop zones.
(3) Transportation obstacles.
(4) Air installations.
(5) Highways and railways.
(6) Ports and harbors.
(7) Inland waterways.
(8) Urban areas.

c. Meteorological Data.
(1) Climatic studies.
(2) Weather data.
(3) Light data.

d. Imagery.
(1) Basic photocover.
(2) Photomaps.
(3) Interpretation keys.

e. Gazetteers.

C–7. Military Intelligence

a. Military Establishment Capabilities.
(1) Governmental subordination of armed forces.
(2) Political subordination of armed forces.
(3) Military treaties and alliances.
(4) Internal security forces.
(5) Manpower resources.
(6) Command and staff doctrine.
(7) Regular and nonregular force structure.

b. Military Establishment Attitudes.
(1) Influence on national policy.
(2) Importance within government.
(3) Tradition of interference in politics.
(4) Prestige among populace.
(5) Loyalty to government.

c. Orgnization of the Armed Forces.
(1) National military establishment.
(2) Territorial organization.
(3) Ground, naval, air order of battle.
(4) Paramilitary order of battle.
(5) Doctrine, strategy and tactics.

d. Biographics.

Section II. INSURGENT MOVEMENT INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

C–8. General Requirements

a. Identification of Insurgent Movement.
(1) Name(s) of movement.
(2) History of movement.

b. Location of Movement.
(1) National level.
(2) Local level.

c. Causes of Insurgent Movement.
(1) Social.
(2) Political.
(3) Intellectual.
(4) Economic.

(5) Religious.
(6) Historical.

d. Composition of Movement.
(1) National level.
(2) Local level.

e. Support of Movement.
(1) Communist Parties and organizations.
(2) Non-Communist Parties and organizations.
(3) Population.
(*a*) Rural.
(*b*) Urban.
(*c*) Government officials and workers.
(*d*) General populace.
(*e*) Military and paramilitary forces.
(*f*) Upper class.
(*g*) Middle class.
(*h*) Lower class.
(*i*) Professional.
(*j*) Minorities and tribes.
(4) External support.
(*a*) Overt.
(*b*) Covert.

f. Membership of Movement.
(1) Actual.
(2) Potential.
(3) Biographics.

g. Activities of Movement.
(1) Nonviolent activities.
(*a*) Political.
(*b*) Economic.
(*c*) Psychological and propaganda.
(*d*) Intelligence.
(*e*) Counterintelligence and security.
(2) Violent activities.
(*a*) Assassinations.
(*b*) Indiscriminate murder.
(*c*) Torture.
(*d*) Kidnapping.
(*e*) Extortion.
(*f*) Arson.
(*g*) Sabotage.

h. Strengths and Vulnerabilities of Movement.
(1) Internal.
(2) External.

C–9. Insurgency Force Intelligence Requirements

a. Development of Force Structure.
(1) Village militia.
(2) Regular armed forces.
(*a*) Regional forces.
(*b*) Main forces.
(3) Relationships with insurgent political movement.

b. Support of Local Populace to Insurgency Forces.
(1) Direct support.
(2) Indirect support.

c. Government Measures and Attitudes.
(1) Tactical.
(2) Nontactical.

d. Supportfrom External Powers.
(1) Manpower.
(2) Weapons and equipment.
(3) Other

e. Order of Battle.
(1) Composition.
(2) Disposition.
(3) Strength.
(4) Tactics.
(5) Training.
(6) Logistics.
(7) Combat effectiveness.
(8) Personalities.
(9) Miscellaneous.

f. Insurgency Force Capabilities.
(1) Tactical.
(*a*) Raids.
(*b*) Ambushes.
(*c*) Interdiction.
(*d*) Harassment.
(2) Support.
(*a*) Logistics.
(*b*) Manpower.
(*c*) Control of areas.
(*d*) Communications.
(*e*) Intelligence.
(*f*) Counterintelligence and security.
(*g*) Psychological and propaganda.
(*h*) Transportation.
(*i*) Chemical.
(*j*) Engineer.
(*k*) Medical.

g. Strengths and Vulnerabilities.
(1) Internal.
(2) External.

APPENDIX G

COMBAT SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

PHASE I

Level of responsibility	*Minimum requirements*
National (NIDCC) Subnational Area Coordination Center	1. LOC studies. 2. Terrain studies. 3. Trafficability analyses. 4. Soil analyses and erosion control. 5. Plans for urban and agricultural growth; relocation requirements. 6. Study of international boundaries for border violations. 7. Study of potential LZ and DZ to disclose possible use by insurgents. 8. Observation of demonstrations and riots for suspected insurgents. 9. Mapping, map stockage, and map supplements. 10. Detection of insurgent supply caches from photography and ground reconnaissance. 11. Planning training of tactical units in surveillance means and capabilities; use of surveillance equipment. 12. Coordinating the use of TAOR resources available for in-country support. 13. Collection of target data on known or potential insurgent force base areas, logistical supplies, training areas, infiltration routes, and food production areas.
Tactical Unit and/or U.S. Advisor to Host Country Unit	1. Support of the surveillance effort within area of responsibility by utilizing the unit's total surveillance capabilities. 2. Assisting in the training of indigenous units in combat surveillance and reconnaissance.

PHASES II AND III

Level of responsibility	*Minimum requirements*
National (NIDCC)	1. The continuation of all Phase I requirements still valid.
Subnational Area Coordination Center	2. Detailed terrain studies and photographic coverage of areas under consideration for current and future operations. 3. Development of repetitive aerial photography coverage for comparative analysis purposes. 4. Collection of information usable for updating operational maps. 5. Reconnaissance to confirm intelligence gathered from other sources. 6. Continual visual observation of all areas of suspected or known insurgents activity.
Tactical Unit and/or U.S. Advisor to Host Country Unit	1. The continuation of all Phase I requirements still valid. 2. Development of target data within areas of known or potential tactical operational value for use in unit target folders. 3. Ground and aerial surveillance patrol plans to cover all areas within unit TAOR. 4. Photographic coverage of TAOR with repetitive coverage on a frequent basis to assure identification of all changes.

APPENDIX H

TYPE INTELLIGENCE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

H-1. General

a. The program of instruction presented in this appendix is designed primarily for the training of host country military intelligence personnel. It is adaptable for use by U.S. Army mobile training teams, as well as by U.S. Army advisor or mission personnel operating in foreign countries. The program is not inclusive of several common subjects, such as scouting and patrolling, which are assumed to be part of the general training program for host country military personnel.

b. The proposed instructional program encompasses 185 training hours. This does not include a recommended two-hour period which could be used daily for language study, orientation, and review on evenings when no night training is scheduled. Additional hours for practical exercises should be added whenever time permits.

H-2. The Instructional Program

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Map Reading	(16)	
Introduction to Maps	1	Definition of maps; uses of maps in intelligence activities; importance of marginal data and meaning of topographic symbols.
Coordinate Systems	4	Explanation and use of Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) and geographic grid systems; and/or explanation of grid system for quick and accurate location of points on any map.
Scale and Distance; Elevation and Relief.	2	Explain relationship between map distance and ground distance on any map, illustrate use of graphic scale to determine ground distance from map measurement. Explanation and use of various methods showing elevation and relief at specific may locations.
Land Navigation	3	Illustrate use of azimuths and of declination diagram in solution of polar coordinates, intersection and resection problems. Explains use of lensatic compass and/or terrain features for point to point navigation. Show techniques for navigation at night.

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Map Reading		
Practical Exercises	4	Practical work with available maps and appropriate tools, in classroom and/or in field, giving students practice in solving typical map reading problems.
Exam and Critique	2	Determine map reading ability of students through extension of practical exercises in classroom and/or in field using available maps. Critique results to reinforce teaching objectives.
Communist Subversion	(12)	
Sino-Soviet Organization of Party and State.	2	Organizational structure of governments of USSR and Communist China and of CPSU and CCP, including intelligence and security organs.
Indoctrination of Communist Party Membership.	1	The nature of Communist Party membership. Comparison of recruiting practices. Democratic centralism as a technique for securing cadre support of Party policies. The meaning of "bureaucratism" and "democracy" within the Party. Criticism and self-criticism as psychological control techniques.
Communist Insurgency Doctrine	1	Evolution of Communist revolutionary theory through Marx, Lenin, and Mao. Distinctive characteristics of the revolutionary strategy employed in Russia and China. Ethics of communism as reflected in subversive insurgency. Objectives of revolutionary communism in theory and practice.
Strategy of Subversive Insurgency.	1	Minimum requirements for an insurgency. The three basic insurgent strategies: early power seizure, coalition government, and parallel government. Common characteristics of the three strategies. Selection of a strategy based upon local conditions.
Communist Tactics Within the Population.	2	The mass organization and the infiltration cell. Objectives of Communist Party control of mass organizations. Forms of the urban demonstration of strength. Forms of support for rural insurgent operations.

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Communist Subversion		
Communist Tactics in Promotion of Insurgency.	1	The five steps in the promotion of an insurgency: intelligence, propaganda, organization, training, and struggle. Methods of protraction and escalation of an insurgency. Formulation and manipulation of People's Liberation Committees.
Insurgent Psychological Operations.	2	The Communist concept of propaganda and agitation. Content of insurgent propaganda. Typical propaganda themes. Face to face persuasion and action propaganda. Techniques of agitation. The insurgent "agitprop" network.
Communist Penetration and Subversive Techniques.	2	Practical exercise and seminar in which the student applies the Communist doctrine, tactics and techniques presented in previous instruction in preparing an assessment of the susceptibility of his own organization to Communist penetration. Assessment prepared outside of class and brought in for discussion of appropriate countermeasures.
Fundamentals of Insurgent Organization and Operations	(27)	
Evolution of the Insurgent Movement.	1	Discussion of the three phases of insurgent development and the five-step promotional method.
History of Bowmore _____	4	Seminar on the development of an insurgency in the hypothetical country of Bowmore. Identification of factors that contributed to political instability. Evidence of insurgent organizations and exploitation of grievance. Comparison of events in the student's country with those in Bowmore.
Organizational Principals _____	2	Organizational principles of the insurgent movement and common characteristics of the insurgent organization.
Insurgent Use of Political Pressure to Weaken the Established Government.	1	The exploitation of local political, economic, and psychological factors by the insurgent organization.

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Fundamentals of Insurgent Organization and Operations.		
Internal and External Development of the Insurgent Movement.	5	Development of the insurgent effort through exploitation of outside assistance, civil population, terrain, propaganda, and intelligence. Discussion of factors which enhance the internal strength of the insurgent movement such as aggressive leadership, internal discipline, unity of the movement, and the will to resist.
Causes of Insurgency	2	Analysis of the grievances which exist within the civil population and are exploited by the insurgent movement to weaken the established government.
Introduction to Insurgent Order of Battle.	2	Introduction to order of battle; necessity for compiling order of battle in peace and war; importance of order of battle factors; and order of battle as it pertains to insurgent operations during the three phases of insurgent development to include personalities, doctrine, etc.
Type Insurgent Order of Battle	6	Typical insurgent organization in each phase of insurgent development to include combat, combat support, and combat service support organizations. Tactics and training during the three phases of insurgent development (sabotage, terrorist activities). Detailed discussion of surprise and mobility to include ambush, raid, and harassing operation.
Other Order of Battle Considerations.	2	Other order of battle considerations concerning internal defense operations to include interrelationship with other sources/agencies to enhance the overall effort and to assess the overall combat effectiveness of the insurgent force.
Insurgent Activity Indicators	2	Type insurgent activity indicators. Determination and evaluation of indicators. Use of insurgent activity to determine the relative advancement of insurgency within the first phase.

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Production of Internal Defense Intelligence.	(39)	
Intelligence Cycle	1	Introduction to planning, collection and processing of information and the dissemination of intelligence for purposes of internal defense in first phase of insurgency.
Area Coordination Center	2	Necessity for civil-military coordination in the local intelligence effort. Type area coordination center including agencies to be represented. Operation of the Area Coordination Center with emphasis upon participating agencies as collectors of information and users of intelligence. Function of the Area Coordination Center in integrating intelligence and operations.
Area Studies in Intelligence Planning.	4	Requirements for information on the local area of operations. Area studies and their use as a basic aid in planning the collection of information. Scope, format, and techniques of preparing an area study, including a practical exercise in the preparation of a local area study.
Intelligence Planning	4	Planning of the collection effort to include determination, format, and content of intelligence requirement; priorities among intelligence requirements; format and function of the collection plan as an aid in intelligence planning during the first phase of insurgency.
Collection of Information	3	Definition of, and distinction between, sources of information and collection agencies. Identification of sources which can be exploited at the local level during the first phase of insurgency; their capabilities and limitations. Identification of collection agencies, their capabilities, limitations, and employment at the local level. Countermeasures the insurgent can employ to hinder the collection effort.

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Production of Internal Defense Intelligence		
Recording of Information _____	3	The development, maintenance, and utilization of recording devices and systems for use at the Area Coordination Center during the first phase of insurgency. The importance of working files in developing knowledge of the insurgent enemy with emphasis on personality and incident files. Influence of local conditions upon the applicability of various recording devices. Discussion of type recording devices with emphasis upon the intelligence workbook.
Evaluation and Interpretation of Information.	4	The production of intelligence through evaluation and interpretation. Evaluation to determine pertinence and credibility of information. Evaluation to determine reliability of source and agency. The process of interpreting information through analysis, integration, and deduction. Use of the pattern analysis techniques.
Determination of Insurgent Capabilities.	2	Methods of determining insurgent capabilities. Importance of intelligence in the determination of probable courses of action during the first phase of insurgency. Format and content of statements regarding insurgent capabilities.
Intelligence Estimate of the Insurgent Situation.	3	Format, content, and function of the estimate. Preparation of an estimate of the insurgent situation at a local level during the first phase of insurgency.
Dissemination of Intelligence __	1	The importance of proper and objective dissemination. Methods and means of dissemination. The effect of timeliness and security upon the dissemination means. The development and utilization of intelligence reports applicable to the first phase of insurgency. The influence of local conditions upon the applicability of various reports. Discussion of type in-

Subject area	Hours	Scope
Production of Internal Defense Intelligence		
		telligence reports with emphasis upon the intelligence estimate.
Role of Intelligence in Internal Defense.	3	The use of intelligence to detect, identify, expose, penetrate and neutralize revolutionary activities and organizations. Considerations of intelligence support to major internal defense programs.
Intelligence Review	1	Review of intelligence cycle; planning collection, processing of information; dissemination of information.
Intelligence Production PE	8	A practical exercise emphasizing the use of intelligence production devices and techniques in an Area Coordination Center.
Intelligence Personnel Management, Stability Operations	(22)	
Introduction	1	Importance of the continuous information coverage of the entire region by area, population, and specific targets. Necessity for broad coverage to provide overall knowledge within geographical boundaries to detect potential subversive activities or dissident elements. Methods of obtaining information regarding a specific target, known or suspected, through informants.
Insurgent Vulnerabilities	1	The vulnerabilities of the insurgent movement to intelligence penetration. Placement of informants within the insurgent political and military organization, cadre, and local support.
Locating the Informant	2	The continuous search for qualified persons who may have or who can obtain placement or access to the desired information. Determination of motivational factors, i.e., progovernment, special interests, grievances against the insurgent. Suspectibility to operational control and discipline.
Initial Checking	2	Security procedures to be followed prior to contact with the prospective informant. File checks, discreet neighborhood inquiry,

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Intelligence Personnel Management, Stability Operations		
		other existing investigative techniques.
Contact	2	How to approach the prospective informant, identity, the offer, answer to objections, reassurances, rewards, and punishments, concluding the bargain. How to plan and arrange for the initial meeting. Degree of exposure, physical security, and operational security during initial contact.
Tasks	2	The need of assigning a clear, meaningful task to the informant who has the capability to accomplish it. What is required and guidelines for collecting, i.e., observation, conversation documents.
Individual and Cell Security	2	The techniques of achieving individual and cell security with an explanation of: individual precautions and defensive measures, both active and passive, to prevent exposure; cell practices and control; cell discipline, and methods to prevent exposure of the cell.
Identity	2	The necessity for a different identity for individuals and the cell; explanation for individual and cell activities; and the use of identities and explanations to prevent exposure. How these identities and explanations are developed to fit the character of the informant, the task which must be accomplished, the area, and other factors. The need to continue normal actions and appearances to prevent notice and detection.
Communications With Informants	3	The requirements in establishing communications with informants. How to meet with informants in a secure manner. The use of signals, couriers, hiding places, and other techniques to communicate with informants.
Testing	2	The testing of the informant's honesty, capabilities, identity,

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Intelligence Personnel Management, Stability Operations.		
		and security. How to conduct field tests, techniques employed and evaluation of the informant.
Separation From Service	2	Compensation and rewards the informant might receive. How compensation may be determined. Security problems in informant payments. Actions after the informant is no longer required. How the informant is separated from service. Categories of separation and post action report.
Records on Informants	1	The need for details in writing of the physical description, personal data, actions as an informant, and any other data which would be necessary if control were to be transferred to another intelligence collector. Security practices to safeguard informant records and the need to develop an informant registry at national or regional level.
Techniques of Gathering Information.	(17)	
Observation and Surveillance	3	Principles of observation. Type of surveillance. Reconnaissance, both ground and air, as a part of the surveillance effort. Techniques of conducting overt and clandestine surveillance during the first phase of insurgency activity. The employment of police patrols in urban areas and military patrols in rural areas as a means of collecting information.
Police Type Support to Internal Defense Operations	4	Installation security, traffic control measures, law enforcement in riot control, and population registry and control measures.
Basic Techniques	6	Employment of the basic techniques of observation and description of personalities, equipment, weapons, movement, construction and incidents to include systematic approach to motivating, training, and directing of individuals to collecting such information, identification and recognition of basic geometric shapes and figures com-

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Techniques of Gathering Information.		
		mon to manmade products and structures, selection of pertinent detail, sketching and drawing from both planimetric and horizontal views, methods of estimating and measuring dimensions, identification, approximation and relation of new or unusual impressions to known objects of previous experiences, estimation of specific time of occurrences and time spans, identification of personalities as to specific individuals, tribal association, area of origin and status within group, identify and denote significance of patterns of activity and changes in mode or status of existence, examples and practical exercises to aid in the instructional process.
Review of Basic Photography	1	Review of the photographic cycle. Sensitized photomaterial, camera lens and shutter relationship.
Determining Exposure	1	Various methods of determining exposure in photography. Use of an exposure meter.
Operation of a 35mm Camera	2	Theory and operation of a simple 35mm camera. Practical exercise in the use of the camera as an aid in the collecting and recording of information.
Interrogation and Handling of Insurgent Suspects.	(18)	
Apprehension and Disposition of Insurgent Suspects.	2	Identification of suspects. Arrest of suspects and search of appropriate area. Objective, preparation and techniques of suspect interrogation. Knowledge of insurgent organization in suspect interrogation. Disposition of interrogated suspect.
Interrogation Techniques	4	Introduction to interrogation techniques. Principles, procedures, and approaches used in interrogation.
Handling of Interrogees	2	The proper handling of interrogees, their personal effects, and documents in order to insure a successful interrogation.
Insurgents as Sources of Information.	2	The value of an insurgent interrogee as a source of information and the types of information which may be elicited.

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
Interrogation and Handling of Insurgent Suspects.		
Interrogation of Illiterates	2	Techniques in interrogating illiterates with limited ability to read, write, or count. Procedures for establishing mutually acceptable frames of reference with interpreter and subject.
Preparation of Reports	2	The techniques of placing information elicited from an interrogee into a usable format.
Communist Interrogation Techniques.	4	Historical examples of Communist techniques of interrogation and indoctrination.
Passive Opposition to Insurgent Penetration and Activity.	(11)	
Insurgent Strategy	2	Analysis of the operational advantages and disadvantages of an insurgent movement compared with those of the established government.
Unit Security Against Penetration.	2	Insurgent methods of operation in penetration. Passive countermeasures including orientation of personnel and establishment of reporting requirements. Problems of unit members and the commander in implementing reporting requirements.
Civil Administration Personnel Security Program.	1	The civil administration as a prime target of infiltration by subversive insurgent elements. The components of an effective personnel security program within the civil administration.
Counterintelligence Support	2	The use of passive security measures, investigation, surveillance, informants, and the population to thwart or detect subversive penetration activities.
Categories of Counterintelligence Operations.	3	Military security; civil security; port, frontier and travel security, censorship and special operations necessary to achieve objective of national security.
Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception.	1	Employment of camouflage, concealment, and deception; passive artifices and countermeasures.
General Orientation	(15)	
Intelligence Orientation	1	Introduction to principles of intelligence. Definitions of intelligence and counterintelligence.

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
General Orientation		
		Types of intelligence. Requirement for intelligence to support operations of local police, paramilitary, and military forces and to support programs of civil affairs and psychological operations conducted by the government for internal defense.
Counterintelligence and Security Orientation.	3	
1. Operational Security Principles.		(1) Internal security measures, secrecy discipline, compartmentation of security operations and liaison with other agencies.
2. Counterintelligence Organization.		(1) Organization, function, mission, capabilities and limitations of personnel.
3. Positive Counterintelligence.		(1) Aggressive information collection program to include special penetration operations.
Public Administration Orientation.	1	Orientation on the concepts of village, regional, and provincial administration duties in support of the government's intelligence collection effort. The concept includes the utilization of cadres involved extensively in pacification tasks.
Psychological Operations Orientation.	2	Orientation on psychological operations to include: tactical and consolidation psychological operations; definition of propaganda; propaganda means and themes; intelligence requirements; and civil affairs requirements in support of internal defense operations.
U.S. Objectives and Organization in Internal Defense and Development Assistance Operations.	4	
1. U.S. Objectives _____		(2) The purpose of this unit of instruction is to give the student a general knowledge of the United States response to developing nations in internal defense and development assistance operations. The objectives of the United States Government in developing nations regarding their internal defense

Subject area	*Hours*	*Scope*
General Orientation		
		effort with emphasis on the organization and mission of the in-country team.
2. U.S. Army and Its Intelligence Support.		(2) Orientation on the U.S. Army with emphasis upon the organization of a division and upon the MI support of a division. Duties and functions of various military intelligence specialists.
Development of an Organization and Tactics for Stability Operations.	4	
1. Intelligence Organization for Small Units.		(2) Organization and functional considerations in the development of a military intelligence organization to support battalion and smaller sized military and paramilitary units. Discussion of organization and functions of a type small unit intelligence support organization for employment in an internal defense mission.
2. Fundamentals of Organization for Stability Operations.		(2) To give the students a general knowledge of the concept of stability operations as part of a comprehensive internal defense program. Military tactics are explained under the general concept of isolation and elimination. Concepts of area organization, combat security, protection of civilian communities and vital installation and immediate action drills.
Final Course Practical Exercises		(8) Practical exercise and seminar in which the student applies the techniques presented in the instruction on hypothetical internal defense/development situations.

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

W. C. WESTMORELAND,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:

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APPENDIX F

EXAMPLE OF A PARTIALLY COMPLETED COLLECTION PLAN



UNIT DELAWARE PROVINCE AREA COORDINATION CENTER

PERIOD COVERED: FROM _____ TO _____

COLLECTION PLAN

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS	INDICATORS	SPECIFIC REQUESTS	PRIMARY COLLECTION AGENCIES: POLICE	MILITARY	NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE	AGRICULTURE	INDUSTRY	PUBLIC HEALTH	EDUCATION	REVENUE	TRANSPORTATION	COMMUNICATIONS	JUSTICE	INFORMATION	MODE AND DESTINATION OF REPORTS	REMARKS
Will the insurgents engage in nonviolent actions? If so, what, when, where and how?	a. Recent (last 6 months) insurgent political activities	(1) Identify provincial leaders of Radical Reform Party	⊗		⊗	⊗							⊗	⊗	AS DIRECTED TO RELEASE PROTECT ACC	
		(2) Report all recent activities of the party	⊗		⊗									X		
		(3) Report current plans and ultimate objectives of the party	⊗		⊗									X		
	b Recent (last 6 months) insurgent economic activities.	(1) Identify leaders of the Peoples' Democratic Labor Party and the Small Farmers' Progressive Grange Association	⊗			⊗	X									
		(2) Report their recent activities			X	⊗	X									
		(3) What are the programs and objectives of these organizations (stated and actual)?	⊗		X	⊗	X									
	c. Recent (last 6 months) insurgent sociological activities	(1) Identify groups (ethnic, religious, social, minorities, etc.) which have been the targets of recent insurgent activities	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	X		
		(2) Report their activities and identify the individuals who conducted them.	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗				X	X		
		(3) Enumerate effects of insurgent activities on the target groups	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	X	⊗	X	X	X		
	d Recent (last 6 months) insurgent psychological activities	(1) Identify targets of insurgent psychological activities and explain why they are targets.	⊗		⊗	⊗	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		
		(2) What do the insurgents hope to achieve through their psychological activities?	⊗		⊗	⊗	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		
		(3) Describe individual insurgent psychological activities.	⊗		⊗	⊗	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Will the insurgent engage in terrorist actions? If so, what, when, where and how?	a Recent assassination.	(1) Report all assassinations, including the identity of those assassined, their positions, the reasons for the assassination, and the identity of the assassin	⊗		⊗	⊗	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
	h Recent cases of torture.	(1) Report the identity of those tortured, their positions, the reasons they were tortured, and the identity of the torturers	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	X	X	X	X	X	⊗	X		
	c Recent cases of extortion	(1) Report the identity of individuals who have been the object of extortion, their positions, the purpose of the extortion, means used, and the identity of the extortioners	⊗		⊗	⊗	X	X	⊗	X	X	X	⊗	X		
	d Recent kidnappings	(1) Report the identity of individuals who have been kidnapped, their positions, why and how they were kidnapped, and the identity of the kidnappers	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		
	e Recent sabotage	(1) Report objects which have been sabotaged, reasons for and results of the sabotage, how sabotage was accomplished, and identity of saboteurs	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		
Will the insurgent engage in terrorist actions? If so, what, when, where and how?	e Recent harassment directed at the government or the population	(1) Report individuals or government forces that have been harassed, purpose and results of the harassment, and identity of and methods used by individuals who conducted the harassment	⊗	⊗	X	⊗	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		

Figure F–1. Example of partially completed collection plan.

EXAMPLE OF PARTIALLY COMPLETED COLLECTION PLAN (cont)

	b. Recent destruction of personnel, equipment, installations by ambush or raid.	(1) Report personnel or objects that have been destroyed by ambush or raid, the manner in which they were destroyed, and the identity of individuals involved in the ambushes or raids.
	c. Recent interdiction of transportation and communication system.	(1) Report systems which have been destroyed or disrupted, methods employed, reasons for destruction, and identify individuals who carried out the destruction.
	d. Recent actions in which insurgent forces dispersed before government forces could close.	(1) Report location, date and nature of actions, forces involved (government and insurgent), and insurgent tactics employed to avoid contact.
Will the insurgents engage in conventional tactical operations? If so, what, when, where, and how?	a. Formation of insurgent military forces of regimental size.	(1) Report location and activities of insurgent regimental headquarters and subordinate units.
Will the insurgents engage in activities to support nonviolent action, terrorist actions, guerrilla operations, or conventional tactical operations? If so, what, when, where and how?	a. Recent insurgent intelligence and security activities.	(1) Report insurgent intelligence collection activities—targets of the activities, methods employed, personnel involved (friendly and insurgent). (2) Report methods used by the insurgents to deny information to the government concerning their location, personnel, organization, installations, activities, and plans.
	b. Recent recruitment and retention of elements of the provincial populace by the insurgents.	(1) Report all attempts (successful and unsuccessful) by insurgents to recruit members of the local populace—identify individuals and groups contacted by the insurgents, insurgent methods of recruitment, and personnel employed. (2) Report how the insurgents retain individuals after they have been recruited.
	c. Recent organization and training of elements of the provincial populace by the insurgents.	(1) Report insurgent attempts to organize the people and the leadership, activities, plans and objectives of insurgent controlled organizations. (2) Report locations of insurgent training sites, describe facilities, type training conducted and identity of students and instructors.
	d. Recent insurgent procurement of financial and logistical support. (Both within province and from external sources.)	(1) Report all items procured by the insurgents by type and quantity—how procured, from and by whom, and disposition of items after procurement.



Figure F-1—Continued.

(*c*) Discovery of arms, ammunition, and explosives being clandestinely manufactured, transported or cached.

(*d*) Increased purchase and theft from salvage yards of metal products such as pipe, casings, wire, spikes, and nails.

(*e*) Increased purchase of surplus military goods and nonserviceable items.

(*f*) Increase in demand for small arms and ammunition on the open market.

(*g*) Reports of large scale purchasing of weapons, ammunition, and material used in their manufacture from gunsmiths, traders and regular businessmen.

(*h*) Increase in pilfering of arms and ammunition from the government.

(*i*) An increase in the number of armed robberies which indicates a tendency toward the use of arms in addition to indicating a source of financing for the insurgent movement.

(*j*) Reports of theft or sudden shortages of certain basic chemicals which could be utilized in the clandestine manufacture of explosives.

(*k*) Appearance of arms manufactured in pro-insurgency oriented countries.

(3) *Clothing.*

(*a*) Unusual systematic purchase of clothing materials, possibly indicating the creation of factories for the manufacture of insurgent uniforms or footwear.

(*b*) Unusual scarcity of clothing or material used in the manufacture of clothing and footwear.

(*c*) Large scale distribution of clothing to underprivileged classes by organizations of recent or suspect origin.

(*d*) Discovery of caches of uniform clothing.

(4) *Drugs.*

(*a*) Scarcity of drugs and medical supplies on the market or black market.

(*b*) Large scale purchase or theft of drugs and other medical supplies from warehouses and distributors.

(*c*) Diversion of shipments of drugs into the cities.

e. Environment Indicators. Environment indicators in an urban area may not be as apparent as in the rural areas of a province or country. It is possible, nevertheless, to recognize insurgency indicators in the physical and manmade environment in an urban center. The following listing, while not all-inclusive is intended to create an atmosphere conducive to recognition of such indicators that may appear in an area.

(1) Apartments and housing being rented but not lived in as homes.

(2) Slogans written on walls, bridges, and streets.

(3) Defacement of government and police information signs.

(4) Disappearance of electrical lines.

(5) Pollution of the urban area's water supply.

(6) Isolated terroristic acts directed at the destruction of government buildings and installations and the homes and businesses of community leaders.

(7) Changes in residence of suspected subversives.

(8) Discovery of message drops.

(9) Apartments and houses apparently being used for purposes other than residences.

(10) Increased smuggling of currency, gold, gems, narcotics, medical supplies, and arms into urban centers.

(11) Reports that local currency is being bought up in world markets by pro-insurgency oriented countries.

(12) Appearance of abnormal amounts of counterfeit currency in country of concern.

(13) Increase in bank robberies.

(14) Work stoppages or slowdowns in essential industries.

(15) Marked decline in product quality in essential industries.

(16) Marked increases in equipment failures in essential industries.

(17) Mass strikes and sympathy strikes in essential industries.

(18) Appearance of known agitators or suspected subversives in picket lines.

(19) Escalation of peaceful strikes to violence against property and nonstriking personnel.

(20) Explosions in or bombing of essential utilities and industries.

(21) Roadblocks and mines on main lines of communication, powerlines, and aqueducts leading to urban centers.

(22) Malicious damage to industrial products or factory machinery.

(*g*) Leakage of classified information to newspapers.

(*h*) Sudden changes in working and living patterns and financial status of government and law enforcement employees.

(*i*) Failure of government raids on suspected subversive meetings or headquarters apparently because of forewarning.

(*j*) Increased student activity against the government and its police, or against minority groups, foreigners and the like.

(*k*) Demonstrations against government forces, scapegoat minority groups, or foreigners who are designed to goad government forces into acting against crowds and thereby creating general hostility toward the government.

(*l*) An increased number of articles or advertisements in newspapers criticizing the government.

(*m*) The growth of general hostility toward the government and law enforcement agencies.

(*n*) The occurrence of strikes in critical areas casting doubt upon the ability of the government to maintain order and provide for the needs of the people.

(*o*) Unusual and unsatisfactorily explained absences of government employees from their offices for periods of short duration.

(*p*) Sporadic, unexplained destruction of and/or forgery of government identification cards and passports.

(*q*) Unexplained disruptions of public utilities.

(*r*) Reports of extortion attempts on local leaders and businessmen.

(*s*) Anonymous threats addressed to or terroristic acts committed against government and business leaders.

(*t*) Murder or kidnapping of government officials.

c. Psychological, Propaganda, and Agitation Indicators. The state of advancement of the insurgent movement may be gauged by certain considerations. First, since the beginnings of the urban insurgency are characterized by a high degree of secrecy and clandestine operation combined with selective recruitment, there is little requirement for a propaganda campaign beyond that necessary for face-to-face or person-to-person recruitment. When the first concrete urban propaganda indicators appear, therefore, it can be taken as a sign that the minimum underground insurgent organization has been established. The initial propaganda goals will be those of attempting to bring the normal pattern of background dissension to a predetermined level and maintaining it at that level until an opportune moment. The secondary goal will be to broaden the base of popular support elsewhere in the urban community with a specially designed campaign.

(1) *Against the general situation.*

(*a*) Worldwide dissemination of propaganda by proinsurgency oriented countries denouncing conditions in, and the government of, the country of concern.

(*b*) In-country dissemination of antigovernment slogans and pronouncements by word of mouth, wall scribblings, and crude posters and leaflets.

(*c*) Initiation of letterwriting campaigns to newspapers and government officials deploring undesirable conditions and blaming individuals in power.

(*d*) Proliferation of slogans pinpointing specific grievances.

(*e*) Increase in petitions demanding government redress of grievances.

(*f*) Circulation of petitions and tracts whose origins cannot be immediately determined, which appear to follow the beliefs and policies of a foreign power.

(*g*) An increase in rumors, publications, or leaders emerging from the areas occupied by recently arrived migrants, which seem to focus upon the idea that no one cares about the new arrivals or their social conditions.

(*h*) A general increase in the underlying feeling of agitation and unrest among the critical urban population for which there is no logical explanation.

(*i*) Appearance of committees and organizations whose leaders do not seem to be from the population of that urban area, yet who purport to speak for all of the citizens of that area.

(*j*) Increased appeals directed at intensifying general religious unrest in countries where religious competition exists and the religious composition of the urban population is heterogeneous.

(*k*) Mass demonstrations whose participants advocate standard Communst demands.

(*l*) Announcements by foreign countries that the concerned country is ripe for a "war of national liberation," or words to that effect.

(*m*) Propaganda identifying local ethnic groups with those in neighboring countries in connection with selected themes.

(*n*) Clandestine in-country radio broad-

casts worded to appeal to those with special grievances or to underprivileged ethnic groups.

(*o*) Use of bullhorns, truck-mounted loudspeakers, and other sophisticated equipment in spontaneous demonstrations.

(*p*) Presence of photographers other than newsmen among demonstrators.

(*q*) Widespread advertising of planned demonstrations or strikes to appeal for sympathetic reception or participation.

(*r*) Rallies to honor "martyred" insurgents.

(*s*) Mass demonstrations honoring revolutionary heroes or dates significant to insurgency movements in other countries.

(*t*) Nationwide strikes called to demonstrate the strength of the insurgent movement.

(*u*) Sympathy strikes called outside the country concerned.

(2) *Against the established government.*

(*a*) Radio propaganda from foreign counties beamed at the country of concern denouncing its government for failure to meet the needs and desires of its people.

(*b*) Propaganda from foreign countries aimed at the country of concern denouncing its allies for imperialistic and expansionistic designs on that country.

(*c*) Demonstrations and violence in foreign countries against embassies, offices, and consulates of the country of concern and its allies.

(*d*) The spread of ideas that the government is corrupt and completely out of touch with the people.

(*e*) Agitation against existing or proposed government projects and plans.

(*f*) Rumors that the government is a pawn of a foreign government.

(*g*) Advocation of a popular front government including new parties unfamiliar to the people.

(*h*) Character assassinations of chief executives and their advisors.

(*i*) Movement to remove strong anti-insurgency leaders.

(*j*) Strikes or work stoppages called to protest government actions.

(3) *Against the military and police.*

(*a*) The spread of ideas that the military and police are corrupt and completely out of touch with the people.

(*b*) Character assassinations of military and police officials.

(*c*) Movement to remove strong anti-insurgency military and police leaders.

(*d*) Pleas to the people to stop cooperating with the military and police.

(*e*) Deliberate acts during demonstrations or strikes to provoke police reprisals.

(*f*) Accusations of police brutality or ineffectiveness or claims that government forces initiated violence when demonstrations end in riots.

(*g*) Publication of altered or misleading photographs purporting show repressive police practices.

(4) *Against the educational system.*

(*a*) Student unrest manifested by new organizations, proclamations, demonstrations, and strikes against authority.

(*b*) Charges by students and others that the educational system is not adequate and is only training youth to do the government's bidding.

(*c*) Appearance of questionable doctrine in the educational system.

(*d*) Clamor for key personnel changes in the educational system.

d. Commodity Indicators. In an insurgency that is both rural and urban, the primary function of the urban section is the financing and supplying of the movement. Not only will an effective intelligence operation that becomes conscious of commodity indicators be aware of the existence of the insurgency, but (of even greater importance) effective intelligence operations will enable the government forces to deny critical supplies to the insurgent movement.

(1) *Foods.*

(*a*) A scarcity of food supplies in the city when there is no report of natural impediments to agriculture, indicating that food is being diverted.

(*b*) In a country or province where there is a tolerated black market, a decline of foodstuffs at this source indicating that the food is being diverted.

(*c*) Sudden shortages of preserved foods or items of food requiring minimal storage facilities.

(*d*) The failure of farmers to transport their crops and meats to the city indicating a fear of travel on the highways.

(*e*) Large scale purchasing of foodstuffs on the market by sources not previously identified as wholesale buyers, possibly indicating purchasing agents for an insurgent movement.

(2) *Arms and ammunition.*

(*a*) Increase in assaults on police and military personnel accompanied by theft of weapons.

(*b*) Increase in thefts and purchases of arms, ammunition, and explosives.

and distribution of goods, which may denote that a subversive insurgency is operating in the area or is making preparation for future operations are—

(1) *Crops.*

(*a*) Diversion of crops from the market.

(*b*) Unexplained decrease in the production of a given crop.

(*c*) Increased reports of pilfering of foodstuffs.

(*d*) Strangers attempting to purchase crops or produce.

(*e*) Farmers marketing a crop that is smaller than usual, yet showing no signs of subsequent financial difficulty.

(*f*) Discovery of caches of staple foodstuffs.

(*g*) Fluctuation in crop prices indicating the existence of an insurgent taxing authority in the area.

(2) *Animals.*

(*a*) Diversion of meat from the market.

(*b*) Reports of loss of hides or diversion of hides from the market.

(*c*) Disappearance of wild game from an area in which it was previously plentiful.

(*d*) Disappearance of pack animals or the appearance of unusual numbers of pack animals in certain areas.

(3) *Arms and ammunition.*

(*a*) Increased loss of weapons by military and police forces.

(*b*) Increased pilferage of weapons.

(c) Discovery of arms caches.

(*d*) Unexplained attacks on patrols resulting in loss of weapons and ammunition.

(*e*) The above factors would not only be applied to actual weapons, but also to any similarly essential goods such as surplus army goods, vital machine parts, vehicles, and the like.

(4) *Clothing.*

(*a*) Unusual scarcity of any type of material that could be used for footwear. This would include such items as hides of animals and old tires in addition to manufactured footwear.

(*b*) Discovery of caches of clothing or of materials which may be used in the manufacture of clothing or uniforms.

(5) *Drugs.*

(*a*) Scarcity of herbs and plants used as drugs.

(*b*) Large scale purchasing or theft of drugs and of the herbs used in their manufacture.

(6) *Communications.*

(a) Increases in purchase and use of radios.

(*b*) Discovery of caches of communications equipment.

(*c*) Unusual increase in communications traffic in amateur radio operations.

e. An environment indicator could result from any manmade change, purposeful or accidental, in the natural environment. The first environment indicators should be apparent in the rural areas. The intelligence gathering network can be facilitated by the assignment of personnel to these areas who are thoroughly familiar with the terrain and who will be able to spot any physical dislocations resulting from any changes that have taken place. The following indicators may be apparent:

(1) Evidence of increased foot traffic in the area.

(2) Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas.

(3) Unexplained trails and cold campsites.

(4) Establishment of new, unexplained agricultural areas, or recently cleared fields.

(5) Unusual smoke, possibly indicating the presence of a campsite or a rudimentary form of communication.

(6) Concentration of dead foliage in an area; possible indication of camouflage.

(7) Presence of foot traps, spikes, and the like, in an area not noted for hunting.

(8) Presence of obstacles such as roadblocks and canal blocks.

E–3. Type Indicators of Urban Insurgent Activity

a. General. Urbanization entails the development of institutions and political processes peculiar to the city-state. These institutions and processes have always been a prime target for subversive insurgency. Indicators of urban insurgent activity will be placed in the four categories of population, propaganda, commodity, and environment indicators.

b. Population Indicators. Urban insurgent leadership is especially selected because of its ability and talent to persuade and manipulate people. This leadership operates initially in an absolute vaccum apart from the other sectors of society and in an atmosphere of intense security. Leadership training is conducted in absolute secrecy be-

cause at this point the insurgency is extremely vulnerable. It is rare that this urban insurgent elite reveals its activities intentionally or by mistake. But the insurgents must reach beyond themselves for growth. It is as a product of the resulting involvement with the public and the necessary popular recruiting to achieve this growth that the insurgency indicators appear.

(1) *General activity.*

(*a*) Increase in size of pro-insurgent oriented embassy or consulate staffs in country of concern.

(*b*) Increase in staff and activities in pro-insurgency oriented embassies or consulates in neighboring countries; including unusual patterns in nature of volume of external communications (both in-country and out-of-country).

(*c*) Increased travel by suspected subversives or other elements of the population to pro-insurgency oriented countries or to countries notably under insurgent influence.

(*d*) Influx of insurgent leaders, both foreign and domestic, into the urban area.

(*e*) Reports of locals being trained in pro-insurgency oriented countries.

(*f*) Increase in visitors from pro-insurgency oriented countries (tourists, technicians, businessmen, officials).

(*g*) Close connections between the diplomatic representatives of pro-insurgency oriented countries and the insurgents.

(*h*) Disappearance of known or suspected insurgents and dissident elements.

(*i*) Increase in insurgent youth gatherings.

(*j*) Hosting of trade fairs or increased attendance by locals.

(*k*) Return of nationals from travel or study in pro-insurgency oriented countries.

(*l*) Increase in visits to urban centers by rural officials and leaders from areas of unrest.

(*m*) Establishment of organizations (even very small) of unexplained origin and of unclear or nebulous aims.

(*n*) Establishment of a new organization to replace an existing organizational structure with identical aims.

(*o*) Appearance of many new members in established organizations such as labor unions.

(*p*) Attempts by new groups to obtain control of established organizations.

(*q*) Infiltration of student organizations and unions by known agitators.

(*r*) Appearance of new organizations with titles stressing patriotism, rectification of grievances, or interests of underprivileged or minority groups.

(*s*) Reports of large donations to new or revamped organizations.

(*t*) Reports of payments to locals for engaging in subversive activities.

(*u*) Reports of the formation of subversive paramilitary organizations.

(*v*) Gernade throwing and bombing.

(*w*) Reports of insurgent lists of targets for planned terroristic acts.

(*x*) Appearance of professional agitators in demonstrations that result in violence.

(*y*) Evidence of the participation of paid and armed demonstrators in riots.

(2) *Activity to gain the support of the people.*

(*a*) Reported incidents of attempted recruitment of people to join new movements or underground organizations.

(*b*) Unexplained unavailability of doctors, printers, and other specialists who may be working with and for the insurgents.

(*c*) Habitual criminals and formerly unruly youth who seem to be acting with new purpose.

(*d*) Increased unrest among laborers.

(*e*) Inability and/or refusal of people, who formerly paid taxes, to pay them now to the government.

(*f*) Reports of extortion and other coercion utilized by the insurgents to obtain financial "donations" from the people.

(*g*) Disappearance of young men from the city.

(3) *Activity against the government.*

(*a*) Failure of police and informant nets to report properly which would indicate sources of information are affiliating with the insurgents or are sufficiently afraid of them to preclude the passing of information.

(*b*) Decreasing success of government agents in infiltrating subversive organizations.

(*c*) Assassination or disappearance of government agents.

(*d*) Reports of increased attempts by insurgent representatives or suspected subversives to make contacts with local leaders or government officials.

(*e*) Reports of attempts to bribe or blackmail government and law enforcement employees.

(*f*) Reports of attempts to extract classified information from government officials or documents from government offices.

APPENDIX E
INSURGENT ACTIVITY INDICATORS

E–1. General

a. Anything that insurgents can do to influence and direct a society toward revolution will be reflected by some overt occurrence or indication, no matter how subtle the action. These occurrences and actions are referred to as insurgent activity indicators, and it is through recognition of them that the first clues to insurgent existence and evidence of the growth of the insurgent movement are obtained. There is a requirement to discover which of the various sociological, economic, political, and other activities are representative of insurgent activity.

b. No attempt is made in this appendix to develop an all-inclusive listing of insurgency indicators. Any attempt to do so would be unsuccessful simply because no one could list in sufficient detail the many possibilities, and combinations thereof, existing in the different nations of the world. Any such compilation must be specific and requires a detailed analysis of the particular country in question. The greater the perception of an insurgency situation within a particular country and the greater the knowledge of the type of insurgent involved, the easier it will be to identify the insurgent activity indicators which are applicable. This appendix will serve as a guide for the determination of insurgent indicators and assist the intelligence officer in developing similar clues to insurgent activity in a particular area. It is important to recognize that isolated actions of seemingly little significance in one frame of reference may show a pattern of an emerging insurgency when coordinated with reports of indicators from other areas. In developing new indicators or utilizing the suggested ones it must be remembered that the insurgent tactical approach is not fixed and is capable of sudden change. The insurgent threat can unfold along altogether different lines simultaneously or switch with suddenness from use of military force, for example, to a political offensive. Such a development is particularly dangerous in that it may make the general situation appear to be much less critical than it really is.

c. The development of appropriate indicators, together with the collection effort instituted to gather needed information, will not only indicate the existence of an insurgency or potential insurgent situation, but also the existence and magnitude of the problems and dissatisfaction of the people. The elimination or effective control of insurgency is predicated on the coordinated efforts of internal defense operational forces working with meaningful programs in their respective fields. Before these programs can be developed, the threat must be defined. The first step in the process of definition is the establishment of insurgent activity indicators.

E–2. Type Indicators of Rural Insurgent Activity

a. A rural area, for purposes of this appendix, includes all farming areas, any town or village up to 5,000 people, and any town or village up to 20,000 people with an agrarian based economy where the townspeople, if not engaged in farming, earn their livelihood in agricultural service industries. In areas such as these, where the interests are so interdependent, insurgency indicators would be similar in both the town and countryside. This is not to say that rural insurgency may not be directed by, and coordinated with, urban insurgency, but current Communist theoreticians emphasize that the key to success is the countryside and the rural population. In such cases the first insurgency indicators will be found in the rural areas where the subversive insurgents are concentrating their initial efforts.

b. During the development of a subversive insurgency, some of the first indicators of latent or incipient insurgency will appear in the rural areas. They will be recognized only by personnel sensitive to change who are intimately familiar with the area and the local conditions.

(1) *General activity.*

(*a*) Identification of insurgents, their supporters and sympathizers who suddenly appear in, or move out, of an area.

(*b*) New faces in the community.

(*c*) Unusual gatherings among the population.

(*d*) Disruption of normal social patterns.

(2) *Action taken to gain the support of the people.*

(*a*) Refusal of peasants to pay rent, taxes, or loan payments or unusual difficulty in their collection.

(*b*) Trend of hostility on the part of the local population toward government forces.

(*c*) Occurrence of actions considered taboo by the populace.

(*d*) Disappearance of the population from or avoidance by the people of certain areas.

(*e*) Unexplained disappearance or dislocation of young people.

(3) *Activity against the government.*

(*a*) Strangers attempting to join local security forces.

(*b*) Reports of the people being approached for purposes of intelligence recruitment.

(*c*) Unusual short absences of government employees.

(*d*) Failure of police and informant nets to report properly.

(*e*) Growth of general hostility toward the government.

(*f*) Unexplained destruction or loss of government identification papers or passports and increased forgeries thereof.

(*g*) Closing of rural schools.

(*h*) Murder and kidnapping of local government officials.

c. Propaganda indicators of an existing insurgency should be apparent in every society. The extent of the propaganda usually provides an indication of the phase of insurgency a country is experiencing. The following indicators are not intended to serve as a complete listing of possibilities, but should serve as a guide and an aid in recognizing the existence of similar indicators.

(1) *General propaganda indicators.*

(*a*) Dissident propaganda from unidentified sources.

(*b*) Increase in the number of entertainers with a political message.

(c) Intensification of religious unrest.

(*d*) Increased agitation on issues for which there is no known reform movement or organization.

(*e*) Increased activity by insurgent organizations thought to be dormant.

(*f*) Circulation of petitions advocating standard insurgent demands.

(*g*) Reports from other countries that the country is ripe for revolution.

(2) *Directed against the established government.*

(*a*) Discrediting attacks causing embarrassment and ridicule of national or public officials.

(*b*) Discrediting the judicial system and police organizations.

(*c*) Characterization of government leaders as puppets and tools of a foreign government.

(*d*) Movement to remove strong anti-insurgency leaders.

(*e*) Agitation against long-term government projects and plans.

(*f*) Rumors resulting in public acceptance of untruths about the government or governmental leaders.

(*g*) Advocacy of a popular front government.

(3) *Directed against the national military forces.*

(*a*) Attacks to embarrass or ridicular military officials.

(*b*) Characterization of military leaders as puppets and tools of a foreign government.

(*c*) Movement to remove strong anti-insurgency leaders from the military.

(*d*) Exhortations to youths to refrain from joining the military service or similar exhortations to soldiers to desert with the resultant rise in the number of AWOL or a decline in the enlistment rate.

(*e*) Characterization of the armed forces as the enemy of the people.

(*f*) Civilian avoidance of and failure to cooperate with the military.

(4) *Directed against the educational system.*

(*a*) Appearance of questionable doctrine in the educational system.

(*b*) Charges by students and others that the educational system is not adequate and is only training the youth of the nation to do the government's bidding.

d. Commodity indicators deviating from the normal pattern in the manufacture, processing

(Classification)

c. Insurgent vulnerabilities. (Lists exploitable insurgent vulnerabilities.)

/s/_____
G2/S2

(Commander if distributed outside headquarters)

ANNEXES:
Distribution: (If distributed only.)
Authentication: (G2/S2 authenticates if commander signs estimate.)

(Classification)

APPENDIX D

FORMAT OF AN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

(Classification)

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Preparing Staff Element
Organization
Location
Date/Time Group

References: Maps, Charts, or other Documents.

1. MISSION. (States the current or proposed mission of the force designated for stability operations.)

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. (This paragraph discusses characteristics of the host country, the area, and their probable effect upon both insurgent and government courses of action.)

a. Geography. (Includes climate and topography.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.

b. Politics. (Includes governmental organization, political parties, and interest groups.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.

c. Economy. (Includes private enterprise and public facilities.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.

d. Sociology. (Includes minority groups and social programs.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.

e. Psychology. (Includes behavior patterns and motivating factors.)
(1) Existing situation.
(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.
(3) Effect on government courses of action.

3. THE INSURGENT SITUATION. (This paragraph discusses the insurgent organization and its activities.)

a. Organization and Leadership. (Includes composition.)
(1) Nonmilitary. (Includes the underground.)

(Classification)

(Classification)

(2) Military. (Includes all insurgent armed elements.)

b. Strength and Disposition.

(1) Nonmilitary.

(2) Military.

c. Recent and Present Significant Activities.

(1) Nonviolent action. (Includes political, economic, sociological, and psychological action.)

(2) Terrorist action. (Includes murder, torture, extortion, kidnapping, and sabotage.)

(3) Guerrilla operations. (Includes harassment, destruction, interdiction, and dispersion.)

(4) Conventional tactical operations. (Includes attack, defense, delay, and withdrawal.)

d. Strengths and Weaknesses.

(1) Recruitment and retention.

(2) Intelligence and security.

(3) Organization and training.

(4) Finance and logistics.

(5) Communications.

4. INSURGENT CAPABILITIES. (This paragraph lists current insurgent capabilities and discusses them in regard to probability of adoption.)

a. Enumeration. (Includes what, where, when, and how for each capability.)

(1) Basic capabilities.

(*a*) Nonviolent action.

(*b*) Terrorist action.

(*c*) Guerrilla operations.

(*d*) Conventional tactical operations.

(*e*) Employment of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

(2) Supporting Capabilities.

(*a*) Intelligence and security.

(*b*) Recruitment and retention.

(*c*) Organization and training.

(*d*) Finance and logistics.

(*e*) Reinforcement capabilities.

b. Analysis and Discussion. (Includes all evidence supporting or rejecting the adoption of each capability.)

5. CONCLUSIONS. (This paragraph draws conclusions from the content of the preceding paragraphs and furnishes a basis for selection of courses of action to accomplish the assigned mission.)

a. Effects of the operational environment. (States the total effect of the area of operations upon courses of action.)

b. Probable insurgent courses of action. (Lists probable insurgent courses of action in order of relative probability of adoption.)

(Classification)

CHAPTER 10

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS

The contents of this chapter, which deals with doctrine in the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), appears in FM 30–31A, a supplement to this manual.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Section I. GENERAL

1–1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual, together with its SECRET NOFORN classified supplement FM 30–31A, provides guidance on doctrine tactics, and techniques for intelligence support to U.S. Army stability operations in the internal defense environment. Its intended use is for commanders, staff officers, and intelligence specialists. It is applicable to major commands and subordinate units and will serve as guidance for intelligence planning, training, and operations (unilateral and combined).

b. This manual is concerned primarily with intelligence requirements in support of U.S. Army stability operations; however, it also has application to U.S. internal defense and development assistance operations where U.S. personnel advise, assist, and train host country (HC) military intelligence personnel. For this reason, the scope is not limited entirely to stability operations but includes a description of the overall internal defense intelligence system, its management, and its unique aspects of operations in the internal defense environment, including those involving collection and production agencies. A discussion of intelligence training requirements for stability operations and a proposed intelligence training program also have been incorporated in this manual.

c. The contents of this manual are based on the broad guidance and doctrine found in FM 100–20, FM 31–22, and FM 31–23. The manual applies primarily to Army force employment in the internal defense and internal development operational environment. FM 30–5 contains the established conventional intelligence doctrine for—

(1) Nuclear and nonnuclear environments.

(2) Chemical, biological, and radiological environments.

d. Guidance on doctrine, tactics, and techniques for intelligence interrogation, counterintelligence operations, and aerial surveillance and reconnaissance operations in support of stability operations in the internal defense environment is contained in FM 30–15, FM 30–17, FM 30–20, and FM 32–10.

1–2. Changes

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes and comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219.

1–3. Definitions

The terminology used in this manual to discuss the internal defense environment and its intelligence aspects is consistent with internal defense terminology contained in AR 310–25 and FM 31–23.

Section II. BACKGROUND

1–4. General

a. Recent history has been characterized by the occurrence of a hundred or more insurgencies. These insurgencies usually have taken place in developing nations as a result of World War II or in nations newly formed from colonial possessions. Frequently, such insurgencies have been Communist inspired or have become subversive in nature as Communist elements manage to gain control of the movement and its leadership and exploit the movement for their own purposes. Any forecast of the future must consider the probable fur-

ther spread of insurgencies among other newly-emerging and developing nations of the world which are seeking to achieve the status of self-respecting and viable members of the international community.

b. Insurgencies usually develop when discontent among the population of a country is not alleviated by appropriate government action. Governments, perhaps unwittingly, may not respond to such discontent in time to prevent their development into real or imagined grievances. Skillful agitators may capitalize on existing conditions and develop grievances when none originally existed. With organization and leadership, growing discontent with existing conditions within a country develops into insurgency.

c. Communist movements use insurgency as a tool to achieve power by the use of military, political, economic, sociological, and psychological means in an integrated attack on weak governments in less-developed countries. Subversive insurgency (so-called "wars of liberation") must be properly recognized as a major form of politico/military conflict requiring at least the same attention and effort as limited and general warfare. The main objectives of insurgencies are the control of the people and the destruction and replacement of the existing government. A combination of persuasion and terror is used to gain control of the people while the government is destroyed by subversion, sabotage, and, if necessary, armed conflict.

1–5. United States Policy

a. United States foreign policy has long viewed an international community of independent, stable, peaceful, progressive, and free nations as the best guarantee of its own security. For this reason the United States Government has undertaken to assist, upon request, certain newly-emerging nations in their development toward political stability and economic and social progress. Many of these nations, however, are confronted with latent, incipient, or active insurgencies which inhibit their national growth and often threaten their very existence. Such nations seek and receive internal defense and development assistance from the United States and other allies to protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency as well as to free them from conditions which foster this unrest and instability.

b. In response to requests for internal defense and development assistance, the United States provides a wide range of help through its various governmental, civilian, and military agencies. The U.S. Army contributes men and resources for stability operations in support of U.S. national internal defense assistance objectives. These U.S. Army resources may vary from provision of a few selected advisors to provision of major combat forces.

c. Internal defense involves all measures taken by a government and its allies to free its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. While these measures will most probably involve some form of military participation, internal defense is not purely a military operation. Political, economic, and sociological factors influence military operations at all levels. Consequently, all U.S. military intelligence personnel and agencies and their host country counterparts are confronted with many intelligence tasks which must be accomplished if stability operations are to make a valuable contribution to the success of the overall internal defense and development effort.

1–6. The Nature of Insurgency

a. General. In order to contribute to the destruction of insurgency, the military intelligence staff officer and specialist must have a thorough understanding of the evolutionary development of insurgent movements. While the nature of insurgencies varies in some respects from country to country, certain patterns and similarities have been discerned. Three frequently overlapping phases have been utilized as an aid in analyzing insurgencies. They are discussed in *b* through *d* below.

b. Phase I: Subversion.

(1) Phase I insurgency varies from situations in which subversive activity is only a potential threat to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with rising frequency in an organized pattern. No major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity occurs during this phase. The beginnings of an insurgency are difficult to recognize. Insurgent activities may appear as one of many legitimate party activities or movements such as loyal opposition or social or religious reform. However, during this development period, when forces of the movement are few, resources limited, and organization and leadership uncertain, the insurgency is most susceptible to counteraction. Although each particular

CHAPTER 2
THE ENVIRONMENT

Section I. THE INSURGENT ARMED ELEMENTS

2–1. General

a. The insurgent enemy is likely to be poorly educated and a part of the underprivileged group of a nation. The low standard of living to which he is accustomed has adapted him to privations. Although he can be well trained and disciplined, he will normally require strong leadership and supervision. He is intimately familiar with the terrain on which he fights and has learned to use it to his best advantage. His knowledge of the area and its people, together with his skill at melding into his surroundings generally keeps him from having to fight pitched battles. He is almost always a native of the country, and he generally relies on the populace for supplies, information, and other support. Outwardly, he is usually indistinguishable from the populace; he has the potential of hiding his weapon and melding into his environment.

b. The insurgent's tactics emphasize a "hit-and-run" technique; he masses sufficiently to insure success, hits his target where least expected, and disperses immediately thereafter. The insurgent relies on flexibility and the use of surprise to compensate for his lack of numbers, training, and equipment. His tactical doctrine demands that the initiative be maintained. The insurgent doctrine further requires that his intelligence be comprehensive and accurate, for intelligence is considered the key to success over any adversary. If unexpected resistance is encountered during an operation, the mission is aborted and foreseeable defeat precluded. Movement normally is accomplished during the hours of darkness or during other conditions of poor visibility. The insurgent keeps his operations simple, thus reducing considerably the burdens of administration and logistics.

c. The insurgent often is highly motivated because of the intensive and continual political indoctrination he receives which promises relief from real or imagined grievances and injustices. If the insurgent's tactics are successful, his morale will remain at a relatively high level, particularly in the early phases of an insurgency. The insurgent may or may not be a Communist. The nature or directions of the insurgent cause may or may not reflect a connection with a Communist cause. In some cases the individual insurgent may not even know that the Communists are supporting his flight for their own purposes.

d. The individual insurgent is distinguished chiefly by his skill at his own sort of fighting, his superb knowledge of the environment in which he lives and fights, and his devotion to the insurgent ideal or cause. It must be remembered, however, that any generalities made concerning the insurgents will vary with the state or degree of education, training, organization, equipment, and leadership which exists in the country concerned. Insurgent regular force units may be introduced into the conflict in the late Phase II or early Phase III stages of the insurgency. The organization and mission of these forces may closely approximate the characteristic of conventional forces.

2–2. Organization

a. At the heart of some insurgency movements, a tightly disciplined party organization may be found (see app B), structured to parallel the existing governmental organizations. In most instances this structure will consist of committee organizations at levels paralleling the existing legitimate political structure. Intermediate echelons may be deleted from the party structure of the party leadership believes that it can adequately supervise and coordinate the activities of subordinate committees from a national level.

b. During a latent insurgency, the demands placed upon a typical party, so far as administration and tactical adaptability are concerned, warrant a relatively simple internal political organization. The party organization could consist of little more than the committee system itself, plus such

agencies or specialized personnel as might be required for intelligence collection, agitation, propaganda, and occasional strong-arm activities. As the insurgency develops, however, the need to establish a mass civil organization and a military force dictates the creation of new echelons of authority and new organizations to accommodate them. Details concerning a type insurgent organization can be found in appendix B.

2-3. Command and Staff

a. The insurgent military organization is austere and its structure simple. An actual physical installation for a headquarters may be nonexistent or of the most primitive type. The headquarters personnel often fight alongside the rank and file of the military force. The staff structure is often informal, but individuals within the force are assigned to perform roughly the same functions required of any military staff. Differences between staff functions necessary in insurgent force organizations and conventional force organizations generally are as follows:

(1) Insurgents carry on few personnel functions—the only two which receive any significant emphasis are recruitment and replacement. Personnel records, if kept at all, are sketchy, and required administration is conducted informally. The insurgent personnel functions dealing with discipline, law and order, and morale are politically oriented.

(2) The intelligence function, on the other hand, receives even more attention in insurgent units than in many conventional military units. This is due to the clandestine, conspiratorial way in which insurgents must live and operate.

(3) Insurgent planning encompasses far more than tactical planning. Even at local levels the party chapter maintains formalized sections dealing with long-range interests, such as youth affairs, agriculture, civilian proselyting, and materiel procurement. General, long-range strategic planning usually is performed by the secret directing apparatus. The results of this long-range planning usually come down to the individual insurgent force in the form of written orders. Operations are characterized by surprise, swift attack, and rapid dispersal, and usually occur under conditions of reduced visibility. Much of the tactical training takes place during actual operations, but considerable attention is given at small unit level to pre-attack rehearsals. Ideological indoctrination receives a high degree of emphasis whenever the insurgents reach a relatively safe position.

(4) Insurgent military forces have a much less complex supply and logistical system than conventional forces. When the insurgents are supplied through clandestine channels, the supply problem may be complicated by the need for security; however, supply operations are made as simple as possible. Insurgent military forces rely on the people for logistical support and also obtain supplies or equipment by successful attacks on governmest forces or from external support provided by a sponsoring power.

(5) Insurgents may have an immediate and near total dependence on close and continuous contact with the population. Winning population support is the key to success or failure of an insurgency. Civilian proselyting sections or equivalent organizational elements are continually engaged in extensive political activities.

(6) Special staff activities of the insurgent armed elements can range from the austere to the complex. While medical care is often scarce and primitive, extensive field hospital facilities may still be found. Construction is kept simple and avoided when possible. It is possible, however, that the insurgents will establish vast tunnel networks and underground facilities. Other insurgent activities may be highly sophisticated. Financing, for example, can attain a degree of complexity that includes formal taxation, issuance of war bonds, and the printing of money.

(7) Insurgent communication will vary from the use of couriers to modern radios. The communication nets will be relatively simple in operations and procedures in the initial stages of insurgency. Subsequent stages normally will evidence more sophistication.

b. Leadership in an insurgency movement stems from the degree of loyalty to the movement. One of the greatest advantages possessed by the insurgents is their well-qualified key leadership which is often provided by foreign powers for operations in the specific insurgency being developed. When a recognized major insurgent force leader lacks a military background, a sponsoring power may infiltrate qualified personnel to serve as his military and technical advisors. By so doing, the military capabilities of the insurgent force are exploited effectively without destroying the command structure of the established organization. Replacement of local leadership with personnel from outside the area, however, may create exploitable morale and disciplinary problems. Often, promising native leadership candidates are recruited, trained over extended periods of time, and then returned to

means. Since climatic conditions vary from nation to nation, area handbooks and USAF Air Weather Service reports should be consulted to determine the details of weather and climate extremes which will affect the employment of U.S. forces and planning assistance programs to the host country.

Section III. TERRAIN

2–8. General

a. Insurgent forces exploit the geographical, as well as political, sociological, economic, and psychological conditions of the environment. Often the terrain is rugged and difficult to negotiate. Inaccessible mountains, swamp areas, rain forests, or uncharted wastelands affect internal development as well as military operations. Communications and transport systems in most developing nations rarely are equal to the requirements of internal defense and development operations.

b. A host country may contain a wide variety of terrain features. Operations must be conducted in areas which vary from high mountain ranges to inundated areas, from desert to thick jungles and rain forests, and from relatively open plains to rugged mountain ranges. The terrain in each area presents significantly different problems in supply, transportation, maintenance, medical support, and other logistical services.

c. Increased efforts to obtain complete intelligence, to habitually employ forces in the same area, and to integrate assistance activities into the activities of the population are required to gain and maintain familiarity with the area.

d. Particularly in the early phases of an insurgency terrain objectives are rarely selected to seize and hold as in conventional operations. The same terrain may be the site of battle over and over again. *The population, not terrain, is the objective of most internal defense and development operations.* When population centers are seized, every effort must be made to secure them so that the insurgents cannot resume or continue insurgent activities.

2–9. Considerations

Terrain characteristics which must be considered during stability operations planning include the following:

a. Dense jungle with undergrowth and canopy overgrowth reduces ground vehicular mobility, adversely affects aircraft operations, and provides concealment for insurgent forces from ground and aerial observation and cover from superior firepower. In order to attack the insurgent effectively, friendly forces have a heavier burden of finding and fixing the insurgent than in conventional warfare. The navigation of observation or reconnaissance aircraft to target areas will be difficult. The determination of the geographical location of detected targets also will be difficult.

b. Swampland, river deltas, and valleys which are flooded during the rainy season, and dense networks of rice paddies in river valleys and lowland areas may be difficult to traverse. Canals and rivers are the "roads" and "highways" of this type of area.

c. Hot and extremely humid weather may weaken personnel and have an adverse effect on materiel.

d. Poor trafficability for vehicles and heavy weapons which limits cross-country movement may prohibit or severely reduce the use of sophisticated equipment. Limited roads and terrain approaches may also channelize trucks and tracked equipment.

e. Terrain and atmospheric conditions may limit radio communications.

f. Mountainous terrain with rain forest type vegetation may prevent ready accessibility to an area.

g. Health hazards, such as malaria, dysentery, parasitic infections, and others may weaken personnel.

h. Hot, dry climates in desert areas may also have weakened effects on personnel and present serious problems in equipment maintenance.

i. The vegetation of an area may not only provide concealment and cover to the insurgent, but, together with the animal life, increase the ability of the insurgent to live off the land.

Section IV. PEOPLE

2-10. General

a. Control of the populace is a primary aim of insurgent organizations, for once this is accomplished, the government usually will fall. Conversely, government internal defense effort have the purpose of separating and protecting people from the insurgent. The success or failure of an insurgency depends substantially upon the attitude of the population. The possible effect on the people of any action must be carefully assessed and "immediate" gain versus "long-term" loss evaluated.

b. Subversive insurgent organizations exploit the discontent of the population. Thus, it may be said that insurgency arises from the people. Because of this identity factor, even the organized cadres of full-time military and paramilitary insurgent units are able to blend into the population when necessary.

c. Insurgent activities—including terrorism, sabotage, subversion, espionage, raids, and ambushes —are conducted by the insurgent from within the structure of society. For this reason, detailed knowledge of the population in an insurgency area is a definite requirement in order to analyze and evaluate insurgent activity.

d. Because some governments in areas afflicted with insurgency are new and undergoing rapid change, there is often little sense in a mutual national identity between the government and the population. There is seldom a national tradition or heritage to act as a unifying force. It is necessary, therefore, that a strong and proud national identity be quickly developed to provide a cohesive force for unifying the government and the population. Governments seek to accomplish this by implementing measures that will develop political and social cohesion and demonstrate economic progress. Civil affairs operations and psychological operations in support of this objective are important aspects of stability operations.

2-11. Considerations

a. The developing nations are undergoing the rapid changes associated with modernization. The process is often a source of tension. The people who resent the loss of traditional ways and values may become alientated from the government. Those portions of the population, not benefited by the change, envy those of the same element within the population who are benefited. The upper strata of society who anticipate loss of status may resent the new developments. Segments of society which favor change in a different manner, or by different processes than those proposed or accomplished, may press for their own programs. For these reasons, while the national government process brings the promise of eventual internal peace and a common national identity, its short-term impacts usually involve the further increase of internal pressures. The potential for insurgency lies in these dissatisfactions and grievances.

b. People residing in sparsely settled areas are strongly influenced by their immediate environments—such factors as family relationships and factors related to obtaining food, clothing, and shelter.

c. The racial stock and physical characteristics of the population of an area are important considerations. A tendency exists among the populations of developing nations to fear and distrust persons who are not of their own race.

d. Ethnic groups, especially those constituting minority factions, are of prime consideration. Ethnic groups may be either a source of discontent or of major assistance depending upon the amount of discrimination or persecution which exists. Where the antagonism between the government and minority faction is not immediately reconcilable, the U.S. or allied forces may provide advisory elements to neutralize or assist in gaining the support of these groups. However, the ultimate solution to this complex problem must be a lasting reconciliation between the government and minority groups.

e. The introduction of large numbers of military and civilian assistance personnel from the United States and allied nations may create additional social and economic problems and antagonisms.

f. Some developing nations are reaching, or have gone beyond, the population saturation point. Many of these nations cannot feed, clothe, employ, or otherwise satisfy even the basic subsistence needs of their populations. Compounding this problem is the fact that the economic growth rate normally does not keep pace with the rate of population increase.

g. The population saturation point may occur in certain geographical areas within a developing

for civil affairs operations, intelligence operations, and psychological operations. These advisors will have some requirements in common in the six intelligence subject areas; however, each will have his own special interest which must be met by operational intelligence. Intelligence advisors must continually bear in mind that their status may shift at any time from primarily an advisory to a basic operational role, and that their basic intelligence requirements will increase accordingly. Thus, even though there may be no current indications of such a shift in their status and its accompanying requirements, their efforts concerning buildup of the documentary data base should be shaped around that eventuality.

5–8. Phase II

a. Intelligence requirements generated at the initiation of the military assistance program for the use of advisors will continue to be applicable as U.S. military efforts are expanded during Phase II. The U.S. military assistance program may be greatly enlarged with more effort at the provincial and lower level of the host country. U.S. Army support units may be committed in Phase II to provide direct technical and specialized assistance to host country military forces. Army aircraft, communication, transportation, ordnance, and medical units are examples of such support. U.S. Army combat units may also be committed in the later stages of Phase II.

b. In the determination of operational intelligence requirements for the Army forces during this period, a significant factor is that the U.S. Army may become involved in some capacity in all five of the major missions associated with stability operations. Requirements may include combat intelligence for tactical operations against the insurgent forces and intelligence to support all operations in the other four missions—civil (to include populace and resources control), intelligence, advisory assistance, and psychological operations which are conducted concurrently with tactical operations.

c. Tactical requirements are concerned with finding, fixing, and destroying the insurgent armed forces. FM 31–16 considers the specific requirements for these operations in great detail. Intelligence requirements for combat support and combat service support units participating in the tactical counterguerrilla effort are adequately established in appropriate field manuals. The combat intelligence requirements for tactical operations in an insurgent war differ little from those of other types of warfare. However, it is the requirement for the other Army missions directly associated with stabilty operations which are distinct in counterinsurgency operations. As part of the stability operations effort during Phase II, intelligence units, psychological operation units, and troops engaged wholly or in part in civil affairs to include populace and resources control operations may be committed. This requires detailed, comprehensive, and current data concerning the six subject intelligence areas (qara 5–3*b*). With the involvement of U.S. combat units, the entire Army intelligence support capability—to include interrogation, order of battle, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, technical intelligence, aerial and ground battlefield surveillance, signal intelligence, and long-range patrols—becomes active.

5–9. Phase III

a. U.S. Army participation in Phase III may involve only support personnel and units, or it may involve combat forces in tactical operations. With such involvement it can be expected that the entire spectrum of stability operations missions will be encountered. Where U.S. buildup is gradual from the initial phase into Phase III of an insurgency, the intelligence requirements for Phase I and Phase II will have been formulated based on advisory and support needs. In such a situation the involvement of Army units in support of host country military forces will have little effect on requirements, except for an obvious increase in the collection-production resources. Where Army involvement begins with little or no advance warning or buildup, an intelligence program to support all missions, tactical and nation building, will be required immediately. Tactical intelligence requirements in Phase II should be expanded to meet the expected larger insurgent force structure.

b. During Phase III, U.S. Army intelligence staffs, specialists, and units will be helping to provide all tactical and nontactical stability operations intelligence needs. Working in coordination with host country and other U.S. and allied intelligence agencies, U.S. Army intelligence will collect, process, and disseminate current and detailed intelligence necessary to support tactical, civil affairs, intelligence, and psychological operations on a continual basis.

c. As discussed in paragraph 6–2, combined mil-

itary intelligence operations with the host country are by far the most effective in stability operations. (Details on combined collection and counterintelligence operations are contained in the classified supplement, FM 30–31A.) Early development of such combined operations should lead to the establishment of combined intelligence production centers during Phase III at both national and subnational levels. Additionally, establishment of the following types of combined intelligence facilities will assist in a fully coordinated effort to exploit all available intelligence assets:

(1) Interrogation Center (for details, see FM 30–15).

(2) Document Exploitation Center (for details, see FM 30–15).

(3) Materiel Exploitation Center (for details, see FM 30–16).

(4) Imagery Interpretation Center (for details, see FM 30–20).

intelligence collection plan. Further, he closely coordinates with sources of information other than intelligence collection agencies. This coordination includes operations and fire support coordinator personnel, host country civilian, paramilitary and military personnel, and other U.S. military and civilian organizations and agencies in-country.

Section II. GROUND SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

8–5. General

a. Ground surveillance integrates all available means of surveillance (both human and mechanical) to cover the area of interest. Mechanical surveillance devices are employed to take advantage of their all-weather, day-and-night capability.

b. Ground reconnaissance utilizes most of the same human and mechanical means as ground surveillance. However, in reconnaissance these means are directed specifically where to look and for what to look. Reconnaissance missions collect in response to specific EEI or OIR; surveillance missions have a much broader scope.

8–6. Agencies

a. Combat Units. Ground surveillance and reconnaissance is part of the mission of all units to be accomplished as part of the normal unit SOP or as a result of the commander's specific intelligence needs. Effective ground surveillance and reconnaissance in stability operations is more difficult to provide because units frequently fight in relative isolation without flank support. (For details on the role of armor and infantry units in reconnaissance and security operations, see FM 31–16, FM 17–1 and FM 7–20.)

b. Patrols.

(1) Patrolling is of paramount importance in stability operations. Regardless of the type of patrol or mission assigned, the collection and reporting of intelligence information is a continuing responsibility for all patrols. Combat patrols as well as reconnaissance patrols should be trained to observe and report negative as well as positive evidence of past or present enemy activity; newly developed trails; vacated assembly areas; locations of fortified and boobytrapped areas; cache sites, whether active or not; current effects of weather on terrain; trafficability and the location of potential landing zones and drop zones. Patrol training should place emphasis on the detection and attack of enemy ambushes, the detection and disarming of boobytraps, knowledge of insurgent delaying devices, the use of deception and knowledge of enemy deception practices, tracking techniques, and procedures for calling for fire support.

(2) Patrolling in stability operations involves much more than just looking for the enemy. It also involves making contact with the people who inhabit the area of interest. Patrols will be required also to contact local police, village chiefs, and friendly paramilitary units as part of their missions. They must be able to observe and report on those items of intelligence interest enumerated in paragraph 8–2. Contact with civilians may require that patrols include linguists. When available, qualified U.S. military linguists can be used; however, often this type of personnel will not be available for everyday operations. In that case maximum utilization should be made of host country soldiers who are proficient in the English language and have been fully cross-trained in all aspects of insurgency patrolling procedures.

(3) Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP), operating under the staff supervision of the G2, make important contributions to the ground surveillance and reconnaissance plan by reporting information concerning remote portions of the area of interest. Insurgency terrain inaccessible to other target acquisition means can be exploited to some degree by LRRP. Indigenous LRRP, clothed and armed like the insurgents, are dispatched to work close to or among insurgent troops. Indigenous LRRP are requested on a support or attachment basis and should be under the operational control of the commander requesting them. In stability operations this is at a tactical level lower than those of other types of war. LRRP units should be formed and commence operation in Phase I. The number of LRRP should be increased as necessary in Phases II and III to satisfy requirements of U.S. major tactical units.

c. Other Sources. Other intelligence sources furnish excellent ground surveillance and reconnaissance support. They assist in gathering information for future requirements as well as make available information already in their possession which may be of value. Among other intelligence sources are—

(1) Counterintelligence units that provide a good source of contact with local civilians and investigate suspicious activity that occurs both

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inside military areas and within civilian communities. They also maintain files on people and organizations that may serve as further contacts for ground reconnaissance elements.

(2) Agent operations which provide a source of information from within the enemy area. Often agents penetrate an area and gather information not otherwise available to any form of overt action or which could only be procured by indigenous personnel.

(3) Interrogation efforts by interrogation sections on prisoners, suspects, defectors, and refugees that can produce much new information or can assist in confirming or refuting information gathered from other sources.

(4) Stay-behind units that can pick up contact with insurgent forces, maintain that contact, and furnish scheduled reports of their sightings. Stay-behind units are capable of remaining in contact for long periods of time, and the information they furnish has a very high degree of reliability.

(5) Technical intelligence specialists and document translators both of which offer valuable information gathered from enemy documents and materiel. Many items brought back from reconnaissance patrols will furnish additional information once it has been identified and analyzed by one of these specialists.

(6) Recovered U.S. personnel can provide very valid information when properly debriefed by intelligence personnel. The fact that he speaks English, has been trained to observe and retain information of intelligence value, and has physically passed through insurgent territory, makes the U.S. returnee an excellent source.

(7) Communications intelligence resources can provide an all-weather, day and night surveillance of enemy communications.

d. Specialized Organizations. There are other specialized organizations that can furnish assistance in gathering information. While their primary mission is not intelligence, their operations do put them in a position where they have a lot of information available. Some of these organizations are—

(1) Special Forces units in-country which are strategically located astride LOC, adjacent to border crossing points, and near identified or suspect insurgent areas of operations. They usually are placed within or adjacent to civilian occupied areas. One of their major missions is to advise indigenous troops on patrols and combat operations within their local area. Constant contact with the land, its people, and the various insurgent forces makes these units a lucrative source of current intelligence information.

(2) U.S. aid-type missions that provide assistance to the indigenous personnel of an area. These organizations have contact with all types of civilians at each level down to the local village and hamlet. Their own personnel are actively engaged in travel around the country. Their reference material, contacts, and personnel all provide a vast amount of useful information.

(3) The host country government has many of its own sources of information. The most important of these sources are those which extend through all echelons of the governmental structure. The major organizations in this category include host country military and paramilitary forces, civilian police, local governmental organizations, and religious groups.

8–7. Planning Considerations

a. Frontlines and secure rear areas usually are not established during stability operations. Tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) are assigned to units within which a base camp is established and permanent responsibility for military control and security is assigned. All terrain within the TAOR cannot be physically occupied due to the vast size of the area involved. As an alternative to physical occupation of the ground, aggressive ground surveillance and reconnaissance must be utilized to effect security.

b. For military operations outside of a unit's TAOR an area of operation (AO) is assigned, usually at some distance from the TAOR. A unit moves into an AO on a temporary basis to conduct tactical operations. Once these operations are accomplished, participating units return to their TAOR or depart directly to a new AO for further operations; however, even when physically separated from their TAOR, units remain responsible for their security.

c. Security for a TAOR or AO requires all-around coverage, mostly by visual observation and patrolling especially during periods of reduced visibility. Special sensors and mechanical devices, such as ground surveillance radars, anti-intrusion devices, night vision scopes, and searchlights can complement this effort, but all such equipment has certain limitations, the most common of which is the requirement for ground line-of-sight. Ground surveillance plans will require the coordination and employment of all available surveillance

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